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Coalition problems in e-markets attract attention from the research communities and 
industry. This research focuses on e-trading models relating to online coalitions. A new 
Core Broking Model (CBM), for online group-trading is presented. This aims not only to 
bring lower prices for buyers but also to create higher profits for providers. 
The survey of current online shopping sites in this thesis shows that it is almost 
impossible to find a site designed specifically for group-trading, although there are plenty 
of joint-selling activities and also many online group-buying sites. The former increases 
competitive advantages and benefits providers. However it allows cartels to take control 
of price and to disadvantage customers. Recently, the latter have become very popular. 
The major problem of these models is that they lack the ability to deal with the stability 
issue in coalitions, which therefore fall apart easily. The core, a concept from economics, 
provides solutions to ensure a stable coalition (Gillies 1953), but its certain problems 
have hindered researchers from applying it to a real-world market. 
Building an online group-trading model is essential. Developing such a new model for 
e-markets can be a real challenge. Three factors, namely (a) incentive compatibility, (b) 
distributed computing, and (c) less computational complexity, all have to be considered at 
the same time. The new model is based on the core and adopts some other solution 
concepts to resolve group-trading problems in e-markets. It involves bundle selling of 
multiple goods from several providers, offering volume discounts to many different 
buyers in group-buying on e-marketplaces. 
The CBM successfully creates a win-win-win situation for customers, providers and 
brokers in e-markets. The comparison between the results of the new model and the core 
shows the CBM is superior to the core in terms of the three factors mentioned above. The 
results of the simulation presented in this thesis demonstrate that the CBM can attract 
customers and deal with online group-trading problems in a large coalition. An extensive 
evaluation of the techniques in the CBM has been made and shows that all of them 
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The purpose of this research is to propose and test a new model for online group-
trading, which includes joint-selling and group-buying. When buyers and sellers get 
together to work out deals, they are forming a coalition. This is usually an effective way 
to achieve traders’ goals. Research shows that goals are more easily obtained in larger 
coalitions, and that it is simple to form these globally on the Internet (Kauffman and 
Wang 2001). 
Developing such a model can be a real challenge, since many practical problems have 
to be solved. When forming coalitions in e-markets, further issues have to be tackled, in 
comparison with traditional commerce. In section 1.1, those factors that must be 
considered in the model are explained. The background of current e-markets and the 
motivation of this research are given in section 1.2. The aim and objectives of research 
are in section 1.3. Developing a workable model for this research was a complicated 
process which touched a lot of different disciplines. As a result, appropriate 
methodological approaches are needed in order to produce quality outputs. In section 1.4, 
a methodology used to develop the new model is given. At the end of the chapter, the 
structure of the thesis is listed. 
1.1 Challenges for Designing Coalition Models in E-Markets 
Concepts and algorithms for coalition formation have been investigated. These 
research domains have been extensively studied in both economics and computer science 
(Moulin 1995, Sandholm 1999), but the two have approached the topic very differently. 
The economics literature traditionally stresses the incentives of each selfish participant in 
coalitions (Green and Laffont 1979). Since the participants are self-interested they will 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
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join a coalition only when they are better off in it (Shehory and Kraus 1999). The 
motivation of all participants in joining a coalition, whatever their roles, has to be taken 
into account. Therefore, just as in non-cooperative games, all the details of moves 
available for participants have to be considered. Thus in addition to the issue of the 
coalition structure, researchers need to consider the incentives for each selfish player. 
In real-world e-markets it is not force but incentive that makes people join a coalition. 
Self-interested participants will join coalitions only if they gain more than they could 
previously. In other words, consumers and providers are free to join and leave a coalition 
at any point of time. It is certainly essential for designers to give as many incentives as 
possible to participants in their coalition models, but trying to determine whether any 
incentive will be effective in inducing a customer to stay in a coalition is not always easy. 
One way for researchers in economics to find solutions to these problems has been to 
examine the stability of a coalition during its life cycle. A coalition with stability 
indicates that its members are choosing not to break it up, because they are better off 
remaining in the coalition. 
Certain solution concepts for coalition problems related to stability notions have 
drawn much attention from researchers. The earliest proposed concept was called the 
stable set (Neumann and Morgenstern 1944), which is a set with stabilities. Its definition 
is very general and the concept can be used in a wide variety of game formats. For many 
years it was the standard solution concept for cooperative games (Owen 1995). However, 
subsequent works by others showed that a stable set may or may not exist (Lucas 1969), 
and is usually quite difficult to find (Lucas 1992). The core has become a well-known 
solution concept because of its incentive compatibility and because the way it finds stable 
sets is more appropriate. It assigns to each cooperative game the set of profits that no 
coalition can improve upon (Gillies 1953). The core is a solution concept for forming 
stable and efficient coalitions. Consequently, it is useful to adopt it into the mechanism in 
the proposed core-base model in this thesis. 
On the other hand, the computer science literature downplays incentives and tries to 
prescribe the formation of algorithms of less computational complexity (Sandholm and 
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Lesser 1997, Rahwan and Jennings 2007). In computer science, game theory can be 
regarded as the study of rational behaviour for interactive decision problems (Fudenberg 
and Tirole 1991). In a game, several players try to maximise their benefits by selecting 
particular actions, and each player's final profit depends on the profiles of actions chosen 
by all the players in the game. 
There are two branches of game theory, non-cooperative and cooperative, which differ 
in how they formalise interdependence among the players. In non-cooperative theory, a 
game is a detailed model of all the moves available to the players. By contrast, a 
cooperative game is a game having “the possibilities for coalition forming” (Aumann 
1987). Here, coalitions of players behave in a cooperative fashion. Hence the game is a 
competition between subgroups of players, rather than between individual players 
(McCain 2003). In other words, researchers in cooperative theory are concerned only 
with the formation of coalitions, but the procedures by which the players join the 
coalitions are not wholly relevant. 
This research is concerned with cooperative games, in which, coalitions are formed in 
precise structure for the purpose of maximising the overall expected utility (Ferguson, 
Nikolaou, and Yemini 1989 1989). However, finding the optimal coalition structure to 
maximise the profit is an NP-complete problem (Sung and Dimitrov 2007), and difficult 
to deal with. Lessening the computational complexity for coalitions can effectively 
produce a reduction in working times. Therefore, to do so is crucial for group-trading 
models in e-markets; the computer science literature reveals a number of attempts to a 
suitable formation of algorithms for this. 
Since the model involves e-commerce in e-markets, it has to interact with multiple 
computers on the Internet. For instance, when customers access the details of goods or 
services in e-markets from their computers using a Web browser, they send requests to a 
Web server, a computer on the e-market. Then the requests are sent to a database at 
another computer on the e-market to retrieve information about the goods. The results are 
returned to the Web server, then to the Web browser, and then displayed to the customers. 
In an e-market, information from various computers is sent via the Internet and then 
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combined to provide a solution which can be used for trading. Obviously, problems on 
the Internet can be classified into the field of distributed computing. How the model deals 
with computational problems using the nature of a distributed system will be discussed in 
chapter 3. 
And so, the e-market is an arena in which incentive compatibility, distributed computing, 
and less computational complexity are all highly relevant. These three factors have been 
considered in the model developed to deal with group-trading problems on the Internet. 
1.2 Background and Motivations 
According to Forrester Research, the growth of e-commerce was at one time more 
than 20% per year all over the world (Forrester Research 2010). Electronic commerce or 
e-commerce is “where business transactions take place via telecommunications networks” 
(Turban et al. 1999). Amongst all the different kinds of sale channels for e-commerce, 
Internet e-commerce has moved to centre stage in the thinking of many businesses. 
Essentially, Internet e-commerce is concerned with transactions among firms or 
organisations. Generally, in the Internet economy, e-commerce performs a wide range of 
online business activities to transfer ownership, or rights to use goods, between different 
companies through networks. An e-market is the main component of Internet e-
commerce (Andam 2003). The information shared among traders and the incentive for 
each individual in e-markets is the main focus of this research. 
Buying or selling goods on the Internet in e-trailers such as eBay has become an 
essential aspect of the daily lives of many people. “Much of the retail sector's overall 
growth in both the US and the EU over the next five years will come from the Internet,” 
said the Forrester Research Vice President in March 2010 (Forrester Research 2010). 
Because there will be large potential profits for traders in the next five years on the 
Internet from 2011 to 2015, this thesis assumes that trading takes place in the e-markets 
of Internet e-commerce. 
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An e-market, also called electronic marketplace, gives product information and trading 
mechanisms to traders and provides them opportunities to execute transactions. Some e-
markets allow participants to bid for products and services on the Internet through auction 
software. There are two reasons why the auction processes in the websites are purposely 
not discussed in this thesis. Firstly, online trading is the main interest of this research. Not 
all online trading involves auction processes. Secondly, there are many kinds of auction, 
for example English or Dutch auctions. Examining the complex nature of auctions would 
distract from the main concern of this research. 
In the last few years, many varied models for e-markets have been developed, suitable 
for the different activities of traders. The online group-buying is “seen as an effective 
form of electronic commerce” (Matsuo et al. 2010). In chapter 2, a background of online 
group-buying is presented. Even though Tsvetovat (2000) has declared it may be a win-
win strategy for both consumers and providers, online group-buying models mainly 
consider the benefits of consumers alone. On the other hand, joint-selling models take the 
viewpoint of providers. Again in chapter 2, issues about joint-selling will be discussed.  
A common way to explore online group-trading problems is to break down such a 
complex issue into online group-buying or joint-selling. In computer science, research 
has mainly focused on one party only – namely group buyers or joint sellers. However, 
researchers in economics regard all the traders in a market as a coalition, whether buyers 
or sellers, and therefore can concentrate on the stability of the coalition. This research is 
based on the approach of the core which contributes new knowledge to the field of 
computer science. It aims not only to obtain lower prices for buyers but to create higher 
profits for providers in e-markets. In other words, the online group-trading problem that 
this research has to tackle is not only online group-buying but also joint-selling. 
1.3 Research Aim and Objectives 
The aim of this research is to introduce a new model, called Core Broking Model 
(CBM), for group-trading in e-markets. The CBM involves joint-selling of multiple 
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products in e-marketplaces, offering a volume discount in group-buying. Several providers 
are involved in transactions of joint-selling, and, on the other side, many different buyers 
form coalitions in order to obtain a volume discount. Drawing on a concept from 
economics known as a ‘core’ to provide a foundation to tackle group-trading problems in e-
markets, this model could add new dimensions to other related researches in computer 
science and E-business. The core is the stable set of profits that no coalition can improve 
upon (Gillies 1953). This research focuses on the following five objectives: 
1. Explore the existing approaches in e-markets including online shopping, group-
trading, group-buying and joint-selling. 
2. Identify the advantages and problems in applying the core to e-markets. 
3. Find solutions to the core and resolve the group-trading problems in e-markets by 
studying relevant topics about coalitions, such as stability, Pareto efficiency, Shapley 
value and distributed systems in the fields of cooperative games and economics. 
4. Build a new group-trading model for e-markets not only to bring lower prices for 
buyers but to create higher profits for providers. 
5. Evaluate the CBM in incentive compatibility, distributed computing and 
computational complexity by comparing it with a traditional core. 
1.4 Methodology 
In order to achieve the aim and the objectives, a methodology was adopted in this 
research. This new hybrid methodology takes advantage of the approach of computer 
science and also of the technique of ‘prototyping’, which involves the testing of “a first or 
preliminary version of a device or vehicle from which other forms are developed” (The 
New Oxford Dictionary of English 2010). In this way prototypes are used to collect test 
results or feedback from users to perfect the final system. A prototype is usually a non-
production model and may be incomplete, unreliable or inefficient, but researchers can 
generalise the intended model to save time and effort. In this research, prototyping took 
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the form of developing versions and collecting test results rather than user feedbacks due 
to the inadequacy to have a real-world test in e-commerce site at this stage. 
In computing, a research project may involve software development projects, but it 
mainly focuses on finishing a thesis. A methodology was proposed and used in this 
research project. The research methodology, shown in Fig. 1.1, contains eight stages: 
literature review, ideation, actualisation, prototyping, construction, adjustment, evaluation 
and dissertation. The starting point of the methodology is a proposal, which contains 
some simple reasons for doing the research, and perhaps a brief description of the 
expected research. After the proposal is accepted, the research begins. 
 
Figure 1.1 Life Cycle of the Methodology 
The life cycle of the methodology consists of two developing sub-cycles, a theoretical 
and a practical sub-cycle. It allows a model developer to focus on logical ideas and 
concepts in the theoretical sub-cycle, and to concentrate on physical functions and 
techniques in the practical sub-cycle. The main purpose of the first sub-cycle is to 
generate some new ideas from old material. It involves three theoretical stages: a 
literature review, ideation and actualisation. There are three practical stages in the second 
sub-cycle: construction, adjustment and evaluation. The ultimate goal of the practical 
sub-cycle is to build a workable model for the research domain. The 8 stages of the 
methodology are as follows: 
1. Literature review − a literature review assesses the requirements of existing practice. 
The main task of this stage is to identify the characteristics and requirements of the 
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research domain. In this research, it identifies the areas that need to be addressed in 
current group-trading problems in e-markets. It reviews alternatives that have been 
suggested for obtaining stable coalitions from the fields of economics and computer 
science. 
2. Ideation − this is the stage of idea creation. The aim of this stage is to generate new 
ideas from existing concepts, by using a process of generating and developing, 
sometimes called ‘brainstorming’. Ideas may also derive from one existing idea by 
putting the original idea in a new context and improving on it, or may make up a 
composite idea by using different elements of individual ideas to make a whole. 
Communication with supervisors and other researchers may also be used to refine 
concepts. All the useful ideas will be sent forwards to the next stage. Anything that is 
produced that is unclear will be sent back to the previous stage for identification or 
alternative solutions. 
3. Actualisation − the goal of this stage is to record faithfully the ideas, which are 
generated in stage 2, through written descriptions, in tables, as graphs, or by 
mathematical expression. The criteria for analysing solution models can also be 
derived, by considering what is required to produce a satisfactory outcome to the 
research topic. In this research, several solutions for the problems of the core have 
been recorded. 
4. Prototyping − in this stage, a conceptual prototype is built. By taking into account 
the ideas which are recorded in stage 3, a prototype for solution models can be 
drafted. It will be modified repeatedly until it reaches the standard of the criteria 
from stage 3. In this research, the graph of a conceptual prototype for solving online 
group-buying problems is drawn. 
5. Construction − a workable model, which is based on the outputs of the theoretical 
cycle and the conceptual prototype from stage 4, is designed and is implemented in 
this stage. A design is “(1) a specification of an object, (2) manifested by an agent, 
who is “a person or company that provides a particular service, typically one that 
involves organizing transactions between two other parties” (The New Oxford 
Dictionary of English 2010). (3) intended to accomplish goals, (4) in a particular 
environment, (5) using a set of primitive components, (6) satisfying a set of 
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requirements, (7) subject to constraints, (8) to create a design, (9) in an environment” 
(Ralph and Wand 2009). An implementation can be made according to the design. In 
this research, the CBM was constructed. 
6. Adjustment − this is a process of correcting, tuning and modifying the model so as 
to best fit the requirements of the research topic. The model needs to be corrected 
when the results it produces are wrong; any errors can be found by executing a series 
of tests and verifying processes. Tuning the performance of the proposed model can 
optimise it, including hardware tuning, software tuning and database tuning. 
Modifications to the system parameters of the model should be made to ensure it is 
capable of dealing with the real-world situation. 
7. Evaluation − evaluation is the systematic assessment of the proposed model using 
criteria against a set of standards. In this research, the main tasks of this stage are to 
determine the criteria, to make an evaluation plan and to perform the evaluation of 
the proposed model. The criteria here are based on the ones from stage 3, but these 
are more detailed and more practical. The criteria and parameters used to evaluate 
the CBM in this research are discussed. 
8. Dissertation− a dissertation, also called a thesis or disquisition, is a document which 
presents the reasons for, the findings of and the results of a research topic. All the 
contents of this thesis are drawn from the reports and outputs of each stage of the 
methodology. 
The output of the theoretical sub-cycle includes the necessary information like ideas 
and criteria for the prototyping stage. The theoretical stages are executed recurrently until 
the theoretical sub-cycle produces enough information leading to the creation of a 
conceptual prototype. 
Every time a new conceptual prototype is generated from the prototyping stage, it is 
sent to the next stage and sets in motion the process of the practical sub-cycle. A non-
functional conceptual prototype will be rejected and sent back to the first sub-cycle. Of 
course, this will halt the process of the second sub-cycle, and then the first sub-cycle will 
come into play again, endeavouring to produce a better conceptual prototype by 
improving the weak points, which are suggested in its evaluation report. 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
10 
 
According to the conceptual prototype, a new model is designed, implemented and 
evaluated in the second sub-cycle of the methodology. The three practical stages of the 
second sub-cycle are performed repeatedly until an eligible model or software systems 
for a thesis are fully created. The whole life sub-cycle keeps reiterating until the research 
is satisfactorily completed and until the ultimate goal, the final dissertation, has been 
prepared. 
This methodology has been used in this research to ensure that the CBM is adequate 
for group-trading problems in e-markets. A conceptual prototype was generated in the 
first sub-cycle. Based on the prototype, the CBM was designed, implemented and 
evaluated. 
1.5 Research Contribution 
The primary contribution of this research is the development of a new online group-
trading model for e-markets. Is the new model beneficial to both sellers and buyers? In 
order to answer this essential research question, an example in Chapter 5 illustrates the 
benefits for traders in these models. In brief, the core concept mainly addresses the 
stability issue in coalitions. By establishing balance of power between two conflicting 
parties, i.e. buyers and sellers, a stable coalition may be formed. Therefore, the core must 
consist of both buyers and sellers. So, the new core-based model performs group-trading. 
It deals with not only group-buying but joint-selling. The new model includes the 
following main characteristics: 
• It is an online model and takes advantage of the Internet environment by adopting the 
techniques of distributed programming and sharing the workload between multiple e-
markets. 
• It is based on the core concept and finds a stable set within which traders can always 
get their best price. In other words, it will not only ensure that buyers get lower 
prices but also that providers gain higher profits. 
• It is a group-trading model which indicates that it provides ways for sellers to 
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perform joint-selling and allows customers to get wholesale discount from group-
buying. 
There are other questions needed to be answered in this research. Does an online 
group-trading model exist in current e-markets? In answering this research question, a 
broad survey of current e-markets has proceeded and shows that no online group-trading 
model can be found. Why is no sign of group-trading model in present e-markets? Group-
trading models are usually mistaken to be group buying, because joint-selling activities 
are difficult to be identified by others except those sellers who take part in the joint-
selling contracts. Is an online group-trading model in need in e-markets? The answer 
definitely is a ‘yes’, because the coalition is more stable in an online group-trading model. 
Through the inspection of current e-marketplace, the coalitions that are formed in online 
group buying or joint selling models fall apart easily, because none of the models deal 
with the stability issue in these coalitions. 
The core provides some solutions to group-trading problems. Is there any problem in 
applying the core in e-markets? One of my papers, that appeared just after my research 
started, pointed out that at least three problems hinder researchers from applying the core 
concept to the real market place (Sun et al. 2006). Another paper of mine talked about 
how to overcome the problems of the core and build a new group-trading core-based 
model (Sun et al. 2009). The final research question is about the criteria to evaluate this 
online core-based group-trading model. Two of my papers mentioned about the 
evaluation of the model (Sun et al. 2012a and 2012b). The efficiency and effectiveness of 
the model are discussed in Chapter 6. 
1.6 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis contains seven chapters. In chapter 1, a brief introduction to this thesis is 
given. Chapter 2 presents existing approaches in e-markets. Portraits of several popular 
websites used on modern e-marketplaces are introduced to help convey an understanding 
of how they work and keep abreast of modern trends in e-markets. Chapter 3 discusses 
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the advantages and problems of the core and several solution concepts used in this 
research to deal with group-trading problems in e-markets. One of these is the use of a 
broker, “a person who buys and sells goods or assets for others” (The New Oxford 
Dictionary of English 2010). So, brokers are a type of agent who specialise in trading. 
Chapter 4 gives an overview of the new CBM, the important role of the brokers in the 
CBM, a Core broking System (CBS), and the fees system for the CBS site. Chapter 5 
presents a case study on which the new model was applied. Evaluation results are 
discussed in chapter 6. Finally in chapter 7, the contributions and limitations of the 
research are provided in addition to areas for future work. 
In the next chapter, a survey of existing approaches in current e-markets is given 
including online group-buying, which is very popular at the present time (Kauffman, Lai 
and Lin 2010). 




Existing Approaches in Current E-Markets 
The main aim of this research is to build a group-trading model for e-markets. Group-
trading in this thesis includes group-buying and joint-selling. In order to determine 
whether there is a genuine group-trading website today, the nature of existing e-
marketplaces must be examined. 
Recently, some new models for group-buying have been proposed (Quality Articles 
Editor 2011). The eBay e-market is the greatest e-market success story to date and 
provides a very useful case study for e-market builders. An analysis of eBay is presented 
in Appendixes 1 to 3 as an example of a shopping site. Appendix 1 shows that the most 
popular shopping site, eBay, does not provide group-buying mechanisms for its members. 
EBay might consider adopting group-buying for its business model, especially after it 
pulled out of Taiwan (EBay financial 2006). Events have not been going smoothly in 
China either (Wang 2010); it should be noted that online group-buying is extremely 
welcome there. 
In section 2.2, the current practices of online group-buying are explored. Actually, 
group-buying is not new at all. The brief history of online group-buying is given in 
subsection 2.2.1. A famous and profitable group-buying site called ‘LivingSocial’ is used 
in subsection 2.2.2 as an illustration of how an online group-buying site works. In 
subsection 2.2.3, the advantages and problems of online group-buying are discussed. 
One important goal in this research is how to give consumers and providers the 
opportunity to conduct business in e-markets fairly. In section 2.3, reasons are given why 
a ‘cartel’ may disadvantage customers in an e-market. Joint-selling in e-markets and also 
ways to prevent a cartel are discussed in that section. It is essential to decide a sensible 
fees system for the CBM. The fees systems of 15 marketplaces are discussed in section 
2.4. 
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2.1 Online Group-Buying and Monopoly 
Online group-buying, team buying or collective buying provides a market mechanism 
that pools several consumers’ purchasing requirements to buy large quantities of one 
particular product from a seller (Gottlieb 2000). This mechanism enables consumers to 
take advantage of significant quantity discounts from the seller and to get a lower product 
price (Kannan and Kopalle 2001). Since the consumers can obtain a lower price as the 
size of the buyer group grows larger, they have the incentive to recruit more consumers 
and make the price even lower (Kauffman and Wang 2002). 
2.1.1 History of Online Group-Buying 
Group-buying is not new. The history of such coalitions can be traced back to the late 
1800s (McKenna 2002). Health care was one of the earliest areas to see the formation of 
large group-buying syndicates. Group-buying in the health care sector was first 
established in 1910 by the Hospital Bureau of New York (SMG Marketing Group 2002). 
In 1999, more than seventy percent of all hospital purchases in the United States were 
made through group-buying contracts (Muse & Associates 2000). Today, group-buying 
coalitions can be found in many industries concerned with the purchase of raw materials 
and supplies (Zentes and Swoboda 2000). 
The advantages that the Internet provides have added to this trend internationally. 
Online group-buying has become extremely popular in recent years and this means that 
researchers will find it worthwhile to develop a system for online transactions along these 
lines (Chang 2007). It attracts a lot attention, including academic researchers and 
practical investors (Zauberman et al. 2009). Analysts and financiers have proposed that it 
is one of the Internet's most innovative consumer opportunities (Kauffman, Lai and Lin 
2010). Researchers have speculated that it may be a win-win strategy for both consumers 
and providers (Tsvetovat et al. 2000). 
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In the late 1990s, there were several group-buying websites (Anand and Aron 2003). 
Mercata.com, Mobshop.com and LetsBuyIt.com were notable examples of websites of 
this kind in the United States (Kauffman and Wang 2002). Although many group-buying 
websites were established in a short period of time, this business model for Internet-based 
selling had been fraught with problems since the first online group-buying site was 
launched (Kauffman, Lai and Lin 2010). Mercata, Mobshop and LetsBuyIt were all 
unsuccessful, though they were heavily funded (Kauffman and Wang 2002). Mercata was 
closed in 2000 (Needle 2001). Mobshop closed its consumer operations in 2001 (Clark 
2001). LetsBuyIt, a technology shopping site that was once believed to have a bright 
future, suffered the indignity of seeing its shares suspended on 29 December 2000 (The 
Economist 2001). It did not survive for long and officially terminated its operations in 
2002 (LetsBuyIt 2002). The cause of the shutdown of these group-buying sites was their 
financial problems (Regan 2001) and the lack of customers (The Economist 2001). 
It is believed that the business model of the old sites might have been the reason for 
the failure (The Economist 2001). Online group-buying, compared to regular online 
shopping, involves more uncertainty and risk (Lin 2009). The very nature of group-
buying coalitions can cause reasons for conflict. Another problem can arise due to 
unequal member allocations that keep smaller participants from taking part in the group-
buying (Bloch, Perlman and Brown 2008). In addition, the discord thus created leads to a 
lack of commitment among coalition members and is another common problem in group-
buying (Heijboer 2003). Even though many people were attracted to the sites, it proved 
hard to persuade enough of them to sign up for transactions. This may explain the short 
life of several such businesses (Aylesworth 2003). 
Somewhat surprisingly, online group-buying businesses have been trying to make a 
comeback recently. Ihergo, a group-buying website in Taiwan, has grown at the startling 
rate of 961 percent in less than two years (Lin 2009). The tuangou phenomenon has been 
most successful in mainland China (Montlake 2007). Many companies all over the world 
have adopted group-buying in their business models (Kauffman, Lai and Lin 2010), 
including Google and Facebook. Google, an American multinational public corporation 
investing in Internet search and advertising technologies, is using its “strengths in 
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information and technology to build products and advocate for policies that address 
global challenges” (Google n.d.). One of its products called ‘Google Offers’ has appeared 
on its site and provides facilities for group-buying by means of virtual communities 
(Panzarino 2011). A virtual community is defined as a social group on the Internet where 
users share common interests (Beamish 1995) and social networking services are the 
most prominent type of virtual community today. As a leader of social networking 
websites, Facebook has more than 600 million active users (Carlson 2011). One of the 
newest features of Facebook, called ‘Buy With Friends’, even allows users to perform 
group-buying on social networks (Marsden 2011). 
2.1.2 An Online Group-Buying Site: LivingSocial 
Consider the business model of a new international group-buying company, called 
LivingSocial, which is based on virtual communities and launched in 2007. It “offers 
daily deals on handpicked experiences that can be shared with friends” (Livingsocial n.d.). 
Members receive an e-mail presenting the daily offer. Once deals have been made, the 
buyers receive their redemption vouchers via e-mail the next day, and then collect their 
goods at leisure. In addition, the buyers may introduce the offer to their friends. If three 
of their friends purchase it, the buyer obtains it free. The money, which the site collects 
from the consumers, is split between Livingsocial and the providers. Assume the retail 
price for an item is £100. Customers pay for an item at a discount of 50%, so they pay 
£50 for each item. The provider gets £25 out of it and the commission is the other £25. 
Members can redeem their vouchers and enjoy the products or services from the 
providers who are the third party. LivingSocial is not the only Internet company offering 
online vouchers for daily deals. Out of more than 500 online group-buying sites in the 
world (Weiss 2010), another large online group-buying company ‘Groupon’ is 
"projecting that the company is on pace to make $1 billion in sales faster than any other 
business, ever" (Weiss 2010). 
The providers come to the sites because they want to find more customers. There are 
many factors that may affect the process as a customer works through the purchase 
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decision. A survey concluded that ‘price’ is the major factor influencing the purchasing 
decisions of consumers (Stockford 2008). This survey took place in 2008 and 125 
individual consumers were asked to comment on the nine factors shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 Factors Influencing Purchase Decision 
The results of the survey implied that ‘Company reputation’ and ‘Trust in Brand Name’ 
are also important factors for customers. So, the strategy of the providers is to use a low 
price to make as many deals as they can. They might not get much profit out of the deals, 
but in the long run, with help from the sites, the company gets a better reputation and 
customers come to trust the brand name more. A research paper showed that customers 
prefer to join the group-buying deals which have been initiated by someone they trust 
who has a higher level of expertise (Bansal and Voyer 2000). Undoubtedly, the sites 
usually have a good reputation and are expert in group-buying (Lin 2009). As far as 
company reputation and trust in brand-name are concerned, these sites are better. The 
sites are definitely able to attract more buyers than most providers could on their own, 
especially when compared with providers who are new or who are unknown to customers. 
The group-buying sites provide a new method for providers to advertise their brand 
and their products. The providers are happy with their risk-free advertising. They are 
counting on the side effects of these promotions even if there is little profit from these 
transactions. In these promotions, consumers pay and have the chance to enjoy products 
from the providers. Businesses offering the deals hope that users who buy the coupon will 
share the experience they have had, spreading the word about their brand. They also hope 
that, after trying their business, customers will tell their friends about it, bringing along 
even more visitors to try it. Thousands of consumers are able to pass on to thousands of 
friends in a virtual community, the good experiences they have had when responding to 
the providers’ promotions. Positive word of mouth is a key factor in encouraging 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged 
version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry 
University.
Chapter 2 Existing Approaches in Current E-Markets 
18 
 
providers to join in a group-buying deal, in the knowledge that they will have an 
exceptional customer experience. 
The sites also give providers the opportunity to turn their stock into cash. It is in the 
interests of the providers to try to sell the large quantity of stock they have bought up, as 
quickly as possible so that the storage costs they incur are minimal. Consider the 
following scenario. A provider bought mobile phones in bulk to lower the cost and 
expects to gain profits from selling them. Every product has a life cycle. A new product is 
launched, grows, and at some point, may die. Some products have a short life cycle. 
Unfortunately, the mobile phone is one of them. Most mobile phones exhibit a gradual 
price decrease over time (Goldsmith 2005), as new phones come onto the market every 
day. So selling out the stock in a short period of time is a key to creating more profit for 
the provider. Besides, the space and maintenance fees for the stock can be quite costly if 
the mobile phones are stored in the warehouse. So it is a good solution for the provider to 
get them sold on the site as soon as possible. 
The first reason why this kind of deal attracts so many customers to the sites is the low 
prices. Customers get a massive discount usually between 50% and 100%. The second 
reason which makes the site so popular is perhaps not quite so easy to see. It is the 
powerful influence that people can wield as members of the same group, to sway each 
other to accept a deal or not. People pass on information to their friends about offers they 
would do well to take advantage of. Table  2.1 indicates that ‘Peer/Colleague 
Recommendation’ is not a crucial factor in the purchasing process for individual buyers. 
However, researchers have discovered that the purchasing decisions of people are deeply 
affected by others in a group (Bikhchandani and Sharma 2001, Pan 2010). People can 
effectively persuade the members of the same virtual community as themselves and their 
friends to join their coalition (Doucette 1997, Chen 2008). The trust between members in 
a virtual community is the key factor for a successful group-buying deal (Lin 2009). 
Peer pressure may result from subtle unconscious influences. Individuals in a group 
can exhibit ‘conformity’, also known as herd behaviour (Asch 1956), which is “behaviour 
in accordance with socially accepted conventions” (The New Oxford Dictionary of 
English 2010). Everyone in a group tries to gain benefit from the same discount. If new 
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members want to join the group, they feel they need to be accepted by the group. Groups 
of people may act in concert, especially in situations that leave little time for decision 
making (Yarnold, Grimm and Mueser 1986). Obviously, the daily deals on the sites take 
full advantage of this ‘conformity’ principle to induce more customers to commit 
themselves to such deals, because 24 hours is not a long time for buyers to make their 
decision. Thus, the group can place strong pressure on individual members to change 
their attitude and behaviour to conform to the group standards. The massive discount may 
be the incentive for a group, but peer pressure is the force which increases the size of the 
group. 
Table 2.2 Annual Revenues of Amazon and eBay 
Year  Amazon  eBay  
1996  $15.7  (million)  
1997  $147.8  -  
1998  $610.0 $47.4 
2000  $1,640.0 $224.7 
2001  $2,761.0 $431.4 
2002  $3,122.0 $748.8 
2003  $5,263.0 $2,165.0 
2004  $6,921.0 $3,271.0 
2005  $8,490.0 $4,552.0 
2006  $10,711.0 $5,969.0 
2007  $14,835.0 $7,672.0 
2008  $19,166.0 $8,541.0 
2009  $24,509.0 $8,727.0 
2010  $34,204.0 $9,156.0 
There are three reasons for establishing online group-buying businesses. Firstly, it may 
be the right time to launch an online business for group-buying. The old sites launched in 
the late 1990s closed during 2000-2002. It is difficult to find their records due to their 
closing down. By looking at other shopping sites, their situation at that time can be 
pictured. The revenues of Amazon, the most successful online provider in the world, 
were only US $15.7 million in 1996 and eBay had even smaller revenues of US $4.7 
million in 1998 (Wikinvest n.d. a). Table 2.2 shows that the revenues of both businesses 
at that time were low. The old sites had likely been through rather hard times, especially 
when the market was so very different and computer ownership was so much smaller. 
Besides, the advanced distributed computing technologies nowadays enable the new 
generation of group-buying models take full advantages of the Internet and draw more 
customers to their websites. Moreover, it takes extra efforts to design a computationally 
distributed system than a centralized one because ‘the additional communication burden 
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of the distributed system needs to be taken on board (Asselin and Chaib-Draa 2006). Some 
innovations of distributed technology using in e-commerce are discussed in section 4.5.2. 
Figure 2.1 History of Amazon’s Revenues (Nasdaq n.d. a) 
In Fig. 2.1, the trend is of rapidly increasing revenues and reveals the amazing success 
of Amazon in recent years (Nasdaq n.d. a). This is a real encouragement to other 
shopping websites. There are signs everywhere showing the popularity of online 
shopping now. In 2010 eBay had 1,449 million transaction entries on its site for goods 
worth US $61,819 million (EBay Inc. 2011). Online shopping today is not a strange thing 
for people any more. This is what has brought online group-buying businesses to life. 
Secondly, the new sites are broking systems, while the old sites belonged to providers 
or retailers. Just like eBay, providers come and sell products and services in these new 
group-buying sites. Consider a group of buyers, each with a certain purchasing 
requirement. The people who play the role of coordinator for the group cannot be sellers, 
because this gives them opportunities to cheat. So in the old sites, the coordinators were 
quite often general customers who were not as proficient as they should have been. 
Because the new sites are broking systems, the brokers can be the coordinators for both 
the seller and the buyers, and be fair and professional. This solves the common problem 
on old sites which arose due to unequal allocations between members that kept smaller 
participants from taking part in the group-buying. 
Thirdly, the new sites have brought in effective strategies to make their business models 
a success. Because attracting customers to them is not easy, some new sites try to build up 
members’ trust in groups by using virtual communities (Hagel and Armstrong 1997), such 
as bulletin boards and social networks. A bulletin board is an online discussion site with 
various topics to discuss, using forums, threads and individual posts (VBulletin Community 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged 
version of the thesis can be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry 
University.
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n.d.). It is easier for members to form a bigger group, if people try to get a shopping model 
going in a virtual community. The recent sites have been very successful in this respect, 
because the customers that they attract already have a commitment to each other. Just like 
eBay, a large number of customers will draw more sellers to a site. This explains the 
phenomenal success of group-buying sites around the world. 
Groupon used to be the most profitable online group-buying site, but its annual 
revenue has gone down from the $713.4 million in 2010 to $312.9 million in 2011 (Raice 
2011). In October 2011, a report from Forrester Research suggested that its business 
model was a disaster (Conlin 2011). There are some problems in these models and they 
are discussed in the next subsection. 
2.1.3 Problems of Online Group-Buying 
One major problem in online group-buying models is that they cannot sustain 
themselves for very long. They are still full of uncertainty and risk. By selling items at a 
large discount the sites are really carrying out a form of advertising which may only work 
for a short time. This will not be in the interest of providers for long especially as far as 
profits are concerned. So the sites might run out of supplies. They will not work for the 
good of customers in the long run either, because the customers might end up with out-
of-date or poor products. Therefore, the coalitions could fall apart easily. The cause of 
this is the potential instability of the group-buying models. Unfortunately, none of these 
models have the ability to deal with the stability issue in the coalitions. 
The second problem in these models is that their markets are ‘monopolies’, giving 
them “exclusive possessions or control of the supply of or trade in a commodity or 
service” (The New Oxford Dictionary of English 2010). They have substantial control 
over what the different customers will have to pay for a particular product. In a monopoly, 
the more customers there are, the higher the price for the item. Competition between 
customers gives the provider the opportunity to control the price. It is dangerous to have 
one provider and one product in an e-market. In many countries, specific restrictions have 
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been placed on monopolies by ‘competition laws’, which “promote or maintain market 
competition by regulating anti-competitive conduct” (Taylor 2006). 
The third problem is these group-buying models need to deal with high computational 
complexity when there are many customers in e-markets. Existing buyer coalition 
formation schemes have been investigated in game theory, but they cannot deal with 
thousands of buyers which could join a coalition in practice because of the high 
computational complexity (Yamamoto and Sycara 2001). The daily deals in LivingSocial 
or Groupon allow buyers to place their orders on the same product only, which is a good 
way to reduce the complexity in group-buying. However, in these daily offers, the buyers 
cannot purchase multiple products at a time. The customers cannot choose items 
according to their preference either. Consequently, the daily deals are the main attraction 
for buyers, but they are also barriers for many potential transactions in the e-markets. 
The final problem is that providers on group-buying sites are liable to be overcharged, 
and this definitely scares away many potential providers. In section 2.3, there is a survey 
for the current fees systems in the e-markets. More discussions will be given there after 
the ways how providers are commonly charged are learned from the survey. 
In order to prevent a price maker in an e-market, it is good to bring as many customers 
and sellers into an e-market as possible. There are many providers and customers on eBay 
and Amazon. It is not easy for any seller or buyer to control the selling price there. 
However, in a group-buying market, during a particular period of time, where there is no 
alternative, there may only be a single provider for a product. Actually, group-buying 
models build monopolies in which the sellers dominate the markets and put the customers 
at a disadvantage (Anand and Aron 2003). If the demand for an item is high, the provider 
has the opportunity to control the price, as there is no competition at all. It is dangerous to 
have monopolies and competition laws in many countries have placed specific 
restrictions on them. The new sites use the low price of deals to avoid violating the 
competition laws, but this may bring many other problems. Some companies may use 
these sites to take over markets and to force other companies out. In the end, the customer 
will either pay more or get bad products and poor services. 
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Sometimes, a handful of sellers in a coalition have a pricing agreement between them. 
In the next section, the question of a ‘cartel’ is introduced. When the market becomes a 
cartel, this encroaches on another sensitive area of competition law. Reasons are given 
why this is a nightmare for consumers and why it is restricted by ‘competition laws’. 
Methods for maintaining a healthy trading environment for buyers and sellers is crucial in 
this research. In the next section, joint-selling in all kinds of situations is discussed and 
the cartel is also introduced. 
2.2 Joint-Selling and Cartel 
The aim of this research is to build the model in an e-market where no one person can 
dominate and be a price maker and so that every seller has some influence in the e-market. 
However, if only a few producers are attracted to the e-market, they may gang up and 
become “a group of similar, independent companies which join together to control prices 
or divide up markets and limit competition” (European Commission 2004) in other words 
a ‘cartel’, which acts as a formal arrangement between producers and manufacturers who 
agree to fix prices, marketing, and production (Sullivan and Sheffrin 2003). A possible 
solution to prevent a cartel in e-markets will be discussed in this section. 
Joint-selling allows several traders to increase their benefits by joining coalitions. 
Authorisation has been granted for many businesses to engage in joint-selling (OECD 
2004). In fact, there are plenty of joint-selling activities in markets all over the world, but 
they are not easy to identify. For instance, joint-selling is quite common in gas markets 
(Albers 2001), but customers cannot be aware that products are from joint-selling. 
Customers purchase gas from one company, but they have no way of knowing the 
company’s joint-selling contract, which is signed by organisations, such as importers and 
distributors. 
A full explanation of the reasons why the model proposed needs to involve group-
trading is another important part of this section. In e-markets, by examining the forces of 
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both demand and supply, an equilibrium price might be found. Group-trading may thus 
involve both group-buying and joint-selling. An introduction to group-buying was given 
in the previous section. Here joint-selling is described. In this research, there are three 
reasons for using joint-selling: 
1. To give incentives to sellers. It is an effective way to attract many providers to the 
scenario. Joint-selling increases the ‘competitive advantage’ (Porter 1985), in various 
ways, including achieving economies of scale and scope, reducing costs of 
transactions, forming and maintaining a ‘brand’, conducting advertising and initiating 
research (OECD 2004). 
2. To give incentives to buyers. There are certain benefits for consumers in joint-selling, 
such as new products, low price due to low cost and better services through business 
partnering. 
3. To reduce computational complexity. Using brokers as media to collaborate sellers 
can effectively lessen complexity and reduce the time taken to process trading 
transactions. In subsection 3.4.2, collaboration amongst sellers will be discussed. 
However, sometimes problems may arise when sellers decide to form a coalition for 
joint-selling. In a free e-market, doing business should be a competitive game amongst 
firms. Sometimes, companies may be tempted to avoid competing by setting up 
agreements between firms. For example, consider the scenario where there are three 
players in a game of poker. Two players may cooperate to eliminate a third, dividing the 
winnings between themselves. This is cheating, because the rules of poker forbid 
cooperation among the players. A situation may occur where the use of a joint-selling 
model will result in some of the providers in an e-market losing out, even though the idea 
is that everybody should benefit equally. Things can get worse in a cartel. Providers in a 
cartel get more than their fair share of the market by controlling prices or dividing up 
markets. They do not need to provide better value products or quality services at 
competitive prices. When a cartel limits competition, consumers in e-markets end up 
paying more for less quality goods or services. 
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The way to prevent cheating in the aforementioned poker scenario is to forbid 
cooperation among the players. However, in an e-market, there is no such rule against 
cooperation among sellers. Cooperation between companies may be necessary if products 
or services are to improve. Expensive research projects for new products are a very 
common incentive for firms to collaborate with one another. Agreements between 
producers and providers can ensure that consumers can buy personalised products which 
suit them. In other words, agreements between companies may restrict competition but 
can also be good for consumers and markets. So, a joint-selling agreement which restricts 
competition will not necessarily turn out to be a cartel. 
Joint-selling activities must operate within the guidelines of the government of the 
country concerned. Competition laws can be enforced to protect the interests of 
consumers locally. However, because traders in e-markets may be international, 
competition laws have therefore become global. There are independent public bodies like 
the UK Competition Commission, “which conducts in-depth inquiries into mergers, 
markets and the regulation of the major regulated industries, ensuring healthy 
competition between companies in the UK for the benefit of companies, customers and 
the economy” (Competition Commission n. d.); global organisations like the Organisation 
for economic Co-operation and Development, “an organisation dedicated to global 
development”, having “34 member countries spanning the globe, from North and South 
America to Europe and the Asia-Pacific region” (OECD n. d. ), or the ‘World Trade 
Organisation’, which is “a global international organisation dealing with the rules of trade 
between nations” (WTO n. d. ). Competition authorities in different places around the 
world have made it their goal to ensure that there is free and fair competition in e-markets 
(European Commission 2004). 
In joint-selling, agreements, such as fixing prices, limiting production or sharing 
markets or customers, have to be restricted. On the other hand, agreements which have 
more positive effects are allowed (European Commission 2004). Agreements between 
companies, which involve developing new products or finding better ways of making 
products available to consumers, are not illegal and are encouraged, because they are 
necessary for improvement of products or services and they are good for consumers. 
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People may be tempted to cheat in some way in the process of trading, but a financial 
reward can also be an incentive to shopping sites to provide a good service to their users. 
It is normal for sellers to pay for the privilege of coming to the e-markets and finding 
potential customers there. In the next section, the fees systems of some popular shopping 
sites are given. 
2.3 Fees Systems in E-Markets 
Shopping sites provide online services for their members. People are willing to pay for 
the services, because they are tailored to their needs. The sites keep themselves afloat 
with the payments from their users. One site will charge people in a completely different 
way from another. For instance, some sites are free, but others charge a fee for sellers to 
list products on their site. This section presents the fees systems of fifteen popular 
shopping sites and gives an overall picture of the fees in current e-markets. Before listing 
the fees for the 15 sites, it will be helpful to introduce the fees system of eBay first. 
Most shopping sites depend on revenues from commissions, “typically a set 
percentage of the value involved, paid to an agent in a commercial transaction” (The New 
Oxford Dictionary of English 2010). The brokers’ revenue comes from commission paid 
by the customers. Higher commission usually brings better services from brokers, but if 
there are fewer customers they may object to paying a high price for commission. 
Deciding a reasonable fee which will please both brokers and customers is a problem. 
EBay’s main revenues come from fees for transactions including insertion fees and 
final value fees. The fees are based on various factors and scales. Insertion fees need to 
be paid from £0.15 to a maximum rate of 3% for an ordinary listing whenever a seller 
lists an item on eBay in the UK. The seller will be charged a final value fee that is from 
0.75% to 10% of the item's final selling price in the UK. More details about the fees 
system of eBay are in Appendix 2. Different companies have different ways of charging. 
The fees of online shopping sites are given here. This will be useful for setting up the fees 
system for the model. 
Chapter 2 Existing Approaches in Current E-Markets 
27 
 
The commission for each market-broker is normally calculated on the basis of a 
percentage of the sale price. The percentage is negotiable. The commissions for brokers 
are commonly part of the confidential data of agreements. For instance, in the area of 
home buying and selling, brokers usually charge the homeowner 5% to 7% commission 
(Kokemuller 2011), but commissions may range widely between 1.5% and 12% in 
practice. Likewise, online broking sites take various commissions. However most of them 
seem to have standard and non-negotiable fees systems. 
Table 2.3 Fees for 15 Shopping Sites 
Company  
Final Value Fees  
(Final Selling Price)  
Online Store Fees  
(Per Month)  
Insertion Fees  
(Starting Price)  
Reference  
Amazon 
8.05%, 11.5%, 17.25%  
£0.86 + £0.16 ~£1.32  
£28.75  £0.06  
(Amazon n. d.)  
Atomic Mall 1~6% of TV  £0~ £12.30  0  (Atomic Mall n. d.)  
Blujay  0 0  0  (Anderson 2006.)  
Bonanzle  
1.5~ 3.5% of FOV + 
£0.31  
0  0  
(Bonanza 2011)  
CQout  1.8~5.4%  £3.41~£9.25  0  (CQout n. d.)  
Craigslist £6.20  0  0  (Musgrove 2006)  
eBay 1.5~10%  £14.99, £49.99, £349.99  £0~£7.95 or 3%+£1  (EBay n. d. e)  
eBid.net 3%  £4~£8  0  (EBid.net n. d.)  
eCrater 0  0  0  (Ashley 2008)  
Etsy 3.5%  0  £0.20  (Etsy n. d.)  
GoAntiques 2~10%  £24.20~£49.62  0  (About.com n. d.)  
iOffer 1.5~5%  0  £0~£12.40  (IOffer n. d.)  
OnlineAuction.co
m  0  
£5  £0~£6.20  
(OnlineAuction.com n. d.)  
Ruby Lane 0  £12.40  £0.19  (Ruby Lane n. d.)  
TIAS.com 2% or10%  £24.80  0  (TIAS.com n. d.)  
The fees for 15 marketplaces are listed in Table 2.3 that reveals that the fees for each 
site are different. There is no average, standard, usual, or normal commission which will 
apply to every e-market. The 15 marketplaces are exactly the same as the selling venues 
in Table A4.1. AuctionBytes selected these established marketplaces because they “had 
traction, had a substantial number of users” (Steiner 2010 a). Generally speaking, there 
are three types of fees which sellers are charged: online store fees, insertion fees and final 
value fees. An online store fee is paid monthly by a seller who opens a store on the sites. 
An insertion fee is calculated at the time an item is listed, even if the item doesn't sell. A 
final value fee is charged when an item is sold. 
Opening an online store is one of the most economic ways for sellers to setup a 
business. The sellers do not need to spend money on renting a warehouse, but they need 
Uniform Resource Locators (URLs) for their online shops. A URL "provides a means of 
locating the resource by describing its primary access mechanism" (Berners-Lee et al. 
2005). Nearly every online group-buying venue provides URLs for sellers. When the 
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sellers pay only a small monthly fee and open online stores on these sites, they can have 
URLs for their stores, to which they can easily direct their customers from around the 
world. There is a good resource here for those market-brokers who need URLs for their 
online store. 
Most of the sites provide special features to allow sellers to customise their 
professional-looking store with logos, images and colours of their choice. Some 
marketplaces help sellers with promotional tools, like highlighting special offers and mail 
newsletters, so that they can advertise their goods and bring in more buyers. EBay charge 
the highest online store fee, which is £349.99 for an anchor shop and £49.99 for a 
featured shop. A GoAntiques online shop at £49.62 comes next. And it is then followed 
by Amazon’s £28.75 and TIAS.com’s online shop at £24.80. The lowest online store fee 
is £5 on OnlineAuction.com. The average online store fee is about £24.50 taking into 
account only the more realistic prices, the highest and the lowest fees on the list being 
somewhat over-exaggerated. 
An insertion fee may be charged whenever a seller lists an item on a shopping site. In 
Table 2.12, all the marketplaces charge a fixed amount of money, except eBay. In nine 
out of the fifteen shopping venues, listing an item is free. On the eBay site, the insertion 
fee is zero when the starting price of an auction-style item is less than £0.99. The concept 
of an insertion fee is perhaps similar to the fee for a newspaper advertisement, but 
newspaper companies do not charge a fee when the products are sold. It does not seem 
fair to ask the seller to pay for insertion fees and final value fees at the same time. Most 
sellers are discontented with this (Steiner 2010 b), especially when they get no profit at 
all out of an unsold item, but they still have to pay the extra expense of an insertion fee. 
Most of the shopping sites calculate the final value fee using a certain percentage of 
the ‘final selling price’, which is the final price of an item excluding shipping fees, 
handling fees or sales taxes. Amazon has the highest percentage, at 17.25% a possible 
reason as to why many of its sellers may have complaints. One seller said that “Amazon’s 
fees are atrocious” (Steiner 2010 c). The second highest percentage is 10%, which is 
charged by eBay, GoAntiques and TIAS.com. And it is then followed by Atomic Mall, at 
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6%, CQout, at 5.4% and iOffer, at 5%. The average percentage of these 15 sites is around 
7.5%. Amazon and eBay are consumers’ top two websites for shopping this year in the 
UK (Sillitoe 2011), but they seem to charge the sellers the highest percentages of the final 
selling price. 
In Atomic Mall, the final fee is up to 6% of the Total Value (TV), which is the total 
price of an item including shipping fees and handling costs. The final value fee on some 
marketplaces like Bonanzle is based on the Final Offer Value (FOV), which is the sale 
price minus a shipping fee exemption of up to £6.20. For example, assume that a seller 
sells a £472 item after shipping. The total shipping for the item is £10, of which only 
£6.20 is deducted. The FOV is £472–£6.20=£465.80. The fee for the first £310 is 
£0.31+£310×3.5%=£11.36 while the fee for the remaining amount is 
£155.80×1.5%=£2.34. So the final value fee is £11.36+£2.34=£13.70. No matter 
whether it is based on TV or FOV, the final value fee for a seller derived from these two 
schemes usually turns out to be more than the fee calculated from either of the final 
selling price of an item. 
From among the sites in Table 2.3, the highest percentage is 17.25%. However, most 
group-buying sites charge a much higher percentage than this, for instance, 30% in 
LivingSocial (Tallai 2010) and 50% in Groupon (Crudele 2010). Although the final value 
fee is the only fee which the sellers have to pay, overcharging seems to be a common 
problem on group-buying sites. In section 2.2, it was discovered that providers regard the 
group-buying sites as places where they promote their brands and products. Even though 
the providers do not expect to get great profit from the deals, it is easy to image how 
upset the providers will be when more than one third of the little profit they have, is taken 
away by the sites. There is only a slim chance that the providers will return to group-
buying sites again. Overcharging providers will drain the online group-buying sites of the 
stocks that they need. The ultimate consequence is that the sites may not have any 
providers to support them at all. 




This chapter has provided a broad survey of current e-markets and gives a general idea 
about what is happening to e-markets today. The world's largest online trading 
community e-market, eBay has many strong competitors, and some of them have adopted 
group-buying in their business model. Online group-buying has become extremely 
popular in recent years and draws a lot of people’s attention. In the late 1990s, there were 
several group-buying websites, but they were all unsuccessful due to financial problems 
and lack of customers. More than 500 online group-buying sites in the world have been 
trying to make a comeback recently. Groupon and LivingSocial are the two most 
profitable companies. Providers come and regard the deals on the group-buying sites as 
promotions. Customers are attracted by the low price deals and peer pressure is the force 
increasing the size of that group. The daily deals on the sites successfully induce more 
customers to commit themselves to them. A large number of customers will tend to draw 
more sellers to the sites. There are at least four major problems in these new online 
group-buying models. The first problem is that their coalitions are unstable and can fall 
apart easily. The second problem is that their markets are monopolies and may fall foul of 
competition laws. The third problem is that providers on the sites are liable to be 
overcharged. The fourth problem is these models need to deal with high computational 
complexity when there are many customers perform group-buying in e-markets. 
In this research, three reasons are advanced for using joint-selling. These relate to 
maximizing profits for sellers, giving incentives to buyers and reducing computational 
complexity. Although cooperation between companies may be necessary in order to 
improve products or services, a cartel is to be avoided. There is no rule against 
cooperation among sellers, but competition laws protect the interests of consumers. Joint-
selling agreements such as fixing prices, limiting production or sharing markets or 
customers, is considered outside this research. 
Generally speaking, three types of fees are charged in e-markets: final value fees, 
online store fees and insertion fees. Amongst the fifteen popular shopping sites, Amazon 
charges the highest final value fee. The average final value fee is around 7.5% of the final 
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selling price. The average monthly online store fee is about £24.50, but EBay’s monthly 
online store fee is up to £349.99. Most of the shopping venues, listing an item are free. 
No group-trading website was found among the current e-markets reviewed. However, 
there may be such sites on the Internet. In fact, joint-selling is not easy to identify. 
Therefore, an online group-trading site might look like a typical group-buying website. 
This chapter has explained how to perform joint-selling without breaking competition law, 
but the problem about instability of the coalitions in group-buying is still unsolved. In the 
next chapter, the core concept is introduced. This concept, drawn from the discipline of 
economics and is constructed on the principle of the stability of coalitions, will be given 
as it seems to have an answer to this problem. 




The Core and Solutions 
The theme of this chapter is a review of the core; it is one of the crucial elements of 
this research. Theoretical suggestions for developing proper coalition models by adding 
the core to suitable coalition structures have already been proposed in the literature 
(Kahan 1984). The model developed here is based on the core. A detailed examination 
and illustration of the core is given in section 3.1. First, the reason why the core concept 
is important for coalition problems needs to be clarified. 
The core concept has been tested and run within the simple market games. The results 
of these games demonstrate that many problems have to be resolved to apply the core in 
e-markets. Section 3.2 introduces several useful solution concepts to devise a workable 
group-trading model for e-marketplaces. The e-market is an arena in which incentive 
compatibility, distributed computing, and less computational complexity are all highly 
relevant. This chapter considers works that have been written about these three issues and 
finds solutions to some of the problems that occur in online group-trading. 
3.1 An Overview of the Core 
The core was first proposed by Francis Y. Edgeworth in 1881 and plays an important 
role in the area of economics (Kannai 1992). It was later defined in game theory terms by 
Gillies in 1953 and then it becomes one of the popular and critical concepts of 
cooperative games in the area of game theory. The core indicates the set of imputations 
under which no coalition has a value greater than the sum of its members' profits (Gillies 
1959). Therefore, members of the core stay and have no incentive to leave, because they 
receive a larger profit than elsewhere. Individuals in a coalition are not only interested in 
maximising the coalition’s joint efficiency, but they are also very concerned with their 
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own profits. If an individual can gain better profit by working alone without involving 
others, the individual will not join the coalition. If a coalition can produce a better profit 
by excluding certain individuals, the coalition will form a new coalition without those 
individuals. The core forms stable and efficient coalitions by calculating the profits of 
different possible coalitions (Osborne 1994). 
This section can be regarded as a report following a close examination of the core. The 
nature of the core is illustrated in some simple market games here. This builds a good 
foundation for understanding this model as developed later. This section concludes with a 
list of the advantages and problems of the core also to be considered later when 
recommending this model. 
3.1.1 A Definition of the Core 
In cooperative games theory, the core is a set of imputations that are not dominated. A 
cooperative game, which is denoted as <N, v> with a coalition N and a value function v: 
2N→𝕽+, where 𝕽+ is nonnegative real numbers, and it is always assumed that v(ϕ) = 0. 
The game consists of n players {1, 2, . . . , n}, who can form non-empty arbitrary 
coalitions S ⊂ N. The value of a sub-coalition S is equal to v(S). Suppose that player i 
contributes an amount of xi. Since the game is assumed to involve transferable utility, 
which means one player can transfer part of his/her utility to another player, the cost to 
the players in the coalition S is simply x(S)=∑i∈S xi. Since each coalition must pay its 
due of v(S), the individual costs xi must satisfy x(S)≥v(S) for every S ⊂ N. The set of cost 
vectors C(v) satisfies the following states, 
C(v):={x∊  𝕽n+.  :  x(S) ≥v(S) for each S ⊂ N }, 
is the set of aspirations of the game, in the sense that this set defines what the players can 
aspire to. 
The goal of the game is to minimize social cost, that is, the total sum of the costs x(N). 
Clearly this minimum is achieved when x(N)=v(N). This leads to the definition of the 
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core of a game. The core of the game is the set of aspiration vectors x ∈ C(v), so that 
x(N)=v(N) and is regarded as efficient (Scarf 1967). The C(v) of the core can be derived 
from the following function (Kikuta and Shapley 1986): 
C(v):={x∊𝕽n  |x(N)=v(N), x(S)≥v(S) for all S ⊂ N }. 
An allocation is inefficient if there is at least one person who can do better, while no 
other person is worse off (Faigle et al. 1997). If any individual conceives of a proposed 
allocation being disadvantageous to them, they can decide to leave. For example, 
consider the case where the individuals of a coalition C get profit P. Now, assume there is 
another coalition D that can generate profit B. If B dominates (is greater than) P, the 
individuals of C may switch to D. The defectors from the coalition can do better for 
themselves by deserting their coalition to join other coalitions. 
The definition can be summarised as “The core of a cooperative game consists of all 
un-dominated allocations in the game” (McCain 2005). The profit of the allocations in a 
core should dominate other possible solutions, meaning that no subgroup or individual 
within the coalition can do better by deserting the coalition. Even for the self-interested 
individuals, the core solution is the result they would adopt, if they are rational. The core 
has become a prominent solution concept in economic applications for coalition problems, 
because it takes on board the incentive of both consumers and providers in coalitions. 
The core is a Pareto efficiency, also called Pareto optimality. It is a central concept in 
economics, proposed by an Italian economist, Vilfredo Pareto (Ng 1983). A formal 
definition of Pareto efficiency is “an economic equilibrium in which it is impossible to 
change the allocation of resources without improving the lot of one agent at the expense 
of another” (Encarta World English Dictionary 2009). A Pareto efficiency is a state 
where resources are allocated in the most efficient manner. The mechanism of Pareto 
efficiency is to select the subset with the biggest v(S), which is simply done by 
comparing economic outcomes. Because it is a way that people widely accept, 
researchers embed it in their models to prevent coalitions from falling apart (Fudenberg 
and Tirole 1991, Haurie 1972, Sen 1993). It may be helpful to use some examples to 
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explore the core and how the mechanism of Pareto Efficiency has been used to decide the 
core. 
3.1.2 Illustrations of the Core 
Some simple market games are based on a ‘Jeff and Adam game’, which was 
originally used to explain some economic ideas (McCain 2005) and are used here to 
illustrate the core (Sun et al. 2006). A 2-person market game is designed to explain the 
basic idea of the competition in e-markets. There are four assumptions of these games: 
complete information, identical cost functions for consumers, identical utility functions 
for providers, one type of product. The first assumption is complete information, which 
describes an economic situation in which knowledge about other market participants is 
available to all participants (Harsanyi 1967). It assumes that all the cost functions and 
possible coalitions must be made available to the public. Just two types of traders are 
involved in the games: Consumer and Provider. In order to simplify the games, only one 
type of consumer and provider are assumed and there is just one kind of product to trade 
with as well. Consumers may exchange their fund with goods. 
It has been common among economists to use level of utility to quantify relative prices 
of goods and services (Stigler 1972). Utility measures the benefits (or drawbacks) from 
consuming or selling a good or service. One utility is equivalent to one unit of fund here. 
A consumer is willing to pay at most 12 units of fund for 3 units of product. Providers 
trade their goods with consumers in order to obtain the funds. By doing this, they may 
increase their utilities as well. The marginal utility functions of customers and providers 
in the following market games are shown in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 Marginal Utility Function 
 
Customer 
Product 1 2 3 4  
Utility 7 10 12 13  
Margin 7 3 2 1  
 
Provider 
Product 1 2 3 4 5 
Utility 7 11 13 14 15 
Margin 7 4 2 1 1 
Chapter 3 The Core and Solutions 
36 
 
A customer’s utility is 7, if he/she owns exactly one item. When he/she has two items, 
his/her utility becomes 7+3=10. He/she wishes to have at most 4 products, because the 
utility remains the same when there are more than 5 products. A provider’s owns 5 items 
at the beginning and he/she wishes to exchange them with at least 15 utilities. Suppose 
he/she sells one item with 2 funds, then his/her total utility becomes 14+2=16. 
At the beginning, consumers have 15 units of fund to spend on goods. Each Consumer 
may purchase at most 4 units of goods. If consumers run out of funds, they have no 
substitute with which they can interchange goods. A provider only has 5 units of goods to 
offer. Initially, traders each have a utility of 15. Their utility will change after transactions 
are agreed. For instance, a consumer purchases 4 goods with 9 units of fund from one 
provider. The consumer owns 4 items and 15–9=6 units of fund. His/her utility is 
13+6=19. On the other hand, the provider has one unit of product and 9 units of fund. The 
utility of the provider is 7+9=16. 
Let N be a set of participants, and v be a characteristic function that holds the value of 
participants’ profit. In a 2-person market game, N={Consumer, Provider}, and for the 
purpose of convenience, Consumer=1, Provider=2. There is only one coalition that they 
can make x(N)=x1+x2=x(S) and v(N)=v(1,2)=v(S), where x1,x2 are the profits of the 
consumer and the provider respectively. Table 3.1 shows a consumer’s profits. Here C0, 
C1, …, C5 are the costs of the consumer. For instance, C3 is the cost of 3 units of goods. 
If the consumer pays 9 units of fund, the consumer’s remaining fund will be: 15-C3=6 
and he/she obtains 3 units of goods from the provider. So the gained benefits are 12. So 
the consumer’s profits amount to 18 (i.e.x1=15-C3+12=18), when he/she pays C3 units of 
the fund to get 3 units of goods. 
Table  3.2 Characteristic Function 
Product 
Sold 
Consumer’s Benefit Provider’s Benefit 
Product Fund Sum Product Fund Sum 
0 0 15 - C0 15 + C0 15 C0 15 + C0 
1 7 15 - C1 22 + C1 14 C1 14 + C1 
2 10 15 - C2 25 + C2 13 C2 13 + C2 
3 12 15 - C3 27 + C3 11 C3 11 + C3 
4 13 15 - C4 28 + C4 7 C4 7 + C4 
Table3.2 shows the provider’s characteristic function. Because the provider offers 3 units 
of goods to the consumer, his/her benefit remains 11. However, his/her fund increases to 9 
units, and his/her profit is:x2=11+C3=11+9=20, when he/she offers 3 units of goods to 
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exchange C3 units of fund. Note that the fund has no influence on the derivation of the 
coalition sums, as the sum=x1+x2=27−C3+11+C3=38, but the fund affects individual gains. 
In Table 3.3, v(S) is the maximum of total utility in the set, which are 38 units of fund. 
It occurs in the trade when the provider offers 2 or 3 units of goods to the consumer. In 
the 2-person game, only one coalition can be formed, that is {1, 2}. Therefore v(N)=v(S), 
so algebraically the core of this 2-person game is the line ab: x2=38–x1. The line is 
bounded by x1≥13 and x2≥15. 
Table 3.3 Total Characteristic Function 
Product 
Sold 
Benefit of Total 
Utilities Customer Provider 
0 15 - C0 15 + C0 30 
1 22 - C1 14 + C1 36 
2 25 - C2 13 + C2 38 
3 27 - C3 11 + C3 38 
4 28 - C4 7 + C4 35 
Here, an example begins with a 2-person game, a large size core and its possible cost 
could range from 2 to 14. The unit price for one unit of product is from 0.67 to 4.67 units 
of fund and the average price is 2.67. The large size of the core is problematic, as the 
possible deals lying at any point on the line ab can be selected by the consumer and the 
provider. A possible solution to this type of problem is the application of bargaining 
theories. However, it depends on the bargaining powers of the consumer and provider. If 
a deal is reached that is close to the point a, the provider can gain more utilities. If the 
final deal is moving towards the point b, the consumer has the advantage. 
There is the possibility of a situation arising where no deal can be agreed upon when 
there is no existing ‘equilibrium’ in the market. The economic term ‘equilibrium’ is “a 
state in which opposing forces or influences are balanced” (The New Oxford Dictionary 
of English 2010). In this state, an ‘equilibrium price’ or best price is established through 
competition so that “the quantity of goods producers wish to supply matches the quantity 
demanders want to purchase” (Dictionary of Finance and Investment Terms 2007). 
Alternatively, a unique stable solution can exist by expanding the market to include more 
consumers and providers. As the size of the market increases from the growth of 
consumers’ demands and providers’ supplies, it is likely that more market conditions will 
be imposed. This could lead to a single and unique solution. 
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This paragraph describes an expanded market that includes 4 players instead of 2. In 
this case, there are 2 identical consumers and 2 identical providers, so N={1,1,2,2}. Table 
3.4 describes the total profit that each coalition can make and indicates the line segment 
for each coalition. Coalition C3, {1,1,2}, contains two identical consumers and one 
provider. Its total utility v(S) is 58. Line segment ef is the benefit trade-off of the 
coalition. 
Table 3.4 Profits of Two-Consumer-to-Two-Provider Coalitions 
S Coalition v(S) Line Pareto Efficiency 
C1 {1, 2} 38 ab N 
C2 {1, 2, 2} 54 cd N 
C3 {1, 1, 2} 58 ef N 
C4 {1, 1, 2, 2} 76 ab Y 
This market game can be concluded as a non-empty core game, because v(N) is 
always the maximum of v(S), which is 76. Coalition C3, {1, 1, 2, 2}, is the core because it 
is the state of ‘Pareto Efficiency’. This is derived from the following steps: 
v(N)=λ C 1 ×v(C1)+λ C 2 ×v(C2)+λ C 3 ×v(C3)+λ C 4 ×v(C4),  so λ C 1 ,λ C 2 ,λ C 3 ,λ C 4  are 0,0,0 and 1, 
because Σ S ∊B , S∋ iλ S =0+0+0+1=1, 
and Σ S ∊Bλ S v(S)=0×38+0×54+0×58+1×76=76, 
so v(N)≥Σ S ∊Bλ S v(S) .  
Since this market game now has a non-empty core, the next step is to examine whether 
there is any unique core in the game. 
 
Figure 3.1 Multiple Cores 
In Fig. 3.1, the line ab intersects the line ef on the point p and the line gh on the point 
s. According to the definition of core, x(S) is not less than v(S). All of the allocations on 
the line pa are dominated by those on the line pe. So the solutions in the line pa cannot be 
the solution in this game, and neither are those in the line sb. The core of a 4-person 
coalition falls on the smaller line segment, ps. As a result, the core can be any point on 
the line ps. In this case, the number of possible solutions has been reduced but multiple 
choices still remain. So, an ideal solution has not been identified within a 4-person game. 
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This indicates that the size of the market is not sufficiently large to produce a solution. 
So, in our example we increase the market to consider 6 participants, 3 providers and 3 
consumers. 
Table 3.5 Profits of Three-Consumer-to-Three-Provider Coalitions 
S Coalition v(S) Line Pareto Efficiency 
C1 {1, 2} 38 C N 
C2 {1, 2, 2} 54 A N 
C3 {1, 1, 2} 58 E N 
C4 {1, 1, 2, 2} 76 C N 
C5 {1, 1, 2, 2, 2} 93 B N 
C6 {1, 1, 1, 2, 2} 97 D N 
C7 {1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2} 114 C Y 
Table 3.5 shows all the possible coalitions for a 6-person game. The 6-person game 
shows a unique core. The point t is the intersection of the lines B, C and D (see Fig. 3.2). 
Every point on the line C except point t is dominated, either by line C or by line D. The 
core of the 6-person game is just one allocation precisely at point t. This is a competitive 
equilibrium, which is a state of balance between supply forces and demand forces (Arthur 
and Sheffrin 2003). 
 
Figure 3.2 Unique Core 
As no other coalitions can do better than the point t, the deal can be made by the 
consumers and the providers with the equilibrium price - the consumer pays 2 units of 
fund to exchange 3 units of product with the provider. The unique core solution may 
identify a subset, which can produce a maximum joint efficiency and a stable allocation. 
In addition, the members in the coalition can achieve their best gains. 
There are consumers and providers in the above games, thus the games can be 
regarded as markets. In 2-person and 4-person games, there are many solutions for the 
participants. So they are games with multiple cores. When it comes to the single solution 
in the 6-person game, the market becomes a unique core game. In other words, a market 
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come to the equilibrium price for the participants. Consider the Three-Consumer-to-
Three-Provider Coalitions again. There are 8 states in this six-person coalition. Since 
v(C7)=114 is the highest, the state of {1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2} is the core . 
Table  3.6 Pareto Efficiency in Six-person Coalition 
S Coalition v(S) Pareto Efficiency 
C0 {} 0 N 
C1 {1, 2} 38 N 
C2 {1, 2, 2} 54 N 
C3 {1, 1, 2} 58 N 
C4 {1, 1, 2, 2} 76 N 
C5 {1, 1, 2, 2, 2} 93 N 
C6 {1, 1, 1, 2, 2} 97 N 
C7 {1, 1, 1, 2, 2, 2} 114 Y 
The results of the games were produced by a PC in the Windows XP environment. All 
the games were implemented into Java programs. The above figures were drawn up using 
Microsoft Excel according to the outputs of the java programs. Only one type of 
consumer and provider are involved in the games. This seems unrealistic and it is not the 
case in real-world markets. However, it simplifies the computation process of the core 
and makes the way the core works easy to understand. 
3.1.3 Advantages and Problems of the Core 
The core has become an essential solution concept in the area of cooperative games 
and modern economics. This is due to its incentive compatibility and additionally, the 
way it finds stable sets is more appropriate (Gillies 1953). By examining the simple 
market games, the advantages of the core can be revealed. 
A stable set is usually difficult to find. However the core provides an appropriate way to find a 
stable set in the simple market games. In order to form a stable coalition, the profits of providers 
and consumers must be optimised so they can reach equilibrium. In addition, the maximisation of 
their joint efficiency should be considered. The fact is that no matter how complex a model is, it is 
useless for an e-market when coalitions are unstable and doomed to fall apart. Researchers in 
computer science realise that a useful coalition model for e-markets should consider not only less 
computational complexity but also the incentives of each selfish participant. 
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Undoubtedly, providing a way to find a stable set is one of the advantages of the core. 
In a cooperative game, subgroups are formed to maximise the overall expected utility. 
Researchers assume participants are cooperative. However, there may be no motivation 
for an individual to join a coalition. On the contrary, the members are willing to stay in 
the core, not because they are cooperative, but because they have incentives, which is 
their own profit. In the simple market games, the core maximises not only the joint 
efficiency of the core, but also the profits of each member of the core. It gives the 
members an incentive to stay in the core. In other words, the cooperation in the core is 
not forced. Incentives need to be given to the customers of the core. The sellers are also 
the members of the core and they stay because there are potential buyers in the core. So 
another advantage of the core is that this may be helpful in drawing many consumers and 
providers to coalitions in e-markets if the core gives them incentives to be cooperative. 
More incentives for traders in this research are discussed in section 3.2. 
Compared with other research in group-buying or joint-selling, the core provides a 
bigger picture. A stable coalition is a coalition with a stable set. The reason, why the 
coalition is stable, is that the members in the coalition can attain an equilibrium price or 
best price. The equilibrium price is a great incentive for the members and it is the best 
price that makes them stay in the core. Without putting two conflicting parties together 
i.e. buyers and sellers in the same coalition, the equilibrium price will never be reached 
and also there will not be any chance to determine whether the coalition is stable or not. 
Altogether, there are two advantages of the core. Firstly, it presents a way to find the 
stable set, which is a set with stabilities. Secondly, its incentive compatibility makes it 
applicable to real-world markets. The fact that it has these two advantages shows that the 
core provides some good points towards solving the coalition problems in e-markets: 
1. A coalition should include all the traders in a market, not just buyers or sellers. 
2. An equilibrium price needs to be found in order to stabilise the coalition. 
3. It is important to give incentives to people for them to form a coalition. This is one of 
the crucial factors for success in e-markets. 
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Despite the advantages of the core, no practical applications of the core can be found 
in use today in e-markets, as the core may be difficult to use. As shown in the previous 
subsection, the core needs to calculate all the results of the subgroups in order to find the 
one core, which has the best result out of all the subgroups. This seems to be a reasonable 
way to solve coalition problems. However, the core has at least three problems which 
hinder researchers from applying it to the real market place. 
The first problem concerns the input information. It does not seem as important as the 
other two followed problems, but it needs to be solved in order to apply the core in the 
marketplace. In the above market games, the traders’ marginal utility functions, which are 
shown in Table 3.1, describe the values which traders are willing to pay for the goods, or to 
sell them for. In practice, collecting such information can be a big problem in the real 
marketplace. 
The second problem for applying core in e-markets is its high computational 
complexity. As illustrated in the previous subsection, the way to find the core is to go 
through all possible subgroups, and to select the best situation, in which the most profit 
can be obtained, not only by the coalition but by each member of the coalition. The 
process to find a core in a coalition is classified as an NP-complete problem (Faigle et al. 
1997), which means it can be too complex to find a core in a large coalition. For example, 
it took a long time for the java program to decide the core and find the price for the 
participants with 20 identical providers and 20 identical buyers in the simple game (Sun 
et al. 2006). The computational complexity is so high that it is hard to imagine how long 
it would take to determine solutions when dealing with large numbers of participants. 
The third problem occurs when there is no stable set in a coalition. The core may exist 
in different forms, a unique-core game, a multiple-core game or an empty-core game 
(Curiel 1997). If a cooperative game has a unique core, it is called a unique-core game. 
The core is a stable set, which may be a subgroup of the coalition. The members in the 
core are the winners in the market place, since allocations in the core satisfy efficiency 
and stability. The amount of profit makes the core efficient enough to keep the members 
in it. A multiple-core game has more than one core in the game. One of the cores in the 
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game may be the winner in the market place. Thus far, research cannot confirm whether 
the core is stable or not, because a number of qualifying conditions have to be satisfied 
first (Gellekom et al. 1999). Sometimes no stable set can be found in a coalition at all. 
It may be the case that there is no stable core in marketplaces. In the exercise in 
subsection 3.1.2, the utility functions were carefully designed for the consumers and 
providers, with the result that a stable core appears. As the number of providers and 
consumers increases, the total utility will not increase in proportion and the individual 
gains will not be improved. When no core can be found in a game, it is an empty-core 
game. An empty-core game is unstable, because no solution can be reached in the game 
at all. This turns out to be a big problem for brokers, sellers and buyers - all the efforts 
will be in vain if no deal can be agreed in a marketplace. In other words, no one can get 
any profit from a coalition with an empty-core. 
So, there are three problems in applying the core to e-markets. Firstly, in order to locate 
the core, the market information has to be transparent and public. How to collect the traders’ 
marginal utility functions will be a practical problem in e-markets. Secondly, the core can be 
effective only when the coalition is small. The computational complexity of the core can 
sometimes become a big problem to deal with in e-markets, because coalitions on the Internet 
may be large. Thirdly, the problem can be even bigger, if a coalition has an empty core and is 
unstable. It can be devastating for participants on an e-market if no deal can be agreed. The 
problems are not just weaknesses of the core. They can be fatal to its application in e-markets. 
How to overcome the problems of the core and create a core-based model to solve online 
group-trading problems will be discussed in the following section. 
3.2 Solutions for the Core 
Solutions for the three main problems of the core are given in this section. The first 
problem is the difficulty to collect the marginal utility functions from customers and 
providers. Instead of marginal utility functions, some common market information is used 
to find the core of a coalition. Since they are publicly available information in e-markets, 
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brokers can easily collect them and calculate the total benefit of a coalition and the gains 
of each member. In this research, price lists and orders are collected, 
1. Price lists: They contain the prices and volume discounts of the products which are 
offered by providers. A volume discount is a discount that a seller gives to a 
customer for buying a large quantity of an item. Just like marginal utility functions, 
price lists show the profits the sellers wish to gain from selling a good or service. 
2. Orders: They contain the amounts and prices of items which the buyers promise to 
pay for. In order to let customers reveal the price they are willing to pay for certain 
amounts of items, just like marginal utility functions do, there is a special field called 
‘expected discount’ in customers’ orders. This field allows customers to place the 
orders without committing to buy the items. The system will wait for the final 
discount to be settled and decide whether the purchase should go ahead or be 
dropped, by comparing the final and expected discount. 
The techniques which listed in subsection 3.2.3 are the solutions to the second problem 
of the core relating to its high computational complexity in a large coalition. A stability 
check, which is given in subsection 3.2.1.1, can detect and prevent a coalition with an 
empty core and turns out to be an effective way to solve the third problem of the core. 
Providing solutions to the three problems of the core is not the sole intention. This 
research has been working on a new approach to making the core applicable to real world 
e-marketplaces. The core is by nature working within a coalition, so that it is incapable of 
dealing with coalition problems in multiple e-markets, in which incentive compatibility, 
distributed computing, and less computational complexity are all highly relevant, some 
solutions for these problems are introduced in this section. 
The main aim of this research is to build a workable core-based group-trading model for 
the Internet, so that three problems relating to online coalitions have been investigated. In 
subsection 3.2.1, methods for providing incentives for traders to join coalitions in e-markets 
are suggested. In subsection 3.2.2, two main reasons for using a distributed system in this 
research are discussed: the very nature of the model requires the use of the internet to allow 
communications amongst several computers and the use of a distributed system in this 
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research is to reduce computational complexity. Solutions for the high computational 
complexity of coalition problems in e-markets are discussed in subsection 3.2.3. 
3.2.1 Incentives 
In the real world, selfish individuals are concerned more about their own benefit than 
that of the rest of the coalition together. In an e-market, the people who are worse off will 
choose to desert the coalition, and in consequence, the coalition disintegrates. It is not too 
difficult to understand the incentive that makes people collaborate and join the same 
group. ‘Volume discount’ can bring two opposing parties together for collaboration. 
Volume discounts attract customers. In Table 3.7, a 35 percent discount is applied to 
30 to 49 units of an item. If the number of units increases to more than 130, the discount 
is 60 percent. Unlike a fixed discount in group-buying sites, there is an even stronger 
incentive here for buyers to purchase large quantities of an item. They are also more 
likely to join a coalition to get more discounts there. On the other hand, a volume 
discount reduces the profits of sellers for each buyer. When sellers offer volume 
discounts to buyers, the sellers reduce the cost by selling their products more quickly. It 
also brings more profits to sellers by selling more units to buyers with incentives. 
Table 3.7 Volume Discounts 
Number 0-9 10-29 30-49 50-79 80-99 100-129 130-- 
Discount 0% 30% 35% 45% 50% 55% 60% 
Providing incentives is always a good means for attracting traders to e-markets. There 
are at least three incentives for traders to join e-markets in the model: a volume discount, 
an equilibrium price and a fair distribution. An equilibrium price can be a good incentive 
for the participants in a coalition. However, the consequences can be devastating if no 
equilibrium price is agreed in an e-market. A stability check has to be introduced to 
ensure that the best price can be worked out in a coalition. Before coalitions are 
combined into larger coalitions to bring greater discounts for customers and more profits 
for sellers, they have to be checked for their stability to avoid an empty core. The Shapley 
value is also introduced to distribute the profit to each provider in a coalition fairly. 




A coalition with an empty-core is a big problem because no deal can be agreed in a 
marketplace. A stability check is a solution to this difficulty, which is also the third problem 
of the coalition with non-deterministic cores. In cooperative games, the stability of cores has 
been one of the most notorious unsolved problems. It is important to have a stable coalition, 
for a game with an empty core is to be understood as a situation of strong instability, as any 
profits that a coalition might have are vulnerable. Detecting the stability of a coalition is 
crucial in this research. Without an equilibrium price, the members may lose their interest in 
remaining in the coalition. Determining the stability of the core is a NP-complete problem 
(Conitzer et al 2003). Attempts to solve the above problem seemed to have failed but recent 
research has showed that a balanced game will always have a stable core (Jain and Vohra 
2006). 
An important sufficient condition for the non-emptiness of the core is that it is 
balanced. Let a cooperative game <N,v> be balanced. Then C(N,v)≠0  (Scarf 1967). 
From the classical Bondareva-Shapley theorem, a cooperative game has a non-empty 
core if and only if it is balanced (Bondareva 1963). A game is balanced if, for every 
balanced collection B, there are weights {λ S } S∊B  and the following condition holds, 
v(N)≥Σ S∊Bλ S v(S).  
A collection B is called a balanced collection if  
∃(λ S ) S∊B∀i∊N Σ S ∊B,S  ∋ iλ S =1, where (λ S ) S∊B  is a vector of positive weights. 
Here a simple market game is used in chapter 2 with a coalition of 2 consumers to 2 
providers is used as an example here. According to the profits shown in Table 2.4, 
v(N)=76, and v(S1)=38, v(S2)=54,v(S3)=58,v(S4)=76 
if λ S1 =0.4,λ S2 =0.3,λ S 3 =0.2 and λ S4 =0.1 are assumed, 
v(N)=76≥Σ S ∊Bλ S v(S)=0.4×38+0.3×54+0.2×58+0.1×76=50.6 
and  Σ S ∊B,S∋ iλ S =0.4+0.3+0.2+0.1=1. 
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So the coalition of 2 consumers to 2 providers is proven to be stable. It is fairly easy to 
check the stability of a coalition with a computer. 
Actually, if condition, v(N)≥v(S) S∊B , holds, the game can be proven to be balanced. 
Assume there are r subsets in the game. 
v(N)=(1/r)×r×v(N)=(1/r)×Σ r v(N)=Σ r ((1/r)×v(N)).  
Replace v(N) with v(S). 
v(N)=Σ r ((1/r)×v(N))≥Σ S ∊B ((1/r)×v(S)) and Σ r (1/r)=1. 
In other words, for a coalition N, if the coalition’s v(N) is greater than v(S) and S is one 
of its subsets, the coalition is proven to be stable. 
In the CBM, any coalition that fails the check will be rejected. Now that the unstable 
coalitions have been excluded, it is certain that traders can make a deal using the stable 
ones. An e-market, where deals can always be made, may attract traders to come. A 
larger coalition, which combines more than one coalition together, can bring more profits 
to its members, as long as it can pass the stability check. This also raises another issue 
about how to distribute the profits fairly amongst the providers. In the next subsection, 
the Shapley value is introduced to solve this problem. 
3.2.1.2 Shapley Value 
In cooperative games, Shapley value presents a fair and unique way of solving the 
problem of distributing surplus profit amongst the players in a coalition, by taking into 
account the worth of each participant (Shapley 1953). The following four axioms for the 
solution were proposed by Shapley: 
1. Efficiency − all the surplus profit of a coalition is fully allocated. 
2. Symmetry − players with the same contribution should be treated equally. 
3. Additivity − the total outcome of two coalitions must be equal to the profit from each 
of these two coalitions added together. 
4. Dummy player − if players contribute nothing, they get nothing. 
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To formalise the above situation, assume a coalition N (of |N| players), and a function 
v:S→𝕽 ,  that is, a so-called ‘worth function’, going from subsets S of coalition N to real 
numbers, with the following properties, 
1.  v(ø)=0 
2. v(S+T)=v(S)+v(T), whenever S and T are subsets of N. 
If the members of coalition S agree to cooperate, then v(S) describes the total expected 
gain from this cooperation. The first property expresses that a null coalition gains nothing. 
The second property describes an additivity, which expresses the fact that collaboration 
can only help but never hurt. The amount that player i gains, 
Sh i (N)=Σ S⊆(N\{ i } ) ( |S |)!( |N|−|S|−1)!÷|N|![v(S∪{i})−v(S)].  
Assume that three players, player 1, 2 and 3, decide to perform joint-selling. Table 3.8 
shows the worth functions of individuals and coalitions. As you can see, the v(S) of {} is 
0. It means that there is null output when no one provides any input. Also, the v(S) of {1,  
2} implies the profit of the coalition of providers 1 and 2 is 47. 
Table 3.8 Worth Functions 
S {} {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2, 3} 
v(S) 0 20 20 40 47 65 70 90 
According to the Shapley value, the gain of provider 2 is, 
Sh 2 ({1,2,3})=(0!2!(v({2})−(v({}))+1!1!(v({1,2}−v({1})+v({2,3})−v
({3}))+2!0!(v({1,2,3})−v({1,3}))÷3!=24.5.  
Do likewise to the other two players. So the gains of players 1, 2 and 3 can all be worked out, 
and they are 22, 24.5, and 43.5 respectively. The sum of the gain of each player is 
22+24.5+43.5, which is equal to 90, and this is the same as v({1, 2, 3}). This shows the 
efficiency of the Shapley value, because it distributes all the gain of the coalition to the players. 
Table 3.9 Subsets 
Code Binary Provider Subset Contribution Size Coefficient 3 2 1 
0 000 - - - {} v({}) 0 - 
1 001 - - Y {1} v({1}) 1 0!2!/3! 
2 010 - Y - {2} v({2}) 1 0!2!/3! 
3 011 - Y Y {1, 2} v({1, 2}) 2 1!1!/3! 
4 100 Y - - {3} v({3}) 1 0!2!/3! 
5 101 Y - Y {1, 3} v({1, 3}) 2 1!1!/3! 
6 110 Y Y - {2, 3} v({2, 3}) 2 1!1!/3! 
7 111 Y Y Y {1, 2, 3} v({1, 2, 3}) 3 2!0!/3! 
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Table 3.9 shows the list of the 23=8 subsets, which are coded from 0 to 7. By analysing 
these codes, the size and members of each set can be revealed. For example, subset 3 
consists of player 1 and player 2, which are denoted as {1, 2}. After code 3 is converted 
into binary, i.e. 0112, the way to find out its members becomes clear. The first and second 
bits of the binary code are 1, so its members are player 1 and player 2 and the size of this 
set is concluded to be 2. Therefore the coefficient for subset 3 is (2-1)!(3-2)!/3!=1!1!/3!. 
The pseudocode in Table 3.10 was designed to calculate the Shapley Value of the 
members of a coalition. The input parameters of the function are ‘count’ and 
‘contribution’, in which store the size of a coalition and the v(S) of each subset in the 
coalition. The output of the function is ‘Shapley’, that is an array storing the Shapley 
Value of every member in the coalition. After the size and coefficient of every subset are 
figured out, the Shapley Value for each provider can be worked out. A program in Table 
A9.1 was implemented according to this pseudocode. 
Table 3.10 Pseudocode to Calculate the Shapley Value 
procedure calculateShapleyValue(count, contribution) 
setNo=2count; 
// calculate size and coefficient of each subset 
for code=0 to setNo -1 
{ 
     size[code]=0; 
     for i=0 to count-1 
          if((code/2i)%2=1) 
               size[code]++; 
     coefficient[code]=(size[code]-1)!*(count - size[code])!/count!; 
} 
// calculate the Shapley Value for each members 
for i=0 to count -1 
{ 
     Shapley[i]=0; 
     for code=0 to setNo-1 
     { 
          output=0; 
          if((code/2i)%2=1) 
                output=contribution[code]- contribution[code-2i]; 
          Shapley[i]+=coefficient [code]*output; 
     } 
} 
return Shapley; 
The Shapley value is a key solution concept for coalition problems. In this research, the 
profits of providers are calculated by Shapley Value according to their contributions to the 
group-trading. Its main advantage is that it provides a unique and fair solution. However, it 
can be a NP-complete problem itself in computing solutions for some games (Deng and 
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Papadimitriou 1994). The Shapley value has the same drawback of high computational 
complexity as the core in a large coalition. But just as the computational problem of the 
core is dealt with in this research, the drawback of the Shapley value is also resolved. 
An advantage of the Shapley value is that everyone gets what they deserve. Increasing 
the profits by combining cores into a larger core can give an incentive to traders. As long 
as the total benefit of a coalition and contributions of members are given, the gains of 
each participant can easily be calculated. It provides another incentive for traders to join 
the coalition, if they know they will get their fair share. 
Shapley value “is the most studied and widely used single-valued solution concept in 
cooperative game theory” (Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein 2001). And the client-server 
networking model which is, without question, the most widely implemented model in 
real-world environments (Zhang 2003), is introduced in the next section. 
3.2.2 Distributed Computing 
In distributed computing, a problem is divided into many tasks, so it can be solved by 
multiple network-connected computers. A distributed system uses “a number of 
independent computers linked by a network” (The New Oxford Dictionary of English 
2010). In e-markets, the computers are self-governing and interact via a large computer 
network, i.e. the Internet, and they communicate with each other by message passing 
(Ghosh 2006). One of the crucial issues for this research is how to build an appropriate 
online distributed system. During the process of refinement, a Web distributed system 
based on the model was implemented to show that the foundational principles of this 
research were workable both in logic and in practice. 
Since the potential number of traders in e-markets may be large, the computational 
complexity in a large coalition can be very high and this can cause many problems in an 
e-commerce project. The main contribution that many researches in distributed 
computing have made is that they have provided ways of reducing computational 
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complexity (Foster and Kesselman 2004). One of the common solutions was applying the 
concept of ‘divide and conquer’. Researches show that less computational complexity can 
be achieved by dividing a coalition into several small sized sub-coalitions (Yamamoto 
and Sycara 2001). These coalitions are then assigned to different computers connected to 
the same network or on the Internet. Dividing a coalition into small sized sub-coalitions is 
a good way to lessen computational complexity. However, it is an NP-complete problem 
as well (Sung and Dimitrov 2007). It is not a proper solution for this research. 
In one of my papers, an effective way is applied to accomplish the job by using the 
concept of combining multiple e-markets to maximise traders’ benefits was introduced 
(Sun et al. 2006). Suppose that there are 14 orders for 3 providers, who offer 10 different 
products. Consider the pseudocode in Table 3.11. In a single e-market, it takes 
14×10×3×10=4200 steps to calculate the total price for every order. 
Table 3.11 Pseudocode to Calculate the Total Prices of Orders 
procedure calculateOrderPrice(provider, providerProduct, order, orderLine) 
/* For each provider, there are providerID, providerName, providerProfit and providerProductNo */ 
/* For each provider product, there are providerProductID, providerProductStock, providerProductSold, providerProductPrice and providerProductCost */ 
/* For each order, there are orderID, orderDate, orderLineNo,orderCustomerID and orderProviderID */ 
/* For each order line, there are orderProductID, orderQuantity, orderActuralQuantity orderDiscount and orderExpectedDiscount */ 
for i=0 to orderNo-1 
{ 
     total[i]=0; 
     for j=0 to orderLineNo-1 
     { 
          for k=0 to providerNo-1 
          { 
               If(orderProviderID[i,j]=providerID[k]) 
               { 
                    for m=0 to providerProductNo-1 
                    { 
                         If(orderProductID[i, j] = prividerProductID[m]) 
                              total[i] += orderActuralQuantity[i, j]*(1-orderDiscount[I,j])*providerProductPrice[k, m]; 
                      } 
                 } 
            } 
     } 
     report total[i]; 
} 
Because solving the high complexity problem in the core is a crucial task, which has to 
be resolved in the CBM, a solution to the problem in e-markets is to exploit the nature of 
online distributed systems. This is explained in the following paragraphs through 
comparing the computational complexity between a single e-market and a four-e-market 
scenario. In this research, in order to simplify the complexity, an assumption has been 
Chapter 3 The Core and Solutions 
52 
 
made, which is that an order can purchase goods from one provider only. In Fig. 3.3, the 
providers’ coalition0 offers volume discounts to buyers. Assume there are p buyers’ 
coalitions in the series from buyers’ coalition1 to buyers’ coalitionp. These are assembled 
on e-market1 through to e-marketp respectively. The buyers’ coalition0 holds the orders 
from the buyers who are in buyers’ coalition1 and buyers’ coalitionk. The core consists of 
providers’ coalition0 and buyers’ coalition0. When these two forces which were working 
against each other before, are put together, the equilibrium price for every item can be 
reached. In this equilibrium, the providers gain their best profits and the buyers also have 
their best discount. The buyers’ coalition0 contains the winning coalitions: these are the 
buyers’ coalitions which fall in the core. 
 
Figure 3.3 Combing E-Markets 
Table 3.12 Pseudocode to Joint Providers 
procedure jointProviders(providerNo, provider, providerProduct) 
count=0;  
for i=0 to providerProductNo[providerNo]-1 
{ 
     for j=0 to providerNo-1 
     { 
          sumPrice=0; 
          sumCost=0; 
          providerProductStock [providerNo, count]=0; 
          for k=0 to providerProductNo-1 
          { 
               sumPrice += providerProductPrice[j, k]*providerProductStock[j, k]) 
               sumCost += providerProductCost[j, k]*providerProductStock[j, k]) 
               productProductStock[providerNo, count] += productProductStock[j, k] 
          } 
          providerProductPrice [providerNo, count] =0; 
          If(sum!=0) 
          { 
                providerProductPrice [providerNo, count] = sumPrice/ providerProductStock[providerNo, count]; 
                providerProductCost [providerNo, count] = sumCost/ providerProductStock[providerNo, count]; 
                count++; 
           } 
     } 
} 
report provider[providerNo], providerProduct[providerNo]; 
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Instead of dividing an e-market into many, the new model combines multiple e-
markets into a big one by forming a big provider and a big buyer. After merging the 
offers in a provider coalition, a big provider holds the combined supplies of all the 
providers, all of whom have signed an agreement to be the suppliers of a project. The 
pseudocode in Table 3.12 provides a way to combine the stock of all the providers 
together and to calculate the average unit price and cost for each product. 
Table 3.13 Multiple E-Markets 



















O1 O2 O3 O4  OO 
As shown in Table 3.13, four different e-markets denoted as A1, A2, A3, and A4 have 
their own broker to take care of them, namely B1, B2, B3 and B4. These e-markers 
attract various consumers to themselves independently. By operating in this way, future 
division into smaller sub-coalitions can be avoided. 
Table 3.14 Pseudocode to Combine Orders 





for i=0 to providerProductNo[providerNo] 
{ 
     sum=0; 
     aSum=0; 
     for j=0 to orderNo-1 
     { 
         if(orderExpectedDiscount[j]>maxDiscount) 
               maxExpectedDiscount=orderExpectedDiscount[j]; 
          for k=0 to orderLineNo-1 
          { 
               If(orderProductID[j, k]=productID[i]); 
               { 
                    sum+=orderQuantity[j, k]; 
                    aSum+=orderActuralQuantity[j, k]; 
               } 
          } 
     } 
     if(sum!=0) 
    { 
          orderProductID[orderNo, count]= productID[i]; 
          orderQuantity[orderNo, count]=sum; 
          orderActuralQuantity[orderNo, count]=aSum; 
          orderExpectedDiscount[orderNo, count]=maxExpectedDiscount; 
          orderDiscount[order, count]=findDiscount(productID[i], aSum); 
          if(orderDiscount[order, count]< maxExpectedDiscount) 
               orderDiscount[order, count]=0; 
          count++; 
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In this multiple e-markets scenario, instead of one big coalition, 4 smaller coalitions 
are dealt with in the e-markets’ computers at the same time by using the pseudocode in 
Table 3.11. There are 3, 4, 2 and 5 orders being drawn to e-markets A1, A2, A3 and A4 
respectively. By using the pseudocode in Table 3.13, the orders O11, O12 and O13 from 
e-market A1 are combined into order O1. On the similar basis, O2, O3 and O4 are 
produced. Finally, O1, O2, O3 and O4 become an integrated order OO. It takes 
10×(3+4+2+5+4)=180 steps to combine the orders. As a result, there are only two 
participants in the core and it takes 1×10×1×1=10 steps to calculate the total price for 
order OO. It only takes 180+10=190 steps to complete the task. By sharing workload in 
multiple e-markets, the complexity of computation can be reduced. This is an efficient 
way to cut down the complexity of e-trading problems. 
In the next section, computational complexity is studied. A larger size of core means 
more profits for the traders. To combine the cores into a larger core with no complexity 
problems is another important goal of this research. Collaborations between traders can 
reduce the high computational complexity (Xiang et al. 2005). The model proposed is a 
distributed system, which can also help to reduce computational complexity. The issue of 
distributed systems is raised again in the next section. 
3.2.3 Computational Complexity 
The term computational complexity can be defined as “a mathematical 
characterisation of the difficulty of a mathematical problem which describes the resources 
required by a computing machine to solve the problem” (The American Heritage Science 
Dictionary 2005). The mathematical study of such characterizations is called 
computational complexity theory and is important in many branches of theoretical 
computer science (Shehory and Kraus 1999, Rahwan and Jennings 2007). 
In computer science, computational complexity is a measure of the time complexity of 
an algorithm (Papadimitriou 1994). This quantifies the amount of time taken by the 
algorithm to solve a problem of a given size of input by calculating how many steps or 
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how much time a computer needs to process it. The time complexity of an algorithm is 
commonly expressed using big O notation, which was popularised in computer science 
by Donald Knuth in 1976. The formal definition of big O notation is as follows, Let f, g: 
N→N be two functions. Given f ∈ O(g) if there exists a real number c > n0 and a 
nonnegative integer n0, so that for each n ∈ N with n ≥ n0, we have f(n) ≤ c·g(n). 
Alternatively, f ∈ O(g) if and only if there is a real number c > 0 such that lim sup n → ∞ 
(f(n)+1)/(g(n)+1)=c. So, big O notation hides constant factors and smaller terms, for 
instance, if T(n) = 7n2 + 15n + 40, in big O notation one would write T(n) = O(n2). 
Computational complexity is also a way to classify a problem according to its inherent 
difficulty - that is, whether it is ‘quick’ or ‘slow’ to solve. There are problems in four 
classes of complexity (Goldreich 2010): 
• P: It is the class of problems for which have algorithms to provide solutions in 
polynomial time i.e. they can be solved within a relative short time. The big O 
notation of their algorithms are O(nk) and k is a constant. 
• NP: It is the class of problems for which have no known way to sort out them quickly, 
but if one is provided with information showing what the answer is, it may be 
possible to work out solutions in polynomial time.  
• NP-Complete: The problems in NP are neither in P nor NP-complete (Ladner 1975). 
Thus the problems in this class are the most difficult problems in NP, in the sense 
that they are hard and have no fast solution (Garey and Johnson 1979). 
• NP-Hard: It is the class of problems which are at least as hard as NP-complete 
problems. NP-hard problems need not be classified in NP. 
Many problems encountered when dealing with trading are classified as NP-Complete 
problems (Luo and Parnas 1994) and the time required to solve these problems easily 
reaches into billions or trillions of years, when there are many providers and buyers to 
exchange huge amount of goods in e-markets. This can be as complicated as shown in 
Fig. 3.4. In practice, the size of coalitions in e-markets can be too large to deal with. As 
mentioned in section 3.1, finding a core in a coalition is also an NP-complete problem. 
To reduce the computational complexity is an important issue. In this research, three 
methods are adopted in the model to reduce the computational complexity of e-trading 
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problems. One way to solve high complexity computational problems is to design the 
model in such a way that it becomes a distributed system (Lynch 1996). 
 
Figure 3.4 Traditional Relationships 
Another way this can be achieved is by encouraging traders to collaborate with each 
other. It has been proven that collaboration between players in games can effectively 
reduce the computational complexity (Maheswaran and Basar 2003), so collaboration 
amongst traders will probably be another way to reduce complexity in e-markets. In the 
next subsection, before this collaboration is discussed, information-hiding needs to be 
introduced. This is a technique used in the background, behind the collaboration, to deal 
with the complexity problem in a large coalition as well. 
3.2.3.1 Information-Hiding 
In computer science, information-hiding is a technique which prevents certain 
information or software components from being accessible to users. In this research, this 
technique is used in coalition problems not only to protect market information from other 
brokers, but also to reduce the computational complexity (Smith and Comiskey 1996). 
This technique was used in combining multiple e-markets to maximise traders’ benefits 
in this research and the previous works (Sun et al. 2012 a). 
 
Figure 3.5 Relationships in Collaboration 
In Fig. 3.5, the relationship between buyers, providers and goods becomes simple, 
especially when compared with Fig. 3.4. The offers from a sellers’ coalition can be put 
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together and becomes a big seller. 
Table 3.15 Three Providers 
Provider ID Product ID Stock Price Cost 
P1 T1 32 67 23 
 T2 41 47 14 
P2 T1 21 65 21 
P3 T1 18 59 18 
 T2 55 49 15 
Table 3.16 A Joint Provider 
Provider ID Product ID Stock Price Cost 
Sun T1 71 64.38 21.14 
 T2 96 48.15 14.57 
Table 3.15 shows original products offered by the three providers P1, P2 and P3. 
Broker Sun has all the stocks shown in Table 3.16, after merging providers. The 
representative called Sun is the new and only seller after the providers are merged. He is 
the newest provider and therefore put in the last element of the providers’ array. The new 
unit price for each item is the average unit price and the cost of each product averages the 
cost of the product for all the providers. 
Assume there are g goods, p sellers and b buyers in an e-market. It takes p×10×b×g 
steps for the pseudocode in Table 3.11. Its big O notation is O(n3) when there are many 
goods, buyers and sellers in the e-market. Now by combining the buyers into one buyer, 
and the sellers into one seller, the steps for the same pseudocode becomes 1×10×g×1. 
As a consequence, the model just needs to calculate the result between one buyer and one 
provider and its big O notation is successfully reduced to O(n). The computation 
therefore becomes trivial and fast. 
Who should be the suitable person to present the providers? It is necessary to ensure 
that this individual is not going to be a potential buyer. A third party such as a broker is 
recommended by this research for he/she is certainly a better candidate than anyone of 
the providers. The brokers collect the product information from the providers. Then they 
put all the offers under their name. Instead of the providers, they now can play as sellers.  
In chapter 2, this merging allows the providers to perform joint-selling together, so 
that they may gain competitive advantages and offer high volume discount to their clients 
due to low cost. The marginal discounts in Table 3.17 come from the volume discounts in 
Table 3.7. By checking the minimum quantity in the minimum quantity field, the volume 
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discount for a certain quantity can be known. 
Table 3.17 Marginal Discount 
Product ID Margin Minimum Quantity Discount 
C1 1 10 30% 
C1 2 30 35% 
C1 3 50 45% 
C1 4 80 50% 
C1 5 100 55% 
C1 6 130 60% 
Five orders O1, O2, O3, O4 and O5 shown in Table 3.18, are from buyers in the e-
market. Table 3.19 shows that combined order O6 are from the market’s broker Ben. The 
ordered dates on it is the date when the orders are combined, in this case 26 April. So Ben 
orders products T1 and T2 from provider Sun and the amounts are 3+2+19+18=42 
and 14+17+2+5=38 respectively. The ‘expected discount’ is a special field in the order 
detail table to be used to decide whether a product of an order will be included or not. 
When the actual discount of a product in an order is less than the expected discount, the 
product may be dropped from the order at the end. The maxima expected discount is the 
final expected discount of the product in the combined order. 
Table 3.18 Five Orders 
Order ID Customer ID Ordered Date Product ID Quantity Expected Discount 
O1 Andy01 03/04/2012 T1 3 5% 
   T2 14 12% 
O2 Ken01 09/04/2012 T1 2 20% 
   T2 17 0% 
O3 Tom01 11/04/2012 T2 2 8% 
O4 Sam01 14/04/2012 T1 19 15% 
O5 James01 25/04/2012 T1 18 15% 
   T2 5 5% 
Table 3.19 A Combined Order 
Order ID Customer ID Ordered Date Product ID Quantity Expected Discount 
O6 Ben 26/04/2012 T1 42 20% 
   T2 38 12% 
With the sum of all the orders being greater than that of any one individual (Table 3.19) 
the combined order O6 may get greater discounts from the volume discount actually 
offered by the providers. As a result, orders from the coalition become a single 
transaction only. This is a powerful way to reduce the size of coalitions and to speed up 
the data communication on the internet. In an e-market, it is necessary to hide personal 
information at the request of individuals and to meet the requirements of Data Protection 
legislation. 
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One advantage to gather customers in multiple e-markets is that there is no need to go 
through the complex process of group division. Another benefit is that it is well suited to 
the environment of the Internet. A small number of consumers would not be able to gain 
any bargaining power at all. Through combining small coalitions of e-markets, a larger 
group can be generated easily. In this way, providers may draw more customers to their 
joint-selling and gain profits. The process described above has been adopted in the model 
presented in this work. 
The thesis is concerned with cooperative games, where coalitions may enforce 
cooperative behaviour. The buyers in the five-person coalition can coordinate their 
strategies to maximise and share the profit. It is beneficial to have representatives like 
Ben to integrate the strategies of members of a coalition. It is also essential to introduce 
third-party professional coordinators such as brokers to organise seller coalitions and 
make them harmonising teams without breaking competition laws. 
Collaboration is a process where two or more people or organisations work together 
for a common goal for their mutual benefit. Using information-hiding can reduce the 
complexity of a coalition, but collaboration between the participants is essential if this 
reduction in complexity is to be achieved. In the next subsection, another reason is given 
for why collaboration is important in this research. 
3.2.3.2 Collaboration 
In the literature, two relationships are identified: cooperation and collaboration. 
Cooperation is a term that “assumes two or more parties, each with separate and 
autonomous programmes, agree to work together in making such programmes more 
successful” (Hord, 1986). Each cooperating participant remains totally independent, takes 
no risk, and retains total authority. On the other hand, collaboration is a “mutually 
beneficial and well-defined relationship entered into by two or more organisations to 
achieve common goals” (Mattessich, Murray-Close and Monsey 2001). It is a formal 
relationship involving shared authority and responsibility for planning, implementation, 
and evaluation of a joint effort. In addition, the risk to each collaborating participant is 
Chapter 3 The Core and Solutions 
60 
 
greater because each member contributes their own resources and reputation. 
The collaboration between members of coalitions plays an important role in online 
group-trading. For example, if there is to be a reduction in complexity, the individual 
computers in each e-market solving their own part of this big problem need to be linked 
together and working as part of the group. Otherwise this reduction in complexity cannot 
happen. Many things need to be coordinated, so that the trading in multiple e-markets can 
work well and smoothly. Good team work consists essentially of the following roles: 
• Leader: This is the person who makes sure that the trading is set to a specific 
schedule, such as which days to close deal and at which time. 
• Recorder: This person keeps track of what happened during the trading in relation to 
the project being discussed. 
• Questioner: This person dares to ask questions that other members might not be 
thinking about, so that the disadvantages to a decision can be found and the involved 
risks may be brought up. 
• Harmoniser: This is a peace maker who creates a harmonious atmosphere and 
conveys that each participant may have a certain point they want to address. 
Since the cooperation between selfish buyers can be unreliable and one provider 
teaming up with another provider may breach the competition rules, in this research, 
brokers are introduced to play the above roles. A broker involves one or more than one 
role. Therefore, the inter-relationship of these roles would need coordinating to ensure the 
collaboration in coalitions and to smooth the process of group-trading in e-markets. 
One of the advantages for buyers when they form a coalition and buy wholesale is that 
they obtain bulk discounts; this is what the buyers are after, and it gives them the 
incentive to work together. However, the buyers must depend on someone like broker 
Ben to transform their coalition into the large buyer. They have to first give Ben the 
orders, and then he can combine them. When Ben gets the invoice from the provider, the 
transaction is now his responsibility, and he must figure out the amount each person owes, 
collect the money, pay the invoice and ask the providers to dispatch the items. The 
relationship between Ben and each buyer must be more formal than cooperation. Because 
Ben plays such an important role in the teamwork and holds a position of trust, the buyers 
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may well have a legal agreement with him. 
The model proposed will work better with a large number of participants. This is why 
brokers are brought into use in this research. Sun and Ben are named as brokers and they 
earn commission by collaborating with the providers and buyers and providing them the 
service. On the same principle, collaboration between a broker and a coalition of 
providers can easily lead to a situation where the coalition becomes one very big provider 
and carries out bundle selling which involves multiple suppliers. In addition, if brokers 
collaborate with one another, it may be possible for them to find more buyers. For 
instance, it is good to have several brokers like Ben in different regions. Each broker 
finds customers locally. This may also save some handling expenses like shipping or tax. 
If brokers collaborate together well, it will be possible to form a big coalition on a global 
level and thus to attract in a large number of buyers. In the CBM, the main reason for 
several brokers working together is that they know that the buyers will get better 
discounts in a large coalition and providers will gain higher sales. The roles and the main 
tasks of brokers in the new model will be discussed in the next chapter. 
3.3 Summary 
‘The core’ was first proposed by Francis Y. Edgeworth in 1881 as an economics term. 
It was later defined in game theory terms by Gillies in 1953 indicating the set of 
imputations under which no coalition has a value greater than the sum of its members' 
profits. It is important for coalition problems, because it may find a stable set and 
calculate an equilibrium price. It has been tested and run within simple market games. 
The results of these games demonstrate that a market needs at least a certain number of 
participants to reach the state of equilibrium and to come to the equilibrium price for the 
participants. It also shows the advantages and problems of the core. 
Firstly, the core provides a way to find a stable set, which is also a Pareto efficiency 
allocation. Secondly it gives that set incentive compatibility. It also shows that a 
coalition should include buyers and sellers to reach an equilibrium price, and this will be 
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crucial in stabilising the coalition. However, it has three problems: (a) no stable set, (b) 
high computational complexity in a large coalition and (c) difficulty in obtaining input 
information needed. It does not seem practical to use the core concept in e-markets. 
Some useful solutions for the problems of the core are introduced by considering 
incentive compatibility, distributed computing, and less computational complexity. 
In the new model, there are at least three incentives for traders: a volume discount, an 
equilibrium price and a fair distribution. The stability checks and the Pareto efficiency 
ensure that the traders in e-markets can have the best price. The Shapley value gives the 
last incentive to traders to join the coalition, because they know they will get their fair 
share. The new model is a distributed system by nature, because it involves multiple e-
marketplaces on the Internet. It is crucial for this research to make efforts towards 
solving the computational problem in e-markets, because, in practice, the size of 
coalitions in e-markets can be too large to deal with. In addition to a distributed 
computing system, information hiding can be also used to solve the problems of high 
computational complexity. The aforementioned methods were adopted in the new model 
through the collaboration of the traders in e-markets. 
In the next chapter, a new model for group trading in e-markets is proposed. All the 
concepts mentioned in the present chapter will be included in the proposed model. It will 
be helpful to discuss the logical processes involved in designing the model to see how 
these concepts can be blended together theoretically. As the description unfolds it will 
become clear how combining these concepts together can deliver the basis of a workable 
group trading site. 




New Core Broking Model  
In this chapter, a new group-trading model for e-markets called the Core Broking 
Model (CBM), is proposed. This new model incorporates the features identified in the 
conclusions of the previous chapters and are discussed. The CBM is based on the core 
and adopts other solution concepts to solve the problems of online coalitions. The model 
involves joint-selling of multiple goods in e-marketplaces, offering volume discount for 
group-buying coalitions. It inherits the advantages of the core. Additional features 
incorporated in the new model are presented to ensure that the three problems of the core 
have been dealt with in section 4.1. These three factors, distributed computing, less 
computational complexity, and incentive compatibility, are incorporated in the model to 
resolve the problems associated with trader coalitions on the internet. 
The construction of this model is presented in the first section of this chapter. Through 
a description of the components contained in the main structure of the CBM, the full 
picture of the CBM can be seen. In the model, besides providers and buyers, there are 
core-brokers and market-brokers. They play different roles and are important in the 
trading process. In section 4.2, the profiles of the core-brokers and market-brokers are 
described. In the real world, a broker functions as an intermediary between parties as they 
negotiate agreements, purchases, or sales in return for a fee or commissions. Section 4.3 
contains a description of how the fees system in the CBM has been set up, so that the 
providers and the buyers contribute the commission for the brokers. 
The model is an online broking system performing functions similar to that of a human 
broker. In the CBM, there is a Core Broking System (CBS) website, specially designed to 
support the core-brokers and market-brokers in their tasks of group-trading. In the fees 
system, the brokers receive a commission by offering their services. How the new model 
works and what it does are answered more precisely in the overview of the CBM in 
sections in this chapter. 
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4.1 Introduction to the CBM 
The CBM inherits the core concept and a core in a coalition can also be derived 
from the same function as the core: 
C(v):={x∊𝕽n  |x(N)=v(N), x(S)≥v(S) for all S∊2N}, 
However, the CBM creates a virtual market on the Internet by involving multi e-markets. 
In this virtual e-market, there can be many group-trading projects in the model. Many 
providers join in the projects and perform joint-selling and sufficient buyers gather in e-
markets because they may get the high discounts available in the projects. So there is a 
healthy level of competition in the virtual e-markets. 
The diagram in Fig. 4.1 represents the structure and gives an overview of the CBM. It 
shows that core-brokers initiate projects, which involve multiple providers, on the CBS 
website and recruit market-brokers to form a team to work on a session of group-trading. 
The market-brokers list the project on the appropriate shopping sites and form buyers’ 
coalitions there. 
 
Figure 4.1 Structure of the CBM 
The CBM is composed of core-brokers, projects, providers’ coalitions, a CBS (Core 
Broking System), e-markets, market-brokers and buyers’ coalitions. The description of 
each component is as follows: 
• Core-brokers − the initiators of the group-trading projects. 
• Projects − sessions of group-trading in e-marketplaces. They involve bundle selling 
of multiple goods from several providers, offering volume discounts to many 
different buyers in group-buying coalitions. 
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• Providers − provide products and services for the core-broker. 
• Market-brokers − professional brokers playing the role of team members in the 
core-brokers’ teams helping them with the group-trading projects. 
• E-markets − may be any existing online shopping avenues such as eBay, Groupon, 
Ruby Lane or the market-brokers’ own sites on which they can post the projects and 
find customers. 
• Buyers − the market-brokers’ clients, who have been attracted to the projects. 
• The CBS consists of three components as follows: 
1. CBS Website− list of group-trading projects. Market-brokers may come here and 
search for the projects which interest them. It is a place where core-brokers and 
market-brokers meet together. 
 
Figure 4.2 Project Subsystem 
2. Project Subsystem − a system specially designed to assist the core-broker in 
managing all the necessary tasks to assure quality outcomes. There are eleven 
functions in it (Fig. 4.2). 
(a) Manage projects − allows the core-brokers to manage their projects and 
to prepare all the essential pre-tasks before their group-trading projects is 
running. This function is specially designed to assist the core-brokers to 
create profitable projects, therefore it consists the following sub-functions: 
(1) Maintain group-trading proposals: A thoughtful proposal usually lead 
to a successful group-trading project. A proposal can be created, 
modified, listed and deleted here. The brokers may also refer to some 
others’ proposals if there have been agreed by the owners. 
(2) Find providers: Providers are the most important resource of the core-
brokers. They select suitable providers for the group-trading projects. 
Chapter 4 New Core Broking Model 
66 
 
(3) Joint providers: The core-brokers are the sellers of the projects and the 
providers’ information will not put on the projects. They must joint 
providers together before the projects are settled. 
(4) Refer existing projects: The brokers may also refer to some others’ 
projects. 
(5) Maintain projects: A formal project can be created, modified, listed 
and deleted here. 
(6) Display projects: Displaying projects on the CBS site is a direct way 
for core-brokers to find the market-brokers they want. 
(b) Recruit market-brokers − the core-brokers can use this function to 
recruit market-brokers. Every time a new session of group-trading starts, 
the core-broker needs to ensure that he/she has the right market-brokers. 
(c) Start trading sessions − sets up the information that is needed before a 
trading session can begin, such as the starting date and the end date. 
(d) Combine orders − puts together the orders that the market-brokers have 
created. 
(e) Rank orders − sorts the orders on the basis of the time they were 
submitted. 
(f) Calculate total benefits − computes the total benefits of a coalition 
including the discounts of the buyers’ coalition and the profits of the 
providers’ coalition. 
(g) Check stability − ensures that none of the subsets of a coalition has a 
larger total benefit than the coalition itself. 
(h) Prepare notices − prepare two kinds of notice. One is to notice the 
market-brokers how many items are for their clients. The other is for the 
providers to inform them how many items of theirs have been sold out.  
(1) Decides the quantity of products for each market-broker. 
(2) Sends out invoices to the market-brokers. 
(3) Decides the number of products fairly for each provider according to 
their contributions. 
(4) Sends out orders to the providers. 
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(i) Pass coupons − when payment from the market-brokers has passed into 
the core-brokers’ bank accounts, this function will allow the core-brokers 
to buy the electronic coupons from the providers and send them to the 
market-brokers. 
(j) Distribute profits − calculates the commission for each broker and the 
payment for each provider. 
(k) Terminate projects − ends the projects. 
3. Market Subsystem − this system has seven functions as shown in Fig. 4.3. By 
using it, the market-brokers can perform transactions for a session on a particular 
project; purchase electronic coupons from the core-broker and send the coupons 
to their clients. 
 
Figure 4.3 Market Subsystem 
(a) Search projects− on the CBS site, the market-brokers may find a project 
that they are interested in, by using keyword searching in the lists of 
projects. There are three options for the market-brokers to choose. The 
first option is searching by product name. Other options involve using the 
name of core-brokers, or the ID of a project. 
(b) Accept orders − confirms the orders from the customers. 
(c) Produce market orders − creates a ‘market order’ by combining all the 
orders that are received from the customers.  
(d) Submit market orders − sends the market orders to the core-broker for 
approval. 
(e) Prepare invoices − when the market-brokers receive the notices from the 
core-broker, they can use this function to send out invoices to each 
customer. 
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(f) Purchase coupons − the market-brokers purchase coupons by transferring 
payment to the core-broker’s bank account. 
(g) Settle contracts− sends out the click-wrap contracts, which are electronic 
contracts for the consumers to click and wrapped on the Internet (Ravicher 
2000), to the customers who have ordered the items, along with the coupons. 
The overall concept of the CBM is given and its components are described in this 
section. The CBM is based on the core concept, but certain improvements have been 
made in the CBM. An explanation about the differences between the core and the CBM is 
given in the next section. 
4.2 The CBM Versus the Core 
Since the CBM is based on the core, the connection between the CBM and core is 
discussed in this section. At first, an algorithm for the core is presented in Subsection 4.2.1 
to describe the way it works. The improvements have been made into the core in the CBM 
are shown in Subsection 4.2.2. In the end of this section, an algorithm for the CBM is given 
in Subsection 4.2.3. It is easy to perceive the contrast between the CBM and the core by 
looking into the algorithms for them. 
4.2.1 An Algorithm for the Core 
In the real world marketplace, any buyer may purchase many kinds of goods. All these 
different goods can be sold to any number of buyers. And a provider may sell many 
different goods. And in one particular situation any of the goods might be provided by any 
of the sellers. In order to locate the core of a coalition, the v(S) of all the sub-groups of the 
coalition must be calculated. Assume that there are 2 customers, who are A and B, purchase 
goods from three providers: 1, 2 and 3. Table 4.1 is the list of the (3+1)2=16 sub-coalitions 
of the e-market, for example, in sub-coalition C09, denoted as {A, B, 2, 1}, customer A 
purchase goods from provider 2 and customer B orders items from provider 1. 
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Sub-Coalition A B 
C00 0 0 {} 
C01 0 1 {B, 1} 
C02 0 2 {B, 2} 
C03 0 3 {B, 3} 
C04 1 0 {A, 1} 
C05 1 1 {A, B, 1, 1} 
C06 1 2 {A, B, 1, 2} 
C07 1 3 {A, B, 1, 3} 
C08 2 0 {A, 2} 
C09 2 1 {A, B, 2, 1} 
C10 2 2 {A, B, 2, 2} 
C11 2 3 {A, B, 2, 3} 
C12 3 0 {A, 3} 
C13 3 1 {A, B, 3, 1} 
C14 3 2 {A, B, 3, 2} 
C15 3 3 {A, B, 3, 3} 
Table 4.2 Pseudocode to Find a Core 
procedure findCore(coalition, coalitionDetail, provider, providerProduct, order, orderLine) 
/* For each coalition, there are coalitionID, coalitionDiscount and coalitionProfit */ 
/* For each coalition details, there are orderID, providerID */ 
/* For each provider, there are providerID, providerName, providerProfit and providerProductNo */ 
/* For each provider product, there are providerProductID, providerProductStock, providerProductSold, providerProductPrice and providerProductCost */ 
/* For each order, there are orderID, orderDate, orderLineNo,orderCustomerID and orderProviderID */ 
/* For each order line, there are orderProductID, orderQuantity, orderActuralQuantity orderDiscount and orderExpectedDiscount */ 
core=’’;  
max=0; 
for i=0 to coalitionNo-1 
{ 
     coalitionDiscount[i]=0; 
     coalitionProfit[i]=0; 
     for j=0 to coalitionDetailNo-1 
     { 
          for k=0 to orderLineNo-1 
          { 
               for p=0 to providerNo-1 
               { 
                    if(orderProviderID[j,k]=providerID[p]) 
                    { 
                         for q=0 to providerProductNo-1 
                        { 
                              if(orderProductID[j, k] = prividerProductID[p, q]) 
                              { 
                                    coalitionDiscount[i]+=orderActuralQuantity[j, k]*orderDiscount[j, k]*providerProductPrice[p, q]; 
                                    coalitionProfit[i]+=orderActuralQuantity[j, k]*(1-orderDiscount[j, k])*providerProductPrice[p, q]; 
                                    coalitionProfit[i]-=orderActuralQuantity[j, k]*providerProductCost[p, q]; 
                              } 
                         } 
                      } 
                 } 
            } 
     } 
     sum= coalitionDiscount[i]+coalitionProfit[i]); 
     if(sum>max) 
     { 
           max=sum; 
           core=coalitionID[i]; 
     } 
} 
report core, max, coalitionDiscount, coalitionProfit; 
In a market, the v(S) of each sub-group sums up the total discount for the buyers and 
the overall benefit of the sellers in the sub-group. In Table 4.2, a pseudocode is designed 
to express the algorithm of finding a core. At first, it calculates the v(S) of every sub-
group, and this is a time consumed task. A sub-coalition, which has the biggest v(S), is 
then selected as the core. 
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4.2.2 Improvements in the CBM 
The CBM deals with large group-trading coalitions on the Internet. Therefore, this 
research must necessarily include distributed computing. The CBM has incentive 
compatibility which will attract a large number of participants to take part in trading. The 
complexity of large coalitions has been taken into account during the design process and 
it is therefore capable of working out the trading result in a short space of time. 
Table 4.3 shows that the CBM inherits two useful techniques from the core concept, 
which are the marginal utility function and the Pareto efficiency. By means of the 
marginal utility function, the total benefit of a coalition and the gains of each member can 
be calculated. As mentioned in section 3.1.3, it is difficult for brokers to collect the 
marginal utility functions from customers, and therefore the core cannot use them in 
practice. Price lists from providers and orders from customers are used to calculate the 
total benefit of a coalition and the gains of each member. Since they are publicly 
available information in e-markets, they are available for everyone. At the point of Pareto 
efficiency, an equilibrium price is reached and gives an incentive to both providers and 
buyers. However, an e-market may not reach Pareto efficient allocation (Anderson 2002). 
In the CBM, a stability check is used to ensure a Pareto efficient allocation can be 
reached in a coalition. A coalition, which passes this check, will have an equilibrium 
price, also known as a best price, for providers and buyers. 
Table 4.3 The CBM versus the Core 
 Technique Problem Result 
Inheritance 
of the core  
Marginal  utility function  Coalition’s  benefit  Coalition’s  benefit  




of  the CBM  
Internet computing  Distributed computing  E-market  
Distributed  computing  Distributed computing  E-markets  
Distributed computing  Computational complexity  Less complexity  
Information-hiding  Computational complexity  Less complexity  
Collaborate  Computational complexity Less complexity  
Stability check  Incentive compatibility  Stability & Best price  
Volume discount  Incentive compatibility  Higher discount  
Shapley value  Incentive compatibility  Fair share  
Market Information (Price lists and Orders)  Information collection Easier and more effective  
Broker  Price maker  Competitive e-market  
The above additional techniques make the CBM capable of coping with online group-
trading problems. By using three techniques, which are volume discount, stability check 
and the Shapley value, the CBM gives traders three incentives: a volume discount, an 
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equilibrium price and a fair distribution. By adding three techniques, which are 
distributed computing, information hiding and collaboration between traders, the CBM is 
able to reduce its computational complexity and to speed up the time it takes to finish the 
task. As it works in e-markets it must therefore use techniques of internet computing and 
distributed computing. The following precise improvements have been made into the core 
in the CBM, 
• Multiple e-markets environment: The problems of the core mentioned in chapter 3 
make it difficult to be used in real world e-markets, but the CBM is designed to be 
used in a multiple e-markets environment. 
• Stability check: It is essential to perform this check to ensure the stability of 
coalitions from every e-market, so that an equilibrium price can be agreed in a 
session of a group-trading project. 
• Short working time: Through collecting orders in many e-markets and combining 
them into a large order, the CBM may find a core quickly and work out an 
equilibrium price for an e-market in a short time. 
• Price lists and orders: Since it is difficult to collect marginal utility functions from 
providers and customers. In this research, price lists and costs of products are the 
needed information from providers. Orders with an additional field to indicate the 
expected discount of buyers are the input collected from customers. 
• New incentives for participants: Volume discounts are the incentives for customers 
to join group-buying. Fair distribution of profits may be an important incentive for 
providers to perform joint-selling. 
• Using brokers: Brokers are introduced to ensure the collaboration in the CBM. 
They are also used to smooth the process of trading in e-markets.  
The above improvements need to consider into the algorithm of the CBM. In the next 
subsection, an algorithm is written and meets the requirements needed in the CBM. 
4.2.3 An Algorithm for the CBM 
An algorithm is designed to contain the following tasks, which are essential in the life 
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cycle of a CBM group-trading project: 
1. Merges the providers who sign the contract for the group-trading project.  
2. Starts a session of group-trading project. 
3. Combines the orders in the same e-markets to be a market order. 
4. Checks the stability of order from every e-market. If any fails in stability check, 
returns it to its market broker. 
5. Sorts the market orders from all the e-markets by their submitted time. 
6. Decides the actual quantity for every market order. 
7. Produces a big order from the orders which successfully get the items. 
8. Decide the number of products for each provider by using the Shapley Value. 
9. Calculates the total benefit of the coalition in each e-market. 
10. Calculates the total benefit of the core. 
11. Calculates the commission for every broker. 
12. Calculates the profits for every provider. 
13. Ends the session of the project. 
Table 4.4 Pseudocode for the CBM 
procedure CBM(productNo, product, providerNo, provider, providerProduct, marketNo, marketOrderNo, marketOrder, marketOrderLine, orderNo, order, oderLine) 
/* For each provider, there are providerID, providerName, providerProfit and providerProductNo */ 
/* For each provider product, there are providerProductID, providerProductStock, providerProductSold, providerProductPrice and providerProductCost */ 
/* For each product, there are productID and productSpec */ 
/* For each market order, there are marketOrderID, marketOrderDate, marketOrderLineNo, marketOrderCustomerID and marketOrderProviderID */ 
/* For each market order line, there are marketOrderProductID, marketOrderQuantity, marketOrderActuralQuantity marketOrderDiscount and marketOrderExpectedDiscount */ 
/* For each order, there are orderID, orderDate, orderLineNo and orderCustomerID */ 
/* For each order line, there are orderProductID, orderQuantity, orderActuralQuantity orderDiscount and orderExpectedDiscount */ 
providerID[providerNo] = ‘Sun’; 




     rankOrders(Order); // sort orders by orderDate in ascending order 
     for i=0 to marketNo-1 
     { 
         decideQuantities(providerProductNo[providerNo], providerProduct[providerNo], marketNo, order[i], orderLine); 
          combineOrders(marketOrder, marketOrderLine); 
     } 
     for i=0 to order[marketNo].orderLineNo-1 
     { 
          findDiscount(order[marketNo].productID[i], quantity); 
     } 
     decideSoldItems(providerNo, provider, providerProduct); 
     stability=checkStability(providerProductNo[providerNo],  providerProduct[providerNo], marketNo, order, orderLine); 
     if(stability=’y’) 
     { 
          CBMCore=calculateCoalitionBenefit(providerProductNo[providerNo], providerProduct[providerNo], orderLineNo[orderNo], orderLine[orderNo]); 
          commission[marketNo]=calculateBrokerCommissions(productNo, providerProduct, marketNo, order, orderLine, 3%); 
          for i=0 to marketNo-1 
                commission[i]=calculateCommissions(productNo, providerProduct, orderNo[i], marketOrder[i], marketOrderLine[i], 4%); 
          calculateProfits(providerNo, provider, providerProduct); 
     } 
} 
report CBMCore, providerProfit, commission; 
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The pseudocode in Table 4.4 reflects the procedure of performing a session of group-
trading project and it is used to express the algorithm of the CBM by taking all above 
tasks into account in order to bring together the new model that has less computational 
complexity, distributed computing and incentive stability. In the above pseudocode, there 
are 7 groups of arrays, namely product, market order, market order line, order and order 
line groups. The descriptions of the arrays are in the following: 
• Provider group: consists of four arrays: providerID, providerName, providerProfit 
and providerProductNo. They are one dimension arrays storing the data of the 
providers of the group-trading projects. 
• Provider line group: consists of five arrays: providerProductID, 
providerProductStock, providerProductSold, providerProductPrice and 
providerProductCost. These two dimension arrays store the data of the products 
which providers offers. The first index of the array is provider ID and the second is 
for the product ID. 
• Product group: consists of two arrays: productID and productSpec. They are one 
dimension arrays storing the details of products. 
• Market order group: consists of five arrays: marketOrderID, marketOrderDate, 
marketOrderLineNo, marketOrderCustomerID and marketOrderProviderID. They 
are two dimension arrays storing the details of the orders from the customers in e-
markets. The first index of the array is market ID and the second index is the element 
number of the array. The data of this group are kept within the databases in the e-
markets. The brokers in the e-markets do not want to share this information with 
others relating to their customers’ orders. 
• Market order line group: consists of five arrays: marketOrderProductID, 
marketOrderQuantity, marketOrderActuralQuantity marketOrderDiscount and 
marketOrderExpectedDiscount. These three dimension arrays stores the data of the 
order lines in customers’ orders. The first index of the array is market ID and the 
second index is order ID and the third is for the order line number of orders. They are 
also the information kept secret with the market brokers. 
• Order group: consists of four arrays: orderID, orderDate, orderLineNo and 
orderCustomerID. They are one dimension arrays storing the details of the market 
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orders from the brokers in e-markets. 
• Order line group: consists of five arrays: orderProductID, orderQuantity, 
orderActuralQuantity orderDiscount and orderExpectedDiscount. These two 
dimension arrays store the data of the order lines in market orders. The first index of 
the array is order ID and the second is for the order line number of orders. 
Since there is a combined element which is merging the other elements together, the 
last position of the arrays in the above group except the ones in product group is for the 
big combined element. Take the order array as an example. Suppose there are b orders, 
the original orders are stored in 0th to (b-1)th elements in the order array. The market order 
is stored in bth position of the array. The above algorithm calls 9 functions, namely 
jointProviders, combineOrders, rankOrders, decideQuantities, decideSoldItems, 
calculateCoalitionBenefit, checkStability, calculateBrokerCommissions and 
calculateProfits. These functions are described as follows: 
1. jointProviders: it merges the providers together into a joint provider. The 
pseudocode in Table 3.12 provides a way to combine the stock of all the providers 
together and to calculate the average unit price and cost for each product. Brokers 
can perform this task by the assistance of the function ‘manage projects’ in the 
project subsystem. 
Table 4.5 Pseudocode to Find Volume Discounts 
procedure findDiscount( productID, quantity) 





     If(quantity>=marginMinQuantity[i]) 
         discount=marginDiscount[i]; 
     i++; 
} 
return discount; 
2. combineOrders: it combines the orders. By using the pseudocode in Table 3.13, the 
orders can be combined together into a big order. This pseudocode is used both the 
function ‘combine orders’ in the market and project subsystem. The pseudocode 
calls the function in Table 4.5 to find actual discounts for all the products in the 
combined order. These discounts are based on the order quantity and the volume 
discount given by the core-broker. The expected discount in the combined order is 
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the maximal expected discount of all. If the expected discount is greater than the 
actual discount, the latter for a product is set to zero, which means this product will 
be drop from the combined order. 
3. rankOrders: Sort the orders from the e-markets by the order of the submission time, 
because the trading is under FCFS principle. Quicksort is the sorting algorithm used 
in this research, because it is often faster than other algorithms (Skiena, 2008). Core-
brokers can execute the function ‘rank orders’ in the project subsystem to perform 
this task. 
4. checkStability: Check the stability of the core in the CBM. The input parameters 
are number of e-markets, products’ details of the core-broker, the market orders 
from each e-market and the final big combined order. The pseudocode in Table 4.6 
is used in ‘check stability’ in the project subsystem. 
Table 4.6 Pseudocode to Check the Stability of the Coalition 
procedure checkStability(productNo, providerProduct, marketNo, order, orderLine) 
stable=’n’; 
for i=0 to marketNo 
     v[i]= calculateCoalitionBenefit(productNo, providerProduct, orderLineNo[i], orderLine[i]); 
count=0; 
while(stable=’n’ and count<100) 
{ 
     r=1; 
     sum=0; 
     for i=0 to marketNo-2 
     { 
          b[i]=randon(0, r); 
          r-=b[i]; 
          sum+=b[i]*v[i]; 
     } 
     sum+=r*v[i]; 
     if(v[marketNo]>sum) 
          stable=’y’; 
} 
return stable; 
Table 4.7 Pseudocode to Decide Actual Quantities 
procedure decideQuantity(productNo, providerProduct, marketNo, order, orderLine) 
for i=0 to productNo-1 
{ 
     stock=providerProductStock[providerNo, i]; 
     for j=0 to marketNo-1 
     { 
          for k=0 to orderLineNo[i]-1 
          { 
                if(prividerProductID[i]= orderProductID[j]) 
               { 
                    If(stock>=orderQuantity[j, k]) 
                         orderActuralQuantity[j, k]=orderQuantity[j, k]; 
                    else 
                         orderActuralQuantity[j, k]=stock; 
                    stock-= orderActuralQuantity[j]; 
               } 
          } 
     } 
} 
return orderActuralQuantity; 
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5. decideQuantities: Decide the actual quantity for every market order. According to 
the stock of each product, the pseudocode in Table 4.7 may be used to do so. Since 
Sun is the sole provider for the products, all the e-markets’ brokers purchase goods 
from him. Core-brokers can execute the function ‘prepare notices’ in the project 
subsystem to perform this task. 
Table 4.8 Joint-Selling 
S {} {P1} {P2} {P3} {P1, P2} {P1, P3} {P2, P3} {P1, P2, P3} 
Product number 0 12 26 31 47 55 68 90 
Table 4.9 Pseudocode to Decide the Sold Items of Providers 
procedure decideSoldItems(providerNo, provider, providerProduct) 
setNo=2providerNo; 
for i=0 to productNo -1 
{ 
       productID= providerProductSold[providerNo,i]; 
     productSold= providerProductSold[providerNo,i]; 
     // if all the stock are sold out, the number of the sold product is the stock 
     if(productSold= providerProductStock[providerNo,i]) 
           for j=0 to providerNo -1 
                for k=0 to providerProductNo -1 
                    if(productID= providerProductID[j, k]; 
                          providerProductSold[j, k]= providerProductStock[j, k]; 
     else 
     { 
           for j=0 to providerNo -1 
                for k=0 to providerProductNo -1 
                    if(productID= providerProductID[j, k]; 
                          contribution[2j]=min(productSold, providerProductSold[j, k]); 
          contribution[0]=0; 
          contribution[setNo -1]=0; 
          for j=0 to setNo -1 
               if(log(j, 2)-int(log(j,2))≠0) 
               { 
                     temp=j; 
                     totalStock=0; 
                     k=0; 
                     while(temp>0) 
                     { 
                           if(temp%2=1) 
                                  totalStock+=contribution[2k]; 
                           temp/=2; 
                            k++; 
                       } 
               } 
          Shapley=calculateShapleyValue(providerNo, contribution); 
           for j=0 to providerNo -1 
                for k=0 to providerProductNo -1 
                    if(productID= providerProductID[j, k]; 
                          providerProductSold[j, k]=Shapley [j, k]; 
     } 
} 
return providerProductSold; 
6. decideSoldItems: Decide the number of products for each provider by using the 
Shapley Value. The preferred numbers should be the stocks of the providers, but if 
the stock is not sold out, the items of each provider that are sold to the customers are 
decided by using Shapley Value. Assume that three provider, namely P1, P2 and P3 
perform joint-selling for one particular product. According Table 4.8, which shows 
Chapter 4 New Core Broking Model 
77 
 
the number of items sold in every sub-coalition, the items offered by each provider 
can be decided by using the calculation of the Shapley value. The results are 19, 32 
and 39 for providers P1, P2 and P3 respectively. This task can also perform by 
executing the function ‘prepare notices’ in the project subsystem. Its pseudocode is in 
Table 4.9. 
7. calculateCoalitionBenefit: Calculate the benefit of a coalition. The process of the 
calculation is simple and straightforward. Core-brokers can execute the function 
‘calculate total benefits’ in the project subsystem to perform this task by using the 
pseudocode in Table 4.10 to calculate the v(S) of the coalitions in e-markets and the 
core in the CBM. 
Table 4.10 Pseudocode to Calculate Coalition’s Benefit 
procedure calculateCoalitionBenefit(productNo, providerProduct, orderLineNo, orderLine) 
benefit=0; 
for i=0 to orderLineNo[orderNo]-1 
{ 
     for j=0 to productNo-1 
     { 
          if(orderProductID[orderNo, i]=prividerProductID[productNo, j]) 
          { 
               orderDiscount[orderNo]+=orderActuralQuantity[orderNo,i]*orderDiscount[orderNo,i]*providerProductPrice[productNo,j]; 
               orderProfit[orderNo]+=orderActuralQuantity[orderNo,i]*(1-orderDiscount[orderNo,i])*providerProductPrice[productNo,j]; 
               orderProfit[orderNo]-=orderActuralQuantity[orderNo, i]*providerProductCost[productNo, j]; 
          } 
     } 
     benefit= orderDiscount[orderNo]+ orderProfit[orderNo]); 
} 
return benefit; 
8. calculateCommissions: Calculate the commission for every broker. The suggested 
commissions, namely handling fees and final value fees for the brokers in the CBM 
may refer to section 4.4 for the details. The pseudocode of calculating the 
commissions is shown in Table 4.11. This is one of the tasks of the function 
‘distribute profits’ in project subsystem.  
Table 4.11 Pseudocode to Calculate the Commissions to Brokers 
procedure calculateCommissions( productNo, providerProduct, orderNo, order, orderLine, rate) 
for i=0 to ProductNo-1 
{ 
     for k=0 to orderLineNo[orderNo]-1 
          if(orderProductID[orderNo, k]=prividerProductID[productNo, i]) 
               n=k; 
     commission=0; 
     for k=0 to orderNo-1 
          for r=0 to orderLineNo[k]-1 
               if(orderProductID[k, r]=prividerProductID[productNo,i]) 
               { 
                     // Handling Fee 
                     difference=orderDiscount[orderNo,n]- orderDiscount[k, r]; 
                     commission+=orderQuantity[k, r]*providerProductPrice[providerNo, j]*difference*10%; 
                     // Final Value Fee 
                     commission+=orderQuantity[k, r]*providerProductPrice[providerNo, i]*(1- orderDiscount[orderNo, n])*rate; 
                   } 
} 
return commission; 
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9. calculateProfits: Calculate the profits of all the providers. The profits for the 
providers can be easily calculated, when the net profit is figured out by deducting 
commissions, which is 7% of final value fee from the total profit. The pseudocode 
in Table 4.12 is to calculate the profits of the providers. This is another task of the 
function ‘distribute profits’ in project subsystem. 
Table 4.12 Pseudocode to Calculate the Profits of Providers 
procedure calculateProfits(providerNo, provider, providerProduct) 
for i=0 to providerNo-1 
     for j=0 to providerProductNo[i]-1 
     { 
          providerProfit[i]=0; 
          for k=0 to providerProductNo[providerNo]-1 
               if(providerProductID[providerNo,k]=prividerProductID[i, j]) 
                    for r=0 to orderLineNo[orderNo]-1 
                         if(orderProductID[orderNo,r]=prividerProductID[i, j]) 
                         { 
                               gain+= providerProductPrice[providerNo,k]*(1- orderDiscount[orderNo,r]*(1-7%);  
                               providerProfit[i]+= providerProductSold[i, j]*(gain- providerProductCost[i,j]); 
                              } 
     } 
report providerProfit; 
In order to ensure a healthy level of competition and the collaboration between traders 
of group-trading in e-markets, the CBM adopts brokers to prevent price makers as would 
occur in monopolies or cartels. Brokers are also used to smooth the process of trading in e-
markets. Brokers are involved in the group-trading to smoothen the process of transactions. 
Because brokers are so vital in the model, different roles for core-broker and market-broker 
need to be clarified. The main subject of the next section is the use of brokers in the CBM. 
4.3 Brokers in the CBM 
Brokers are “persons who buy and sell goods or assets for others” (The New Oxford 
Dictionary of English 2010). They typically functions as agents responsible for executing 
purchases and sales of goods. They have to be available to receive orders and carry out 
transactions. When they are asked to place an order, they must consult with the client and 
obtain the specific information they need to complete it. Professional brokers usually have 
licenses to prove that they are well-versed in the regulations and laws of the securities industry. 
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Brokers play a wide variety of roles in trading process. They may be salespersons and 
fill orders based on specific instructions received from their clients. They may also serve 
as trading advisers to their customers providing services like market research or trade 
recommendations. Many brokers keep their customers informed regarding any relevant 
news that might affect customers’ trade positions. The broker may be a brokerage firm, 
but in this research, this term usually refers to an individual. 
In the CBM, there are core-brokers and market-brokers. Some valuable lessons have 
been learnt from the failure of previous group-buying sites. A research article suggests 
that the expertise of group leaders is an important factor for a member’s involvement in a 
group-buying session (Lin 2009). Unprofessional leadership of a coalition leads to a lack 
of commitment among its members, and so the conclusion is that group leaders must be 
specialists. In order to avoid unequal member allocations, the person who organises the 
group-trading session should not be a member of the group. This makes a broker a perfect 
candidate to manage a group. Brokers are specialists in trading and do not belong to any 
coalition, so they can be a great help to group-trading. Brokers organise coalitions and 
look after the process of trading. In the CBM, suppliers provide products, but they do not 
directly sell goods to customers. The actual sellers are the brokers. 
Two different kinds of broker are assigned varied tasks at different points in time. 
First, the core-broker brings up a proposal which combines several products together in 
order to do a session of bundle selling. Then the market-brokers give notice of a sale on 
their sites and bring the customers in. Next the core-broker collects the orders from the 
market-brokers and builds up the buyer coalitions by forming them into groups. Finally, 
the market-brokers close the deals by sending the coupons to the buyers when they have 
paid for their goods. The core-brokers interact with the providers to get the information 
they need about items and communicates with the market-brokers about their orders. Also 
the market-brokers may speak with the core-broker or the buyers. 
The core-broker acts as the representative for the coalition of providers, and a market-
broker is the representative for a coalition of buyers. The core-broker acts like a project 
manager. On the other hand, the market-brokers are like salesmen in the CBM. The main 
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interaction is between the core-broker and the market-brokers and it is crucial for the 
CBM. Commission is an effective way to encourage brokers to fulfil their duties. 
4.3.1 Market-brokers 
In the CBM, market-brokers act like real-world salesmen. The market-brokers are the 
people with whom the customers deal in this model. The role of the market-broker is 
essential in making or breaking a deal with buyers. The interaction between customers 
and salesmen often determines the final outcome of a retail transaction. In the present 
competitive world, an unprofitable firm can easily die off. Good salesmen can easily 
increase the profits of a store in retail marketing. Therefore market-brokers capable of 
finding potential buyers are necessary for a successful project. 
Market-brokers can find the project in which they are interested, on the CBS website, 
where the current group-trading projects are listed. After signing an agreement for a session 
of group-trading with a core-broker, market-brokers may advertise on their own online shops 
and start to gather buyers. They should get a URL for their shops first, so their shops can be 
easily accessed by customers. Market-brokers will probably not have a URL at this point. 
They may open their shops on the website of some popular online shopping sites like eBay. 
In the CBM, the market-brokers can use the market subsystem to perform all the tasks 
needed in the trading process on the e-marketplace. They are at liberty to use any other 
marketing tools they may prefer to help with their sites. There are plenty of useful market 
function models which have been suggested (Bakos 1998, Giaglis, Klein and O'Keefe 
2002, Alonso 2003). Some of these models, working through on-line Web service 
directories, can produce functions for an e-market to serve three main purposes (Clark 
2002): (a) to match buyers and providers; (b) to facilitate transactions and (c) to provide 
the institutional infrastructure for business. 
It is a market-broker’s duty to form a buyers’ coalition on an e-market. All the orders 
in the buyers’ coalition will be transformed into one single order before the market-
broker submits this to the core-broker. Because the core-broker does not have the 
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opportunity to get any information from the buyers, taking care of buyers is the main 
responsibility of the market-broker. There is another advantage here, in that the CBM 
regards the information of the customers as the private property of the market-broker. So, 
nobody, not even the core-broker, can steal the customers away from the market-brokers. 
4.3.2 Core-brokers 
A successful project always has a responsible core-broker. The role of core-brokers is 
similar to that of a project manager. The core-brokers create a project for a session of 
bundle selling and have overall responsibility for the successful planning, execution, 
monitoring, control and closure of a project. They initialise a joint-selling proposal, in 
which several providers will need to be involved. One of the things that the core-brokers 
must look for is people they can work with to be providers and market-brokers. They may 
find providers through many channels such as the online UK business directory, which 
“offers free business listings of thousands of companies, businesses, non-profit 
organisations and charities which serve the UK” (UK Business Directory n . d . ). 
It does not matter whether market-brokers come from a team that the core-broker has 
made up or whether they are found in a list of candidates who are interested in the 
positions. Good market-brokers will need to attract lots of customers. When the market-
brokers have formed their buyers’ coalitions, the core-broker combines all the coalitions 
together. The performance of each market-broker is then recorded so that the core-broker 
will be able to refer to it in the future. The final duty for the core-broker is to calculate 
discounts for the coalition and to send notices to the relevant market-brokers. 
The core-brokers will negotiate an agreement with the market-brokers, but they must 
lay down the strategies for the market-brokers carefully as these will affect their 
performance. The core-broker provides all the necessary information to the market-
brokers for them to promote the product and market it. Commission and agreements for 
brokers are discussed in the next section. 
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4.4 Fees System of the CBM 
Core-brokers need the help of several market-brokers for their projects. In the CBM, a 
core-broker needs to make an agreement with each market-broker individually. An 
agreement is “a negotiated and typically legally binding arrangement between parties as 
to a course of action” (The New Oxford Dictionary of English 2010). In order to 
recognise the need for high standards in the quality of the dynamic business processes 
involved and to guarantee that these are maintained from start to finish, a formal 
agreement is commonly used to create mutual business relations between the parties. As 
the agreement is negotiated, the requirements of the parties, such as the duties they must 
carry out and the commission they will be paid, become established. 
A commission agreement is used in the CBM. The specification of commission for each 
market-broker must be clearly identified. The commission agreement should contain details 
of the brokers, the duration of the agreement, information about the project and also about 
the laws in force in that particular country. A satisfactory commission agreement 
encourages the market-brokers to attract more customers. The main purpose of the 
commission agreement is to fix the amount of commission paid to the brokers and the 
terms that will apply; it is an important stage for brokers, as the commission is a powerful 
incentive for them. In the CBM, the financial transactions between brokers are by bank 
transfer. In order to determine a suitable commission system for the CBM, the investigation 
in section 2.4, which examined the commission paid in popular e-commerce shopping sites, 
is taken into consideration. The average percentage of final value fee is around 7.5%. The 
average online store fee is about £24.50. Most of the sites do not charge insertion fees. 
Good teamwork is essential to a successful group-trading project. Providers supply 
goods which brokers will sell for them in the CBM. It is the brokers’ job to perform 
marketing and selling. If the core-broker, as a project manager, is creative enough, 
effective group-trading sessions will result. The contribution of powerful salesmen will 
ensure that more customers contribute to the trading. With the help of a professionally 
designed Web page, a stable e-marketplace can function properly. But unless the fees to 
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these people are at a sufficient level to encourage them to make a contribution to the 
team, it is unlikely that any group-trading will take place. 
This subsection explains the fees system of the CBM and how the members pay their 
fees. Commission for brokers in the CBM comes from the fees that the providers pay. 
Charging high fees will make brokers happy, but may repel providers. A site with low 
fees will end up in debt. A good fees system is essential for a group-trading site. The 
eBay’s fees system in Appendix 2 and the survey of fees systems in current e-markets in 
section 2.4 contribute greatly to the CBM’s fees system here. In the CBM, there are four 
kinds of fees: a session fee, an online store fee, a handling fee and a final value fee. The 
session fee and the online store fee are paid to the CBS site, while the handling fee and 
the final value fee are the commission paid to the brokers. 
It is suggested that a session fee of £30 should be paid by core-brokers every time they 
enter a listing for a session on a project on the site. The session fee is the only fee the 
core-brokers need to pay. They do not pay any other fee for the project. An online store 
fee of £24.50 is a suggested monthly fee for market-brokers, who wish to open an online 
store on the CBS site including purchase of domain name, server use, maintenance etc. 
These payments are the main income of the site. However, online store on the CBS is not 
yet available to any market-broker due to the small capacity of current server. 
The brokers will earn two kinds of commission in return for their efforts. The brokers 
set the projects in motion and keep a watchful eye on the process of group-trading and 
ensure that what is on offer to the buyers will be attractive to them. A final value fee is 
paid by the providers to reward the brokers. The brokers combine the orders to ensure 
that buyers get better discounts. A handling fee from the buyers rewards the brokers. 
These two fees will be automatically deducted from the payments before being 
transferred into the core-brokers’ accounts. 
It is suggested that the final value fee in the CBM should be 7% of the final selling 
value. When a final value fee is received, it is then divided into two portions. The market-
broker takes 4% and the core-broker gains 3%. For example, a core-broker CB has four 
market-brokers: MB1, MB2, MB3 and MB4, who order 100, 80, 120 and 50 items 
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respectively. Assume that the retail price of an item from a provider is £100 and the 
buyers get 40% discount. The final selling price for one unit of the item is £100×(1–
40%)=£60. The total number of items is 100+80+120+50=350. The provider earns 
£60×350×(1–7%)= £195,300. The core-broker gains £60×350×3%–£30= £600. As 
an example of a market-broker MB3 gets £60×120×4%= £288. 
It is suggested that the handling fee should be 10% of the extra discount, which the 
customer gains, after each of the brokers has processed the orders. For example, in Table 
4.13, market-broker MB3 has four customers C1, C2, C3 and C4. Customer C1 orders 10 
items and has a discount of 3% at the beginning. When MB3 put the orders together, the 
market order has 21% discount. Customer C1’s discount increases 21%−3%=18%, so 
he pays £100×10×18%×10%=£18 to reward MB3. When core-broker CB combines 
all the orders together, the final discount becomes 40%. C1 pays another 
£100×10×(40%−3%−18%)×10%=£19 to CB for services. The benefit that MB3 
gets from this fee, is £18+£29.70+£29.40+£33.60=£110.70, while core-broker CB 
gains £19+£62.70+£93.10+£53.20=£228 from MB3’s cl ients. 
















C1 10 3% £370 £600 £37 £637 18% £18 19% £19 
C2 33 12% £924 £1980 £92.40 £2072.40 9% £29.70 19% £62.70 
C3 49 15% £1225 £2940 £122.50 £3062.50 6% £29.40 19% £93.10 
C4 28 9% £868 £1680 £86.80 £1766.80 12% £33.60 19% £53.20 
Market-broker MB3 has four customers C1, C2, C3 and C4. Customer C1 orders 10 
items and has a discount of 3% at the beginning. When MB3 put the orders together, the 
market order has 21% discount. Customer C1’s discount increases 21%−3%=18%, so 
he pays £100×10×18%×10%=£18 to reward MB3. When core-broker CB combines 
all the orders together, the final discount becomes 40%. C1 pays another 
£100×10×(40%−3%−18%)×10%=£19 to CB for services . The benefit that MB3 
gets from this fee, is £18+£29.70+£29.40+£33.60=£110.70, while core-broker CB 
gains £19+£62.70+£93.10+£53.20=£228 from MB3’s cl ients. 
The commission to a broker can be calculated by the pseudocode in Table 4.11, in 
which the handling fees and final value fees are figured out. Brokers may get these two 
kinds of fees only when their customers’ orders are committed, so that they may bring 
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more customers to the group-trading sites and make deals. Online store fees and section 
fees are the income of the group-trading sites and will never be part of the commission of 
brokers, so they should not be considered in the pseudocode. 
In the CBM, market-brokers attract their clients in e-markets, which may be their own 
websites or existing e-commerce sites like eBay as long as the sites provide the functions 
below for them to go ahead their transactions with customers: 
• List products and services offered by their providers. 
• Send an invoice to a particular customer. 
• Receive an order placed online by a customer for the articles listed for sale. 
• Communicate with customers. 
Most market-brokers may want to open their shops on the website of some popular 
shopping avenues. One advantage of using an existing site is that such a site may have a 
good reputation and a large customer base, making it easier for the market-brokers to find 
buyers there. But they may have to pay a fee to the site although there are many sites, 
with little or no fee. They have plenty of alternatives to choose from, but they are likely 
to have varying customer bases. A good market-broker will put a lot of effort into finding 
potential customers and use more than one website at the same time for the project 
session. Another advantage for the market-brokers to deal with their clients in such sites 
is the ‘infrastructure’ support provided by these sits. 
In the next section, a definition of infrastructure and the reasons why it is important to 
an e-commerce site are discussed. The CBM is designed to be used as a practical model, 
so that its computational infrastructure must be addressed and the considerations for it are 
listed in the next section. 
4.5 A Computational Infrastructure for the CBM  
Infrastructure is “the basic physical and organizational structures and facilities needed 
for the operation of a society or enterprise” (The New Oxford Dictionary of English 2010). 
In computer science, it is the hardware and software structures and technologies needed 
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for companies to provide necessary e-commerce services to their employees, customers 
and business partners. 
In the emerging global economy, e-commerce has increasingly become a necessary 
component of business strategy for economic cooperation and development. E-commerce 
is the use of electronic communications and digital information processing technology in 
business transactions to create, transform, and redefine relationships for value creation 
between or among organizations, and between organizations and individuals (Lallana et 
al. 2000). E-commerce is usually associated with buying and selling over the Internet, 
and it is chiefly concerned with any form of business transaction in which the parties 
interact electronically rather than by physical exchanges or direct physical contact. 
Since the potential number of traders in e-markets may be large, a high speed network 
is required in the group-trading. There are two factors: bandwidth and latency, that 
contributes to the perceived speed of a network. Bandwidth represents the amount of data 
that passes through a network connection. A high bandwidth supporting data rates of 300 
Kbps or higher is preferred. Another element called latency is a synonym for delay. It is 
an expression of how much time it takes for a packet of data to get from one designated 
point to another. On DSL or cable Internet connections, latencies are typical less than 100 
milliseconds. Using such high-bandwidth Internet connections between computers can 
effectively reduce latency of the e-commerce system.  
Other than a high-speed network, every e-commerce company requires an 
infrastructure to support its customers and operations. It is important to choose a correct 
infrastructure to enable the group-trading operations to run efficiently in this new model. 
In section 4.5.1, different levels of requirement of the CBM are highlighted, and the 
technology elements required for its effective development are discussed. Due to the 
distributed nature of e-commerce systems, the further necessary developments and 
innovations in technologies that bind the elements together to make the CBM a 
functioning unit are listed section 4.5.2. 
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4.5.1 Requirements of the CBM 
E-commerce can be regarded as an application of Internet technologies and related 
standards in business process to deal with the four different levels of requirement in Fig. 





Figure 4.4 Levels of Requirement 
• Information: The Internet can be utilises as a powerful resource of information for 
marketing purposes. In e-commerce, marketing may be the most important of all the 
infrastructure elements. On the CBS website, there are project specifications, the 
product descriptions, and the price lists and they can be viewed by visitors. In the 
CBM, it’s market-brokers taking care of most of marketing jobs. They advertise the 
products on their sites. Once visitors are on the sites, the market-brokers need to keep 
them there and compel the potential customers to buy from them. Table 4.14 lists the 
abilities required for information listing and acquirement in this level. 
Table 4.14 Information Level 
Visitors’ Ability Market-Brokers’ Ability 
 Search products for purchase 
using e-catalogues.  
 Provide access to a current catalogue of product offerings. 
 Provide the means for visitors to register at the site, to make 
comments, or to request additional information. 
 Measure and analyze the traffic at the site tomodify and 
maintain the various applications. 
Market-brokers built their own sites on popular shopping avenues, which provide them 
all the function they need to list the products and attract customers. On the CBS site, 
visitors may browse the information on the home pages that brokers list. 
• Communication: Highly interactive communication between customers, brokers and 
companies can be accomplished by using e-mail based services via the Internet. 
Table 4.15 shows the activities in communication level. 
Table 4.15 Communication Level 
Customers’ Ability Brokers’ Ability 
 Enquire the item details or the postage 
and payment for the item. 
 Determine the specifications of the items.  
 Negotiate the total purchase prices. 
 Answer customers’ questions.  
 Pass queries and requests to a Web-based call centre. 
 Collect and list common questions and answers as 
Frequent Asked Questions (FAQ) for customers. 
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In the CBM, the communication is the key to a successful project. Good 
communication between market-brokers and customers in the e-markets may 
effectively increase the customer base, while high standard of communication 
between providers and broker in CBS site may lead to profitable projects. The CBS 
site is a sell-side B2B (business to business) site is enabling brokers to purchase 
goods and services from provider. 
Table 4.16 Knowledge Level 
Providers’ Ability Core-Brokers’ Ability 
 Understand their products and know 
how to promote them. 
 Have good idea about the potential 
strength of the products. 
 Are willing to give knowledgeable 
support. 
 Propose group-trading proposals. 
 Select suitable products and providers. 
 Joint different providers together and create group-trading projects. 
 Negotiate with providers. 
 Have concept of the current markets. 
 Choose right market-brokers. 
 Provide the means for brokers to register at the CBS site, to make 
comments, or to request additional information. 
• Knowledge: The Internet can be applied for knowledge exchange. The abilities of 
providers and brokers are listed in Table 4.16. 
In CBS website, the knowledge sharing in the communities formed by core-brokers. 
The information of products from providers and full knowledge of the current 
markets are essential for core-brokers to create profitable group-trading projects. 
Groupware for community platforms sustains the multilateral exchange of complex 
information between community members on the Web. Therefore, team or divisional 
portals may be used by groups or communities that want to share specific content or 
business functions. 
Table 4.17 Transaction Level 
Buyers’ Ability Core-Brokers’ Ability Market-Brokers’ Ability 
 Place an order for desired 
products using a shopping cart. 
 Confirm an order, ensuring 
that the desired product is 
available. 
 Pay for the ordered products, 
usually through some form of 
credit. 
 Track electronic coupons, after 
they pay. 
 Combine orders from market-
brokers. 
 Check the stability for the 
combined order. 
 Calculate volume discounts for 
combined orders. 
 Decide the amount of providers’ 
products which are sold to buyers. 
 Calculate the commissions to 
brokers. 
 Calculate the profits of providers. 
 Provide an electronic shopping cart in 
which buyers can assemble their 
purchases. 
 Verify a customer’s credit and approve 
the customer’s purchase. 
 Combine orders and send them to core-
brokers. 
 Confirm orders and send invoices to 
buyers. 
 Collect payments for orders  
 Arrange for electronic coupons delivery. 
• Transaction: Business transactions can be completed via the Internet. A B2C 
(business to customer) electronic storefront must support the same tasks that a 
physical store supports and needs to offer certain capabilities to buyers and to the 
merchant. In Table 4.17, the tasks for core-brokers and market-brokers show that 
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they play totally different roles in group-trading process. The tasks of buyers in 
group-trading are the same as those in normal e-commerce sites. 
Choosing the right ecommerce platform is one of the most important decisions. To 
develop an e-commerce site can be full of complexity. During the process of adjustment, 
a Web distributed system based on the elements of knowledge level in the CBM was 
implemented to show that the foundational principles of this research are workable both 
in logic and in practice. The next section lists the Internet technologies used to support 
the activities in the CBM when it deals with inter-business or inter-organizational e-
commerce and in business-to-consumer transactions. 
4.5.2 Technology Infrastructure for the CBM 
The CBM is built on the distributed application architecture, which is “designed to 
allow users of a computer network to access information, applications, and services, as 
well as to exchange information with others, through a single, consistent user 
environment” (Sventek 1992). Just like other e-commerce systems, the distributed nature 
of the CBM needs many innovations in technologies: middleware, groupware and 
application development standard. These e-commerce technologies are listed in 
subsection 4.5.2.1, 4.5.2.2and 4.5.2.3. The CBM’s Web programming is built on a multi-
tier architecture and this is introduced in subsection 4.5.2.4. 
4.5.2.1 E-Commerce Middleware 
Middleware is “any software that allows other software to interact” and it is “the glue 
between software components or between software and the network or it is the slash in 
Client/Server” (Middleware Resource Centre 2008). It encompasses various technologies 
and facilitates the availability of backend resources for the CBM. 
Chapter 4 New Core Broking Model 
90 
 
• Communication middleware: enables application to communicate with each other. 
The CBM uses HTTP protocol, which is Internet’s primary communication protocol 
between a Web browser and Web server. 
• Database middleware: masks the complexities of accessing a database from 
applications. Open Database Connectivity (ODBC) is the database middleware 
standards used to increase the CBM’s portability in different databases. 
• Application middleware: enables the triggering of other applications, extends the 
functionality of applications and provide various runtime execution services. 
Common Gateway Interface (CGI) is the traditional portable way to invoke server-
side programs. It defines how Web server software can delegate the generation of 
Web pages to a stand-alone application or an executable file (Robinson 2004). It is 
especially suitable for less intensive e-commerce application like the CBS site. 
4.5.2.2 E-Commerce Groupware 
Groupware refers to “programs that help people work together collectively while 
located remotely from each other” (Rouse 2005). It is an application that enables real 
time collaboration by using groupware services: sharing of calendars, collective writing, 
e-mail handling, shared database access, electronic meetings with each person able to see 
and display information to others, and other activities. The communication methods may 
be via e-mail, voice communication or new trend of unified messaging that enable a one-
step mechanism for storing and retrieving various type of messages. 
4.5.2.3 E-Commerce Application Development Standards 
E-commerce application requires access to back-end relational databases and other 
transaction systems. Integration can be accomplished by using e-commerce suite 
packages customizing, the integration with a Web scripting language such as PHP, Active 
Server Pages (ASP), or JSP, employing specialized application servers, employing a full-
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blown EAI tool, or using XML-based technologies. ASP is used as a Web scripting 
language in developing the CBM. 
4.5.2.4 Multi-Tier Architecture and Web Programming for the CBM 
Typically, an application system on the Internet uses the client-server communications 
architecture shown in Fig. 4.5, where the client questions the server about trading, such as 
making a request for the details of an item, and the server processes the request and 
returns information to the client. 
 
Figure 4.5 Client-server Architecture 
Client-server systems are one of the most widely used systems for solving computing 
problems (Zhang et al. 2003, Huang and Ravishankar 1994). An e-market is a website 
where sellers and buyers make deals. The  client-server architecture uses a distributed 
application structure. “Client-server is often a generic umbrella term for any application 
architecture that divides processing among two or more processes” (Reese 2000). One of 
the processes provides multiple users with access to the same resource and acts like a 
resource provider, usually called a server, and another process, called the client, is the 
process which obtains the data or creates a demand for it. A server machine is a host that 
runs server programs which share their resources with clients. A client initiates 
communication sessions with a server by requesting the server's content. 
A computer program that runs in a distributed system is called a distributed program. 
Distributed programming is the process of writing such programs (Andrews 2000). Web 
programming is one type of distributed programming which works on the Internet. A 
website is a Web application on the Internet using a client-server distributed architecture. 
A Web application is a collection of Web pages, which are Web programmes. 
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Virtually every e-commerce application requires database access. A multi-tier 
architecture is an application structure which provides interaction between servers, clients 
and connection to a back-end database for an e-commerce application. The CBM is built in 
four-tier architecture. Fig. 4.6 shows an example of such architecture (Burlington, 2002): 
 
Figure 4.6 Four-tier Architecture 
1. A Web browser that requests from a client and presents information to the client. A 
client is also a computer that is connected to the Internet. It uses a Web browser and 
requests Web pages from the Web server. The first Web browser was created in 1993 
(Andreessen 1993). A Web browser such as Internet Explorer, Netscape Navigator, 
Mozilla or Google Chrome, is a software tool, which uses Web pages to access 
information resources on the Internet (Cailliau and Gillies 2000). 
2. A Web server is a powerful computer that is connected to the Internet. Through a 
Web server, a website can be available to everyone around the world at all times. 
Each Web server should have a permanent unique Internet protocol (IP) address and a 
domain name. A domain name, also called a hostname, is “the part of a network 
address which identifies it as belonging to a particular domain” (The New Oxford 
Dictionary of English 2010), such as www.hmco.com, which is the address of a 
computer network connection and identifies the owner of the address. A Web server 
that delivers Web pages, collects the data sent by the client, and passes data to and 
from the application server 
3. An application server that executes database queries based on the data passed by the 
Web server, sends the queries to the back-end database, manipulates and formats the 
data resulting from the database query, and sends the formatted response to the Web 
server. 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can 
be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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4. A database server in which the data are stored and managed and database requests are 
processed.  
This separation of functions makes it easier to change any tier without impacting the 
other tiers. Thus, an application server can be designed to interface or communicate with 
a wide variety of databases and database management systems, such as Oracle or MS 
SQL Server. So Web programming can be regarded as communication between a client 
and servers. Generally, there are two kinds of software technology in existence to build 
systems that can integrate Internet and Web components: they are the ‘client-side’ and the 
‘server-side’ of Web programming (Deitel and Deitel 2007). 
Client-side programmes are executed by the client's Web browser (Raggett 1997). 
Most of the traditional Web pages, which are built with technologies like JavaScript, 
ActiveX, Java, and Flash, do not involve any server processing. The greatest problem 
with these client-side technologies is that they might not be supported by all browsers and 
operating systems. In addition, the client-side technologies have serious security 
problems. 
On the other hand, in server-side Web programming, a user's request is verified by 
running a script directly on the Web server to generate dynamic Web pages. In the past, 
the way to build a server-side Web application was tedious and error-prone (MacDonald 
2007) by using the challenging CGI standard. Microsoft Visual Studio is used as a 
development tool to create the distributed programming applications in this research. In 
its rich environment, developers can write source codes, compile them and rapidly create 
ASP.NET applications. In ASP.NET, C# programming is use as scripting languages 
and .NET languages to develop the CBM. 
ASP.NET is a more capable Microsoft Web application platform. ASP.NET does not 
have the same security problems as the client-side approaches, because it is designed as a 
server-side technology. It allows programmers to build dynamic websites, Web 
applications and Web services. It supports new web-enabled devices such as personal 
digital assistants (PDAs), smart phones and palmtop computers. Although ASP.NET is 
server-side, it allows programmers to combine the best of client-side programming with 
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server-side programming, and it can intelligently adjust itself to whatever type of client 
browser is being used. On the ASP.NET platform, an e-commerce site for the CBM can 
be easily built. 
4.6 Summary 
In this chapter, an overview of the CBM has been provided. The structure of the CBM 
enables it to create a virtual market on the Internet by involving multi e-markets. The 
CBM is composed of core-brokers, projects, providers’ coalitions, e-markets, market-
brokers, buyers’ coalitions and a Core Broking System (CBS), which comprises three 
components: a CBS website, a project subsystem and a market subsystem. The CBS 
website is for core-brokers to list their group-trading projects and meet market-brokers. 
The project subsystem is specially designed to assist the core-broker, while the market 
subsystem is for the market-brokers. 
The CBM inherits two functions from the core, but has made some improvements. In 
the core, marginal utility function is used, but price lists and orders are used in the CBM 
to calculate the total benefit of a coalition and the gains of each member. This public 
information is easier for brokers to collect than that required for the marginal utility 
function. In the CBM, a stability check is used to ensure a Pareto efficient allocation can 
be reached in a coalition. Some additional techniques make the CBM capable of coping 
with the problems of online group-trading; there are volume discounts, stability check 
and the Shapley value, which give traders more incentives. With the further techniques of 
distributed computing, information hiding and collaboration between traders, the CBM is 
able to reduce its computational complexity. Techniques of internet computing and 
distributed computing enable the CMB to work in e-markets. 
An algorithm is designed to find a core. At first, it calculates the v(S) of every sub-
group, and this is a time consumed task. A sub-coalition, which has the biggest v(S), is 
then selected as the core. Another algorithm that involves 7 groups of arrays and 9 sub-
functions, reflects the CBM procedure to calculate v(S) of the grand coalition and the 
Chapter 4 New Core Broking Model 
95 
 
participants’ benefits in a group-trading. 
Two different kinds of brokers: a core-broker and market-brokers, are described in the 
CBM. A core-broker acts like a project manager, while market-brokers are like salesmen. 
The core-brokers create a multi-provider project for a session of bundle-selling and have 
overall responsibility for successful planning, execution, monitoring, control and closure 
of a project. They must find market-brokers to work with. After signing an agreement 
with the core-broker, market-brokers start to gather buyers. The core-brokers provide all 
necessary information to the market-brokers for them to promote the products. Making or 
breaking a deal with buyers is the main responsibility of the market-brokers, so their 
interaction with customers often determines the final outcome of a retail transaction. 
In the CBM, there are four kinds of fees: a session fee, an online store fee, a handling 
fee and a final value fee. The session fee and the online store fee are paid to the CBS site, 
while the handling fee and the final value fee form the commission to the brokers. A 
session fee is paid by core-brokers every time they list for a session on a project on the 
site. An online store fee of the CBS is a monthly fee for market-brokers, who wish to 
open an online store on the site. The final value fee is paid by the providers to reward the 
brokers and is 7% of the final selling value. The handling fee is 10% of the extra discount, 
which the customer gains after each of the brokers has processed the orders. 
Since the potential number of traders in e-markets may be large, a high speed network 
with high-rate bandwidth and low latency is required in the group-trading. It is important 
to choose a correct infrastructure to enable the group-trading operations to run efficiently 
in the new model. Four different levels requirement of the CBM are highlighted, and then 
the technology elements that are required for the effective development are listed. Just 
like other e-commerce systems, the distributed nature of the CBM needs many 
innovations in technologies: middleware, groupware and application development 
standard. During the process of adjustment, a Web distributed system based on the 
elements of knowledge level in the CBM was implemented to show that the foundational 
principles of this research are workable both in logic and in practice. By using the 
ASP.NET platform, the CBM is built on the distributed multi-tier architecture which 
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provides interaction between servers, clients and connection to a back-end database for an 
e-commerce application. 
The overview in this chapter clarifies many of the basic concepts and provides the 
background against which the details of the CBM can be examined in the next chapter. 




A Closer Look at the CBM: A Case Study 
In this chapter, a case study demonstrates the processes occurring in the CBM. The 
applicability of the CBM to e-markets is presented through a case study relating to a 
group-trading project in a travel agent scenario. In section 5.1, group-trading project S1 is 
initiated by core-broker Ben. Three suppliers, who provide hotel rooms and car hire 
around the Midlands, join the project and sell their products using the new method 
provided by the CBM. The purpose of the project is to enable sessions of bundle selling 
by integrating the resources of the providers. By offering volume wholesale discounts, 
customers may form groups in order to purchase items. During the process of this 
research, an elementary prototype of the Core Broking System (CBS) was developed in 
C# under the development environment of Visual Studio 2008. It consists of two 
subsystems: the project subsystem and the market subsystem. It was built to assist core-
brokers and market-brokers perform their tasks efficiently and effectively during trading 
in the CBM. There are four stages in the CBM, namely commencing, gathering, 
combining and closing. 
In section 5.2, the processes of these stages are illustrated. The market-brokers collect 
payment from the customers and transfer it to the core-brokers. On receipt the money in 
their bank accounts, the core-brokers issue coupons which are then dispatched from the 
market-brokers to the customers, so that they can claim the products or services from the 
providers. In the commencing stage, the three market-brokers advertise the project in their 
e-markets. In the gathering stage, the market-brokers bring customers to the core-broker, 
Ben. Unlike normal e-markets, the customers are allowed to place their orders with the 
discount they wish to get in the CBM. In the combining stage, the core-brokers increase 
the customers’ discounts by combining the orders from the market-brokers. In the closing 
stage, the core-broker and the market-brokers allocate the goods to their customers and 
decide how much they should pay. 
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5.1 A Group-Trading Project: S1 
Core-broker Ben plans to create a group-trading project ‘S1’ after he has considered 
the resources available to him. He will market it as ‘Summer Time around the Midlands’ 
to help people travel economically during the summer. The coupons can be purchased by 
buyers with volume discounts. The buyers will use these coupons for their travelling by 
sending them to travel agents who provide them with hotel rooms and car hire around the 
Midlands. Ben has to prepare a proposal first. The aim of the proposal is to bring together 
a number of different products for a session of bundle selling in which a couple of 
providers will need to be involved. Three tables, a product table, a supplier table and a 
providing table, are used by Ben to store the information about suppliers and the products 
offered. The structure and descriptions of these three tables are listed in Appendix 4. The 
supplier table and the providing table can only be accessed by Ben, who will wish to 
protect this valuable resource from others. 
Table 5.1 Suppliers 
Supplier ID Name E-mail Phone No Address Supplier ID Post Code 
P1  Bob  bob399@cbs.co.uk  (01788)556492  399 Barby Rd Rugby  P1  CV22 5DT  
P2  Tom  tom1528@cbs.co.uk  (024)76305681  1528 Burton Rd Atherstone  P2  CV9 3PX  
P3  Ken  ken416@cbs.co.uk  (01455)293434  416 Bosworth Rd. Nuneaton  P3  CV13 6PA  
P4  Mike  mike766@cbs.co.uk  (024)76343459  766 Burling Way Nuneaton P4  CV10 7RH  
Table 5.2 Products 
Supplier ID  Product ID  Retail Price  Stock  Cost  
P1  Ca 100.91  44  25.15 
P1  Cb  67.87  30  16.66 
P1  Cc 49.03  40  12.56 
P1  Ra 85. 49  20  23.21 
P2  Ca 99.29  34  27.62 
P2  Cb  64. 49  25  18.09 
P2  Cc 47. 68  31 11.29 
P2  Cd  27. 02  30 7.46 
P2  Ra 90.27  38 21.39 
P2  Rb  54.69  41 14.64 
P3  Ca 99.28  49 24.72 
P3  Cb  70. 85  34 20.70  
P3  Cc 49.78  37 11.71 
P3  Cd  29. 84  19  6.46 
P3  Rb  51.56  22  16.58 
P3  Rc  28.08  40  7.00  
P4  Ca 98.29 48 25.15 
P4  Cb  63.38 36 16.66 
P4  Cc 47.04 42 12.56 
P4  Rb  50.60  41 14.64 
It is essential to seek suitable providers who can offer the right products. In Table 5.1, 
there are four potential providers for project S1: P1, P2, P3 and P4. In Table 5.2, the 
information relates to the products provided by the suppliers. A single supplier may 
provide more than one product and it is not necessary for one product to be obtained from 
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only one supplier. Table 5.3 shows the possible products that Ben can put into his 
proposal. 
Table 5.3 Details of Products 
Product ID  Product Description  
Ca  Car classed exceptional  
Cb  Car classed standard  
Cc  Car classed intermediate  
Cd  Car classed compact  
Ra  Room of twin private  
Rb  Room of four-bed Dorm  
Rc  Room of eight-bed Dorm  
If  Insurance for family under 60  
Is  Insurance for single person  
Fd  Direct flight from Ireland to the UK  
Table 5.4 Volume Discounts from Ben 
Car Rental  >=2  >=5  >=10  >=20  >=50  
Ca  5%  10%  20%  30%  40%  
 Cb  0%  5%  10%  20%  30%  
Cc  0%   0%   5%  10%  20%  
 Cd  0%   0%  0%   5%  10%  
Hotel Room  >=3  >=8  >=15  >=25  >=45  
 Ra  5%  10%  18%  25%  35%  
 Rb  0%  5%  10%  18%  25%  
 Rc  0%   0%  5%  10%  18%  
According to the contents of the above three Tables, Ben sets up a proposal PR1 for a 
travel agent to provide hotel rooms and car hire around the Midlands. Ben then works out 
the volume discount in Table 5.4 for the products he wants to include in the proposal. He 
will have to discuss the contents of the proposal with the suppliers. 
Table 5.5 Details of Products after Negotiations 
Supplier ID  Name  Product ID  Retail Price  Stock  Cost  
P1  Bob  Ca 98.29 48 25.15 
  Cb  63.38 36 16.66 
  Cc 47.04 42 12.56 
  Ra 82.88 40 23.21 
P2  Tom  Ca 96.29 40 27.62 
  Cb  62.93 29 18.09 
  Cc 46.64 31 11.29 
  Cd  26.28 30 7.46 
  Ra 87.27 38 21.39 
  Rb  50.60  41 14.64 
P3  Ken  Ca 96.26 49 24.72 
  Cb  68.98 34 20.70  
  Cc 45.78 37 11.71 
  Cd  26.89 26 6.46 
  Rb  50.55 27 16.58 
  Rc  24.04 41 7.00  
The interviews and the negotiations which now take place with potential providers will 
transform the idea conceived into a formal project. After responses to this proposal have 
come through from the suppliers, the negotiations between Ben and the suppliers can begin 
and a project for online joint-selling created. During the period of negotiation, supplier P4 
decides to leave, but suppliers P1, P2 and P3 want to take part in the joint-selling. The 
providing table in Table 5.5 shows the products that the suppliers provide after Ben 
negotiates with them. Ben can now transform proposal PR1 into a new project S1. 
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Table 5.6 Products in Project S1 
Project ID  Supplier  Product ID  Retail Price  Stock  Cost  
S1  Ben  Ca 96.98 137 25.72 
  Cb  65.17 99 18.47 
  Cc 46.50  110 11.92 
  Cd 26.56 56 7.00  
  Ra 85.02 78 22.32 
  Rb 50.58 68 15.41 
  Rc  24.04 41 7.00  
Being assisted by the project subsystem, Ben works out the data for each product in 
the project using the information in the providing table. Table  5.6 shows the new 
contents of the project providing table. For instance, in Table 5.6, the total stock of 
product Ca is 48+40+49=137. The retail price of product Ca is the average retail price, 
(£98.29×48+£96.29×40+£96.26×49)÷137=£96.98. Likewise, the average cost of 
product Ca is (£25.15×48+£27.62×40+£24.72×49)÷137=£25.72. In this way, 
project S1 looks to customers as if there was only one supplier, who is Ben himself. The 
final retail price in Table 5.6 will be used to calculate the discount for customers and 
what to pay the providers for the items. He has to determine the volume discounts for 
these four products. 
Table 5.7 Price Lists in Project S1 
Project ID  Product ID  Range No  Minimum Amount  Discount  
S1  Ca  1  2  5%  
  2  5  10%  
  3  10  20%  
  4  20  30%  
  5  50  40%  
 Cb  1  5  5%  
  2  10  10%  
  3  20  20%  
  4  50  30%  
 Cc  1  10  5%  
  2  20  10%  
  3  50  20%  
 Cd  1  20  5%  
  2  50  10%  
 Ra  1  3  5%  
  2  8  10%  
  3  15  18%  
  4  25  25%  
  5  45  35%  
 Rb  1  8  5%  
  2  15  10%  
  3  25  18%  
  4  45  25%  
 Rc  1  15  5%  
  2  25  10%  
  3  45  18%  
After Ben discusses it with the suppliers, the project price list table is compiled (Table 
5.7). Ben has decided that the new project S1 is a travel agent offering inexpensive hotel 
rooms and low car rentals. The products have varied discounts, because buyers have 
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ordered different volumes of the product. For instance, ordering 21 units of product Ca 
falls in range 4 and has 30% discount. 
The CBS was designed to assist brokers with their tasks in group-trading and 
supported by a CBS website for core-brokers to list their group-trading projects. By 
getting forms from the CBS site, Ben can now prepare the following three documents: 
• Project specs − this may include description, aims, background, the possible 
advantages and any information about the project which may be useful to the market-
brokers. The initiating and closing date of the project must be also included. 
• Product descriptions − the products, involved in the project, have to be fully 
described. 
• Price lists − the retail prices of the products and the volume discounts for them. 
Before core-brokers upload the above three documents to the CBS website, Ben needs 
first to register himself and project S1 on the CBS website. Once this information is 
stored in the database and listed on the CBS site, he can start a session of group-trading. 
In the next section, the process of how Ben executes project S1 on the CBS is 
demonstrated. 
5.2 The Process in the CBM 
In the CBM, core-brokers and market-brokers execute group-trading sessions on the 
CBS website. With the help of programs in the CBS, the brokers can easily calculate the 
discounts for the buyers. After a project is initiated, a group-trading session can be started. 
 
Figure 5.1 System Flow Chart of the CBM 
The system flow chart of the model is shown in Fig. 5.1. There are four stages: commencing, 
gathering, combining and closing. A brief description for these stages is as follows: 
Chapter 5 A Closer Look at the CBM: A Case Study 
102 
 
1. Commencing − the core-broker recruits market-brokers and begins sessions of group 
trading in a project. 
2. Gathering − the market-brokers attract buyers to their websites and submit the 
coalitions of buyers they have formed to the core-broker. 
3. Combining − the core-broker combines the coalitions together, decides the final 
prices for the items, checks the stability of the coalitions and sends notices to the 
market-brokers. 
4. Closing − the market-brokers close the deal with the buyers. The final orders and 
invoices for each customer will be prepared by the market-brokers. After the buyers 
have paid for their purchases, the profits of the providers and the commission for all 
the brokers will be calculated. At this point, the core-brokers may choose to have a 
new session of trading or to stop the project for good. 
Each session has a starting and end date. The duration of each session should be long 
enough for a market-broker to form a coalition of buyers of a reasonable size. It should 
also be short enough to allow buyers to gain the items they want as soon as possible. 
They may be in a hurry, because some of the products or services will cease to be useful 
after quite a short period of time (Matear et al. 2000). In the CBM, the suggested duration 
for a session is usually one week. The ending time of a session needs to be clearly 
communicated to the market-brokers. 
The CBS is built to aid brokers with the tasks in each stage of the CBM. A database in 
the CBS, which contains several tables, is available for the brokers to store the 
information needed for the tasks in the above stages. The structure and descriptions of 
these tables are listed in Appendix 4. More details about the stages are given in the 
following sections. 
5.2.1 Commencing 
The core-brokers must find several market-brokers to help with the marketing, before 
a session of online joint-selling starts. It is also necessary for the core-broker to fix a 
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starting and end date for a session of group-buying. In Fig. 5.2, there are two steps: 
recruit market-brokers and start a session of group-trading. 
 
Figure 5.2 Commencing Stage 
5.2.1.1 Recruit Market-brokers 
The core-brokers have to recruit qualified market-brokers to take part in the project 
before a session can really start. The market-brokers must be capable of bringing buyers 
in to join the group-buying for the project. There are plenty of alternatives that core-
brokers may use to find market-brokers, such as team members who have already worked 
with them in the past; new applicants who apply on the CBS site; other core-brokers or 
their team members; or other potential market-brokers whom the core-brokers find by 
exploring broker directories at sites like ‘Top20Sites.com’. 
Candidates for the positions of market-broker need to be members of the CBS site and 
have a member ID before they make an application to the core-brokers for the posts. The 
personal information of a successful applicant is stored in the broker table. A project usually 
needs 3 or 4 market-brokers, but it is up to the core-brokers to decide how many they want. 
In Table 5.8, three market-brokers, Paul, Tim and Phil, are assigned by Ben to the 
project P1. They are in charge of gathering customers locally, from their own 
geographical areas. The project that the core-broker has initiated now has global 
proportions, because the core-broker has collaborated with market-brokers all over the 
world. In addition to the information shown in Table 5.8, the broker table may contain 
other information about market-brokers, such as the URL of their shopping sites. 
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Table 5.8 Market-brokers in Project S1 
Broker ID  Name  E-mail  Phone No  Address  Post Code  
MK21  Paul  Paul874@cbs.co.uk  (01455)226490  874 Orchard Close, Hinckley  LE10 3LR  
MK30  Tim  Tim5361@cbs.co.uk  (024)76305681  5361 Moat Ave, Coventry  CV3 6BW  
MK37  Phil  Phil782@cbs.co.uk  (01132)639415  782 Conference Place, Leeds  LS12 3DZ  
 
5.2.1.2 Start Trading 
The core-brokers can pay a session fee of £30 and start a project session, when the 
information such as the starting and end date of the session of trading has been stored in 
the project session table. In Table 5.9, session 01 of project S1 begins on the morning of 
22 August 2011 at 9:00 and will end at 23:59 on 29 August 2011. 
Table 5.9 A Session of Group-Trading 
Project ID  Session ID  Starting Date  End Date  
S1  01  22 August 2011  29 August 2011  
Ben inserts three records in the project session broker table as demonstrated in Table 5.10. 
Each record shows the status of the respective market-broker, in the current session of trading. 
Each market-broker is given one unique order ID for a session of trading. The order date/time 
field stores the actual submission time of the market order of a market-broker. The field 
headed ‘total’ is the total payment of the market order of a market-broker. The received 
payment, which the market-broker has paid, is stored in the received field. 
Table 5.10 Trading Records 
Project ID  Session  Broker ID  Order ID  Order Date  Order Time  Total  Received  
S1  01  MK21  OP10121  29/08  18: 42: 56    
S1  01  MK30  OP10130  29/08 09:24:50    
S1  01  MK37  OP10137  29/08 13: 52: 43    
The market-brokers are given the information needed for their own website to promote 
the project including three documents; a project session specification, a product 
description and a price list which are shown in the beginning of section 5.2. There may be 
more than one session of trading for a project and it is not necessary for the same market-
brokers to be involved in further sessions. Before a new session of trading starts, the core-
broker of the project will need to check that the right market-brokers are in place for the 
new session. Sometimes, the market-broker may be one of the suppliers in the project, as 
long as there is an agreement. 
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Only the market-brokers are permitted to deal with potential customers and 
accumulate profits. So the core-brokers must attempt to supply the market-brokers with 
the information they need to promote the project on his/her website, such as the project 
description, the product descriptions and the price list. In the next section, market-broker 
Tim illustrates how a market-broker gathers customers in his own area. 
5.2.2 Gathering 
This section describes how market-brokers gather customers to visit their online shops. 
First, the market-brokers have to set up their websites, where they can advertise the 
project and attract customers. They need to submit their coalition to the core-broker 
before the ending time of the current session of trading. In Fig. 5.3, the market-brokers 
are responsible for most of the tasks in this stage. Three tables, a customer table, an order 
table and an order detail table, are used by the market-brokers to store information about 
their customers and the orders the customers have made. 
 
Figure 5.3 Gathering Stage 
As the system flow chart shows that there are four steps in this stage, namely: setup 
websites; accept orders; produce market orders and submit market orders. 
5.2.2.1 Setup Websites 
In order to perform transactions of online group-buying, the market-brokers must have 
shopping websites where they can list goods for a session in the group-trading project. 
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They may set up their own personal website in running their own online shopping site. 
The key, however, is to find ways to attract customers, which can be quite a problem, 
even for a market-broker. 
Another option involves the compilation of a list the goods for a session in a group-
trading project on an existing online shopping avenue. If market-brokers choose a group-
buying site, the results will be different from those on a normal site. If they decide to go 
for a popular non-group-buying site like eBay, they have the additional task of working 
out a way to form buyers’ coalitions on that site. It would be easier to form buyers’ 
coalitions on a popular group-buying site like LivingSocial, but as they only put one 
product up for sale each day and there are many providers waiting in the queue – Listing 
could take a long time. 
Having set up their group-buying website, the market-brokers may also download the 
three documents of public information and the five tables of project information on the 
CBS website. Even though this information should be enough to list the project on their 
websites, the core-broker will still need to provide as many resources as possible, so that 
the market-brokers can gather potential buyers. The market-brokers can then advertise the 
goods on their websites and try to attract potential buyers to purchase the products as a 
group. If customers show an interest, they are asked to leave their contact details. It is the 
market-brokers’ responsibility to keep the site updated with the latest trading information. 
5.2.2.2 Accept Orders 
The market-brokers accept the orders from the customers. With aid from the market 
system, the market-brokers will easily keep updating the status of the current volume 
discounts for each product and list these on line. The customers may come back and 
check the latest status on the sites. 
A ’submission time’ is the time when the market-broker plans to submit the coalition 
to the core-broker. It is usually near to the end date of the session. Quite often customers 
will wait and watch without making an order. A submission time is therefore used to urge 
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customers to place orders promptly. Thus, it is good to make the submission time on the 
market-brokers’ websites as clear and easy as possible for the customers to follow. In 
Table 5.11, market-broker Tim receives four orders which are from three customers: 
Martin, Steve and John. They each have a unique customer ID in the customer table 
shown in Table 5.12, namely C34, C92 and C108. 
Table 5.11 Tim’s Customers 
Order ID  Description  Date/Time Ordered  Shipping Address  Customer ID  
O081101 1
st
 order of C92. 26 August 12:09:24 727 Abercom Rd. Chapelfield, Coventry CV1 8ED C92 
O081109  26 August 16:20:56 3107 Hartlepool Rd., Coventry CV1 5JB C34 
O081207 2
nd
 order of C92. 27 August 02:36:48 8921 Mowbray St., Coventry CV2 4FZ C92 
O081211  27 August 10:47:25 822 Longford Square, Coventry CV6 8ED C108 
Table 5.12 Tim’s Customers’ Orders 
Cust ID Name E-mail  PayPal Phone No Address  Post Code  
C34  Martin martin368@cbs.co.uk Martin51@gmail.com  (024)76717851 368 Earlsdon Avenue South, Coventry  CV5 6DT  
C92  Steve steve591@cbs.co.uk steve217@ cbs.co.uk  (024)76448217 591 Wyver Crescent, Coventry  CV9 3PX  
C108  John john9762@cbs.co.uk john9762@cbs.co.uk  (024)76369435 9762 Torrington Ave, Coventry  CV4 9HL  
The order lines of these four orders are stored in the order detail table in Table 5.13. 
The two orders from customer Steve have different shipping addresses. He orders 14 
units of product Cd and gets 0% discount for order O081101. When he places his second 
order, O081207, he purchases another 6 units. So he buys 20 units of product Cd 
altogether and therefore has 5% discount. So the actual discount for product Cd in order 
O081101 changes from 0% to 5% discount. In fact, the actual discount and the actual 
quantity, which customer Steve gets, will finally be decided only after Ben has combined 
all the market-brokers’ orders together. 
Table 5.13 Original Details in Tim’s Customers’ Orders 
Order ID  Product ID  Quantity Ordered  Expected Discount  Customer ID  Actual Discount  
O081101  Cb  2  10%  C92  0%  
O081101  Cc  17  20%  C92  10% (5%)  
O081101  Cd  14  10%  C92  5% (0%)  
O081101  Ra  11  18%  C92  10%  
O081109  Cc  9  10%  C34  0%  
O081109  Cd  4  10%  C34  0%  
O081109  Ra  6  25%  C34  5%  
O081207  Cc  5  20%  C92  10% (0%)  
O081207  Cd  6  10%  C92  5% (0%)  
O081211  Cb  5  30%  C108  5%  
O081211  Ra  8  35%  C108  10%  
Customer Steve himself expects to get 10% discount out of product Cd in this group-
trading scheme. His intention is shown in the expected discount field in Table 5.13. If the 
actual discount of a product in an order is less than the expected discount, the product 
may be dropped from the order at the end. The market-brokers will try to negotiate with 
the customers about the high expected discounts. This will be discussed below. 
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5.2.2.3 Produce Market Orders 
After the market-brokers have collected the orders from the customers, they use the 
market system to help them combine the customer orders into market orders. It is up to 
the market-brokers to decide on the submission time. When the deadline for submission 
has passed, the market-broker stops taking orders from customers and concentrates on 
preparing the submission. It is necessary to combine all the orders a market-broker has 
into one big market order, because a market-broker can only be allowed to give the core-
broker one market order for one session. 
Table 5.14 Tim’s Market Order 
Order ID  Description  Date/Time Ordered  Shipping Address  Customer ID  
OP10130   29 August 09:24:50  5361 Moat Ave, Coventry CV3 6BW  MB30  
The contents of Table 5.14 give the impression that the market order is purely from 
market-broker Tim with a broker ID, MB30. It does not include any information from 
Tim’s customers. This effectively protects the information of his customers. So 
combining the orders is beneficial to a market-broker and will reduce the computational 
complexity of the coalition as well. 
In Table 5.10, the four records in the order detail table imply that there are four 
products in the market order. The field headed ‘quantity ordered’ stores the total 
quantities of the products in the orders that have been combined by the market-brokers. In 
Table 5.13, the quantities of product Ra are 16, 19 and 4. So in Table 5.15, the total 
quantity of product Cb in Tim’s market order is 14+6+4=24, which makes the actual 
discount of the product to be 5%. 
Table 5.15 Original Details in Tim’s Market Order 
Order ID  Product ID  Quantity Ordered  Expected Discount  Actual Quantity  Actual Discount  
OP10130  Cb  7  30%   5%  
OP10130  Cc  31  20%   10%  
OP10130  Cd  24  10%   5%  
OP10130  Ra  25  35%   25%  
For each product, the largest expected discount is selected and this will be the expected 
discount of all the customers’ orders which make up the market order. For example, the 
expected discounts of Product Ra in orders O081101, O081109 and O081211 are 18%, 
25% and 35% respectively, as in Table 5.13. So the expected discount for product Ra in the 
market order is the largest of these three discounts, that is, 35%. The actual discounts of 
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market order OP10130 in Table 5.15 - as opposed to the expected ones - will not be settled 
until the core-broker has combined all the orders from the market-brokers. 
The quantity of the order line in the market order will be set to zero by the core-broker, 
when its expected discount is higher than its actual discount. The consequences of this 
will be quite serious, because now nobody in the group that the market-broker has 
assembled will get the product. It is the market-brokers’ duty to make sure that every 
member of their group gets the goods they want in the trading session. The system will 
produce a warning list for the market-brokers containing all the expected discounts that 
are higher than the actual discounts in the order lines. So they may try to negotiate with 
the customers, before they submit the market order to the core-broker. 
In Table 5.15, all the expected discounts are higher than the actual discounts in the 
order lines of Tim’s order. He has negotiated with his customers and has tried his best to 
cut down their expected discounts. For instance, in the case of product Ra, Tim had to tell 
his customers that he was not sure that he would be able to get the expected discount of 
35%. So he persuaded customer Steve to change the expected discount for product Ra 
from 35% to 25%. Table 5.16 shows the order detail table from customers after Tim has 
fulfilled his duty. 
Table 5.16 New Details in Tim’s Customers’ Orders 
Order ID  Product ID  Quantity Ordered  Expected Discount  Actual Quantity  Actual Discount  
O081101  Cb  2  5%   0%  
O081101  Cc  17  10% (20%)   10%  
O081101  Cd  14  5% (10%)   5%  
O081101  Ra  11  18%   10%  
O081109  Cc  9  10%   0%  
O081109  Cd  4  5% (10%)   0%  
O081109  Ra  6  25%   5%  
O081207  Cc  5  10% (20%)   10%  
O081207  Cd  6  5% (10%)   5%  
O081211  Cb  5  5% (30%)   5%  
O081211  Ra  8  25% (35%)   10%  
Table 5.17 New Details in Tim’s Market Order 
Order ID  Product ID  Quantity Ordered  Expected Discount  Actual Quantity  Actual Discount  
OP10130  Cb  7  5%   5%  
OP10130  Cc  31  10%   10%  
OP10130  Cd  24  5%   5%  
OP10130  Ra  25  25%   25%  
In Table 5.17, the new order detail table of Tim reveals excellent results after the negotiation. 
The lower the expected discount is, the greater the chance will be that the customers will be 
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able to obtain the items they have ordered. If the expected discount is to be changed, the buyers 
must give their consent first. So, competent market-brokers would try their best to persuade 
their customers to make the expected discount as low as the actual discount. 
5.2.2.4 Submit Market Orders 
The market-brokers submit the market orders to the core-broker using the market 
system with the unique order ID provided at the beginning of the session. After the 
current coalitions have been transformed into market orders, the actual submission time 
will be recorded in them as the order date/time. The market-brokers must hand in their 
market orders to the core-broker before the end time of the session. Each market-broker 
can only give one order to the core-broker in a single session of trading. In Table 5.14, 
market-broker Tim submits order OP10130 at 9:24:50 on 29/08/2011, which is the 
critical time in the event of a stock shortfall. At this point, he does not have any way of 
knowing whether the stock of Ben is enough for all the market-brokers, so the best policy 
for him is to submit the market order as early as possible. The details of the revised order 
are given in Table 5.17. 
When the end date of a session is reached, the market-brokers send out their market orders and 
wait for a reply from the core-broker. After the core-broker has processed the orders, the market-
brokers will receive notices from the core-broker. In the next section, the core-broker moves all 
the market orders from the market-brokers into the core and calculates the results for the orders, 
including the discounts for each product the market-brokers have submitted. 
5.2.3 Combining 
The purpose of this stage is to try to obtain higher discounts for the market-brokers. 
The core-broker of the project handles most of the tasks in this stage. When all the market 
orders of the session have been collected, the core-brokers use the project system to 
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verify the data contained in the orders from the market-brokers. After liaising with the 
market-brokers and confirming all the details of the orders, they will now combine all the 
coalitions and provide higher discounts for each product to the customers with the aid of 
the project system. 
 
Figure 5.4 Combining Stage 
In Fig. 5.4, the system flow chart shows that there are five steps in this stage, namely 
check stability, rank orders, combine orders, calculate discounts and deliver notices. 
Table 5.18 Details in Phil’s Combined Order 
Order ID  Product ID  Quantity Ordered  Expected Discount  Actual Quantity  Actual Discount  
OP10137  Cb  12  20%   10%  
OP10137  Cc  15  20%   5%  
OP10137  Cd  16  10%   0%  
Table 5.19 Details in Paul’s Combined Order 
Order ID  Product ID  Quantity Ordered  Expected Discount  Actual Quantity  Actual Discount  
OP10121  Cb  10  30%   10%  
OP10121  Cd  28  10%   5%  
OP10121  Ra  36  35%   25%  
The details of the market orders from the three market-brokers are shown in Tables 
5.17, 5.18 and 5.19 respectively. These tables are used to illustrate how the core-broker 
processes the orders, as the four steps are followed through. 
5.2.3.1 Check Stability 
The core-brokers check the stability of the coalition, by making sure that the current 
coalition’s total benefit is larger than the total benefit of its every subset. Before they do 
so, they have to determine the total profit of the possible subgroups of the coalition. 
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The quantities of the items, which each market-broker can have as a member of a 
particular subgroup, can be calculated by using the same method as in step 3. There are 
four members: Ben, Phil, Tim and Paul in the current coalition. There are 7 subgroups for 
the coalition. Table 5.20 displays the items each market-broker can have in all the sub-
coalitions. Coalition S1,3, {Ben, Phil, Paul}, contains Ben and market-brokers Phil and 
Paul. Function q(a market-broker) represents the items which the market-broker can get. 
In S1,3, market-broker Phil get 16 units of product Cd and Paul gains 28 units of Cd and 
36 units of Ra. 
Table 5.20 Sub-Coalitions 
Subgroup Members  q(Phil) q(Tim) q(Paul) 
Cb Cc Cd Ra Cb Cc Cd Ra Cb Cc Cd Ra 
S
1
 {Ben, Phil} 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S
2
 {Ben, Tim} 0 0 0 0 7 31 24 25 0 0 0 0 
S
3
 {Ben, Paul} 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
S
1, 2
 {Ben, Phil, Tim} 0 0 16 0 7 31 24 25 0 0 0 0 
S
2, 3
 {Ben, Tim, Paul} 0 0 0 0 7 31 24 25 0 0 28 36 
S
1, 3
 {Ben, Phil, Paul} 0 0 16 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 28 36 
S
1, 2, 3
 {Ben, Phil, Tim, Paul} 0 0 16 0 7 31 24 25 0 0 16 36 
Table 5.21 Profits of Sub-Coalitions 
Subgroup  v(Phil)  v(Tim)  v(Paul)  v(BEN)  v(Subgroup)  
S
1
  0  0  0  0  0  
S
2
  0  974.98  0  2461.84  3436.82  
S
3
  0  0  0  0  0  
S
1, 2
  42.50 974.98  0  2732.31 3749.78  
S
2, 3
  0  974.98  1146.12  4122.04  6243.14  
S
1, 3
  42.50 0  1146.12  1930.66  3119.28  
S
1, 2, 3
  42.50 974.98  1087.69  4189.65  6321.38  
Function v(a market-broker) indicates the discount for the market-broker’s customers. 
In Table 5.20, market-broker Phil gets 26 units of product Cd in coalition S1,3. He gains 
10% discount. The value of v(Phil) in S1,3 is £26.56×10%×16=£42.50, listed in Table 
5.21. All the savings made as a result of a market-broker’s discount, will be for the 
benefit of the buyers for whom he/she is working. This will be explained in the next stage. 
Function v(a core-broker) signifies the profit of the brokers and providers. In S1,3, 
Ben’s profit is from the payment from market-brokers Phil and Paul. The costs of product 
Cd and Ra are £7 and £11.92 respectively. The retail price and discount for product Ra 
are £22.32 and 35%. The value of v(Ben) in S1,3 is (£26.56×(1–10%)–
£7)×(16+28)+(£22.32×(1–35%)–£11.92)×36=£1930.66. In fact, total profit 
v(Ben) does not belong to Ben only. It will be distributed among the providers and 
brokers. 
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Function v(a subgroup) represents the total benefit that accrues to both buyers and 
providers. The value of v(S1,3) is £42.50+£1146.12+£1930.66=£3119.28. The 
benefits of all the seven sub-coalitions are listed in Table 5.21. This data enables Ben to 
check the stability of the coalition. It turns out that coalition S1, 2, 3 is stable, because it 
has the largest benefit, i.e. £6321.38. 
5.2.3.2 Combine Orders 
The core-brokers combine the market orders from the market-brokers into a single large 
order after the orders are sorted in ascending order according to the dates on them. They 
combine the orders using the same principle as the market-brokers in the third step of the gather 
stage. They also calculate the actual discount for each product. The actual quantity ordered is 
checked against the quantity the core-broker has in stock to take account of any shortfall. 
Order OP101ALL shown in Table 5.22 is the result of Ben combining the three orders 
in Tables 5.17, 5.18 and 5.19. The quantities of product Cd from market-brokers Phil, 
Tim and Paul are 26, 24 and 28. Thus the quantity of product Cd in order OP101ALL is 
26+24+28=78, but the stock of product Cd is only 56 (see Table 5.6). When Ben finds 
there is a lack of stock, he will try to contact the providers and request a further supply. In 
this case, Ben did not succeed in getting more items. The actual discount of product Ra is 
35% as can be seen from Table 5.7. The expected discounts of product Ra in Tables 5.17 
and 5.19 are 25% and 35%. The highest 35% is then put into the expected discount field 
in Table 5.22 opposite product Ra. 
Table 5.22 Non-Finalised Core 
Order ID  Product ID  Quantity Ordered  Expected Discount  Actual Quantity  Actual Discount  
OP101ALL  Cb  29  30%  29  20%  
OP101ALL  Cc  46  20%  46  10%  
OP101ALL  Cd  78  10%  56  10%  
OP101ALL  Ra  61  35%  61  35%  
The order lines of order OP101ALL need to be adjusted if their expected discount is 
higher than their actual discount. For example, for product Cb in Table 5.22, the expected 
discount of 30% is higher than the actual discount of 20%. The order lines of product Cb 
in Tables 5.17, 5.18 and 5.19 have to be dropped from the trading, if their actual 
discounts are less than the expected discounts. The expected discount of product Cb in 
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Paul’s order is 30%, which is higher than the actual discount, i.e. 20%. After the order 
line of product Cb in Table 5.18 has been excluded, the quantity ordered of product Cb in 
order OP101ALL is 29−10=19. The actual discount of product Cb becomes 10%. The 
expected discount of product Cb in Phil’s order is 20%, which is higher than 10%, and 
needs to be excluded. Finally, the quantity ordered of product Cb in order OP101ALL 
becomes 19−12=7 and the actual discount becomes 5%. In the same way, the order 
lines of products Cc, Cd and Ra in order OP101ALL can be worked out. The order lines 
of order OP101ALL after being adjusted are shown in Table 5.23. 
Table 5.23 Possible Core 
Order ID  Product ID  Quantity Ordered  Expected Discount  Actual Quantity  Actual Discount  
OP101ALL  Cb  29  5%  7  5%  
OP101ALL  Cc  56  10%  31  10%  
OP101ALL  Cd  78  10%  78 10%  
OP101ALL  Ra  61  35%  56  35%  
5.2.3.3 Calculate Totals 
Before continuing to process the orders, the project system will arrange the records in 
the project session broker table according to the time when they were ordered. 
Table 5.24 Sorted Trading Records 
Project ID  Session  Broker ID  Order ID Order Date  Order Time  Total  Received  
S1 01 MK37 OP10137 29/08 08: 42: 56   
S1 01 MK30 OP10130 29/08 09: 24: 50   
S1 01 MK21 OP10121 29/08 13: 52: 43   
Table 5.24 shows the result after the records in Table 5.10 are sorted in ascending 
order by the order date/time field, which records the actual date/time that the market-
brokers hand in their market orders. The core-brokers can use the system to calculate the 
total payment for each order that has come from the market-brokers, after they have 
calculated the actual discounts and the actual quantities of the order lines in the orders. 
Ben works on the actual discounts for each market-broker, which are in Tables 5.25, 
5.26 and 5.27 with the aid of the CBS system. Firstly, he fills the actual discounts with 
the same percentages as the actual discounts in Table 5.23. Secondly, he sets the actual 
discount of the order line to 0%, when the actual discount is less than the expected 
discount. For instance, 5% is entered in the actual discount field of product Cb in Table 
5.25. It works out as 0%, because its actual discount of 5% is less than its expected 
discount of 20%. 
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Table 5.25 Final Details in Phil’s Market Order 
Order ID  Product ID  Quantity Ordered  Expected Discount  Actual Quantity  Actual Discount  
OP10137  Cb  12  20%  0  0%  
OP10137  Cc  15  20%  0  0%  
OP10137  Cd  16  10%  16  10%  
Table 5.26 Final Details in Tim’s Market Order 
Order ID  Product ID  Quantity Ordered  Expected Discount  Actual Quantity  Actual Discount  
OP10130  Cb  7  5%  7  5%  
OP10130  Cc  31  10%  31  10%  
OP10130  Cd  24  5%  24  10%  
OP10130  Ra  25  25%  25  35%  
Table 5.27 Final Details in Paul’s Market Order 
Order ID  Product ID  Quantity Ordered  Expected Discount  Actual Quantity  Actual Discount  
OP10121  Cb  10  30%  0  0%  
OP10121  Cd  28  10%  16  10%  
OP10121  Ra  36  35%  36  35%  
The principle that the CBM uses in dealing with the orders is first come first served, 
and this principle is followed in Table 5.24. For product Cd, the actual quantity of order 
OP101ALL is 56, but the customers’ demand was 78. There is not enough stock for all 
the orders, so in Table 5.27, only 56–16–24=16 items are left over for order OP10121. 
The project system calculates the total payments for each order and puts them in the 
project session broker table. This is shown in Table 5.28. The retail prices of products Cb, 
Cc, Cd and Ra are 65.17, 46.50, 26.56 and 85.06, which are shown in Table 5.6. 
According to the information in Table 5.26, the total payment of market-broker MK30, 
Tim, is £65.17×(1–5%)×7+£46.50×(1–10%)×31+£26.56×(1–
10%)×24+£85.06×(1–35%)×25=£3686.65. 
Table 5.28 Trading Records with Totals 
Project ID Session Broker ID Order ID Order Date  Order Time Total Received 
S1 01 MK37 OP10137 29/08  08: 42: 56 382.46 Y 
S1 01 MK30 OP10130 29/08 09: 24: 50 3686.65 Y 
S1 01 MK21 OP10121 29/08 13: 52: 43 2372.87 Y 
By observing above four tables, one can see how important the role of a good market-
broker is. After the negotiations by market-broker Tim, his coalition has bought the 
biggest number of items and has the highest total payment. A competent broker like Tim 
brings more benefit to both the customers and the providers, and in the CBM, also creates 
more commission for the brokers. A good core-broker will try to ensure that the market-
brokers get the best discounts. 
Perhaps someone might question whether the commission of the brokers would cover 
their costs. There are plenty of customers on the Internet, so this case study presumably 
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would have to be viewed as part of a much larger trading exercise. There are several 
sessions of trading in a group-trading project. The market-brokers may take part in other 
sessions of trading, if they want to earn more commission. 
5.2.3.4 Deliver Notices 
The core-brokers deliver the notices to the market-brokers normally via e-mail and 
await payment from them. The payment from a customer includes the handling fees and 
the final value fees for the market-broker and the core-broker. In the CBM, the money for 
the brokers comes from these two fees. Since the customers’ money is sent via the 
market-broker’s PayPal account, a PayPal fee will be taken from that account. However, 
the market-broker is not responsible for the whole fee. Part of the fee should be paid by 
the core-broker and the providers and needs to be returned to the market-broker. 
Table 5.29 Notice to Tim 
Notice to Marker Broker 
Order ID: OP10130  Order Date: 29 August 2011 09:24:50 Due Date: 06 September 2011 
Winner: Tim  Marker Broker ID: MK30 Total Payment:  £3460.29  Bank Account: 01234567 



















Fee 1  
PayPal  
Fee 2  Payment  
Cb  7 7 5% 5% 65.17 433.38 0.00 17.34 0.38 11.69 403.98 
Cc 31 31 10% 10% 46.50  1297.35 0.00 51.89 1.13 34.99 1209.34 
Cd 24 24 5% 10% 26.56 573.70 3.19 22.95 0.59 15.47 537.87 
Ra 25 25 25% 35% 85.06 1382.23 21.27 55.29 1.82 37.28 1309.10 
      3686.65 24.45 147.47 3.92 99.43 3460.29 
 
A notice sent to market-broker Tim is shown in Table 5.29. The total payment is 
£3460.29. The due date is eight days after the order date. The order date, the shipping 
address, the quantity ordered and the original discount come from Tim’s market order, 
which can be seen in Tables 5.14 and 5.15. The actual quantity and the actual discount 
have been taken from Table 5.24. For product Ra, the payment is £26.56×(1–
35%)×25=£1382.23, and the handling fee for Ben is worked out to be £26.56×(35%–
25%)×25×10%=£21.27. The final value fees is £26.56×(1–35%)×25×4%=£55.29. The 
field ‘PayPal Fee 1’ is Ben’s PayPal fee, but it has actually been paid by Tim. Because 
the total sum is £3478.11, and the rate charged is 2.9% (refer to Table A3.6), the fee for 
product Ra for Ben is (£1382.23×3%+£21.27)×2.9%=£1.82. The other part of the PayPal 
fee, PayPal Fee 2, should be paid by the providers £1382.23×(1–7%)×2.9%=£37.28. The 
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payment to Ben for product Ra is £1382.23+£21.27–£55.29–£1.82–£37.28=£1309.10. 
Tables 5.30 and 5.31 are the notices for Phil and Paul respectively. 
Table 5.30 Notice to Phil 
Notice to Marker Broker 
Order ID: OP10137  Order Date: 29 August 2011 08:42:56 Due Date: 06 September 2011 
Winner: Phil  Marker Broker ID: MK37 Total Payment:  £370.96  Bank Account: 01234567 



















Fee 1  
PayPal  
Fee 2  Payment  
Cd  16 16 0% 10% 26.56 382.46 4.25 15.30 0.46 0.00 370.96 
      382.46 4.25 15.30 0.46 0.00 370.96 
Table 5.31 Notice to Paul 
Notice to Marker Broker 
Order ID: OP10121  Order Date: 29 August 2011 13:52:43 Due Date: 06 September 2011 
Winner: Paul  Marker Broker ID: MK21 Total Payment:  £3460.29  Bank Account: 01234567 



















Fee 1  
PayPal  
Fee 2  Payment  
Cd  28 16 5% 10% 26.56 382.46 2.12 15.30 0.39 10.32 358.58 
Ra 36 36 25% 35% 85.06 1990.40 30.62 79.62 2.62 53.68 1885.11 
      2372.87 32.75 94.91 3.01 64.00 2243.69 
The core-brokers rely on the market-brokers to collect money for them, because they 
have no way to contact the buyers. The next stage explains the process by which the 
market-brokers receive payment from clients, the way that the items are transferred to a 
customer and how the profit can be distributed among providers and brokers. 
5.2.4 Closing 
When the market-brokers receive the notices from the core-broker, they need to 
distribute the gain to all the buyers. It is the market-brokers’ turn now, and they close the 
transactions with the buyers. They use the market system to prepare invoices for their 
clients, send the invoices out, collect the money from their clients via Paypal and put it in 
the core-broker’s bank account. The core-broker then sends coupons to the market-
brokers. The transaction is considered completed when a customer receives the coupons. 
At the same time, the core-broker will distribute the profit to each of the providers 
according to the contribution they have made. The number of items that will be taken 
from each provider is calculated using the Shapley value. This means that the actual 
number of items, that each provider will now be allowed to supply, is decided by the 
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quantity that they offered in the first place. In the CBM, all the different suppliers will 
have set their own prices for each product. The final retail price for each product is the 
average of the original prices that the providers said they would charge. This final price 
will be the new retail price for everyone who is involved. 
 
Figure 5.5 Closing Stage 
This section describes the performance of the CBM, and it will conclude by listing all 
the profits the participants gain in the group trading session. As in Fig. 5.5, there are three 
steps in this stage: prepare invoices; purchase coupons and close transactions. 
5.2.4.1 Prepare Invoices 
The market-brokers prepare invoices for the customers, when the notice has been 
received. To complete this task, they need to look at the original orders from the 
customers. Because the actual discounts have been given to them by the core-broker, the 
market-brokers need to figure out the actual quantity and calculate the payment and 
handling fee for each order line. 
If the actual quantity is less than the quantity ordered, the market-brokers have to 
decide how to distribute the items fairly. One option for doing this is FCFS. The other 
option is to use the Shapley value, which is decided by the original amount ordered by 
each customer. 
Chapter 5 A Closer Look at the CBM: A Case Study 
119 
 
According to customer Martin’s order in Tables 5.11 and 5.16, market-broker Tim 
works out an invoice for him, which is shown in Table 5.32. For product Cc, the handling 
fee is £46.50×(10%–0%)×9×10%=£4.19, and the payment is £46.50×(1–
10%)×9=£376.65. Martin can settle the total payment of £824.40 via Tim’s PayPal 
account, at Tim536@cbs.co.uk. 
Table 5.32 Invoice for Martin 
Invoice 
Order ID: O081109  Order Date: 26 August 16: 20: 56 Due Date: 04 September 2011 
Winner: Martin Customer ID: C34 Total Payment: £824.40 PayPal Account: Tim536@cbs.co.uk 










Discount Price  Payment  
Handling 
Fee Sum  
Cc  9 9 0% 10% 46.50  376.65 4.19 380.84 
Cd  4 4 0% 10% 26.56 95.62 1.06 96.68 
Ra 6 6 5% 35% 85.02 331.58 15.30 346.88 
In Table 5.33, Tim’s balance sheet shows the total of utility is equal to the total 
amount under the debits balance columns. 
Table 5.33 Tim’s Balance Sheet 
Title Debit Credit 
Payment to BEN  3459.68 
Cash from Steve 2157.18  
Cash from Martin 824.40  
Cash from John 770.29  
PayPal Fee from BEN  3.92 
PayPal Fee from Providers  99.41 
Steve's Handling Fee  14.68 
Martin's Handling Fee  14.92 
John's Handling Fee  11.83 
Steve's Final Value Fee   85.22 
Martin's Final Value Fee  32.15 
John's Final Value Fee  30.07 
Total:  £3751.87 £3751.87 
5.2.4.2 Purchase Coupons 
The brokers order the coupons from the providers. If the accounts balance and the 
customers’ payments have arrived, the market-brokers can proceed to pay for the coupons 
by transferring that money into the core-broker’s account. The core-brokers can then pay 
the providers, when they have determined how many items they should take from each 
provider. 
Table 5.34 Worth Functions for Products 
Product ID  {}  {1}  {2}  {3}  {1, 2}  {1, 3}  {2, 3}  {1, 2, 3}  
Cb  0  7 7 7 7 7 7 7 
Cc  0  31 31 31 31 31 31 31 
Cd  0  0 30 26 30 26 56 56 
Ra  0  40 38 27 61 61 61 61 
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Table 5.34 shows the number of items sold in each coalition. Call provider 1, Bob, 
provider 2, Tom, and provider 3, Ken. Coalition {1, 2} contains providers Bob and 
Tom, and they provide 30 units of product Cd. Coalition {3} supplies 27 units of product 
Ra which come from provider Ken. 
By using the Shapley value and the data in Table 5.34, all the different amounts of 
each product can be worked out and how they can be distributed fairly, to each provider. 
In Table 5.35, Tom is only allowed to make and receive payment for 
0!×2!×38+1!×1!×(61−40+61−27))+2!×0!×(61−61)÷3!=22 units of product Ra. 
The core-broker calculates the payment that each provider will receive. 
Table 5.35 Shares of Items 
Product ID  Bob  Tom  Ken  
Cb  3  2  2  
Cc  11  10  10  
Cd  0  30  26  
Ra  23  22  16  
Table 5.36 An Order to Ken 
Order 
Order ID: OO090703  Order Date: 07 September 2011 15:21:30 













Cb  2 5% 65.17 123.82 8.67 3.34 111.82 
Cc 10 10% 46.50 418.50 29.30 11.29 377.92 
Cd 26 10% 26.56 621.50 43.51 16.76 561.24 
Ra 16  35% 85.06 884.62 61.92 23.86 798.84 
    1163.83 81.47 31.39 1050.97 
In Table 5.36, Ben sends out an order to Ken. He also sends similar orders to Bob and 
Tom. An explanation will be given of the contents of this table, when the profits of the 
core-broker and the providers are discussed. Because the market-brokers have deducted 
their revenues before they transfer the money out, the core-brokers only need to calculate 
their own revenues and the money for each provider. 
In Table 5.37, the amount that Ben receives for product Ra includes the final value fee 
and the handling fee. The final value fee is £3372.63×3%=£101.18. When his 
handling fees are added up, namely £21.27 and £30.62 (see Tables 5.29 and 5.31 
respectively) the total handling fee is £51.89. Likewise, the PayPal fee is 
£1.82+£2.62=£4.44. The profit ,  which Ben gains from product Ra, is  
£51.89+£101.18−£4.44=£148.63. The total profit for Ben is the sum of the 
profit  from the four products.  It  is  £12.62+£37.79+£48.28+£148.63=£247.32. 
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Value Fee  PayPal Profit 
Cb  99 7 5% 65.17 433.38 0.00 13.00 0.38 12.62 
Cc 110 31 10% 46.50 1297.35 0.00 38.92 1.13 37.79 
Cd 56 56 10% 26.56 1338.62 9.56 40.16 1.44 48.28 
Ra 78 61 35% 85.06 3372.63 51.89 101.18 4.44 148.63 
     6441.98 61.45 193.26 7.39 247.32 










Value Fee  
MB‘s Final 
Value Fee  PayPal Profit  Payment  
Cb  36 3 5% 16.66 65.17 185.73 5.57 7.43 5.01 117.74 167.72 
Cc 42 11 10% 12.56 46.50 460.35 13.81 18.41 12.42 277.55 415.71 
Ra 40 23 35% 23.21 85.06 1271.65 38.15 50.87 34.30 614.51 1148.34 
     Bob  1917.73 57.53 76.71 51.72 1009.80 1731.77 
Cb  29 2 5% 18.09 65.17 123.82 3.71 4.95 3.34 75.64 111.82 
Cc 31 10 10% 11.29 46.50 418.50 12.56 16.74 11.29 265.02 377.92 
Cd 30 30 10% 7.46 26.56 717.12 21.51 28.68 19.34 423.78 647.58 
Ra 38 22 35% 21.39 85.06 1216.36 36.49 48.65 32.81 627.83 1098.41 
     Tom  2351.98 70.56 94.08 63.43 1316.63 2123.91 
Cb 34 2 5% 20.70 65.17 123.82 3.71 4.95 8.67 3.34 70.42 
Cc 37 10 10% 11.71 46.50 418.50 12.56 16.74 29.30 11.29 260.82 
Cd 26 26 10% 6.46 26.56 621.50 18.65 24.86 43.51 16.76 393.28 
Ra 27 16 35% 16.58 85.06 884.62 26.54 35.38 61.92 23.86 533.56 
     Ken  1163.83 34.91 46.55 81.47 31.39 724.51 
The payment for each item to the providers needs to exclude the expenses, which are 
the brokers’ commission and the PayPal fee. In Table 5.38, the payment to Bob for 
product Ra is £1271.65−£38.15−£50.87−£34.30=£1148.34. The profit is the payment 
minus the cost. His profit for Product Ra is £1148.34−£23.21×23=£614.51. In this table, 
in order to calculate the providers’ net profits, the cost of each product is given. In reality, 
nobody would reveal this information to anyone, even the core-brokers. 























Tim Cb 3 65.17 5% 5% √   174.03  167.72    
Tim Cb 2 65.17 5% 5%  √  116.02  111.82    
Tim Cb 2 65.17 5% 5%   √ 116.02  111.82    
Tim Cc 11 46.50 10% 10% √   431.33  415.71    
Tim Cc 10 46.50 10% 10%  √  392.12  377.92    
Tim Cc 10 46.50 10% 10%   √ 392.12  377.92    
Tim Cd 24 26.56 5% 10%   √ 540.64  518.06    
Tim Ra 23 85.06 25% 35% √   1210.58  1148.34    
Tim Ra 2 85.06 25% 35%  √  105.27  99.86    
        Sum 3478.11  3329.16    
Phil Cd 16 26.56 0% 10%  √  360.64  345.38    
        Sum 360.64  345.38    
Paul Cd 14 26.56 5% 10%  √  313.76  302.20    
Paul Cd 2 26.56 5% 10%   √ 44.82  43.17    
Paul Ra 20 85.06 25% 35%  √  1047.28  998.55    
Paul Ra 16 85.06 25% 35%   √ 837.83  798.84    
        Sum 2243.69  2142.77    
        Total 6082.44  5817.30    
A check list like the one in Table 5.39 will help Ben when he collects the money from 
the market-brokers and pays the providers for the coupons. The money is transferred into 
Core-broker Bens’ bank accounts and coupons are received in exchange. The agreement 
is that Ben must send out the coupons within two working days, after he has received the 
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money. Ben will try his best to make sure that the market-brokers receive the coupons 
and close the transactions as soon as possible. 
5.2.4.3 Close Transactions 
When the coupons have arrived, it is time for all the brokers to close the transactions. 
The core-broker sends the coupons to the market-brokers who close the transactions with 
their clients. Finally, the core-broker closes the transactions with the providers and ends 
the current session of group trading. He/she has to decide whether to start a new session 
of trading or to terminate this group-trading project. The check list in Table 5.39 will also 
be used by Ben to check the coupons and determine where they are from and where they 
are going. Sometimes, the coupons received for one particular product may come from 
different providers, for instance, 3 of the coupons that Tim has for product Cb are from 
Bob and 2 of them are from Ken. 
The core-broker passes the coupons on. When the customers are certain that they have 
received all the coupons they ordered, the market-brokers can close the transactions with 
the customers. If all the market-brokers reply with an OK, the transactions between the 
core-broker and the providers are then closed. 
Table 5.40 Tim’s Check List 



























O081101 Steve  Cb  65.17 2 2 0% 5% 5% 124.47  115.42    
O081101 Steve  Cc  46.5 17 17 10% 10% 10% 711.45  663.19    
O081101 Steve  Cd  26.56 14 14 5% 5% 10% 336.52  313.76    
O081101 Steve  Ra 85.02 11 11 10% 25% 35% 631.27  575.73    
O081207 Steve  Cc  46.5 5 5 10% 10% 10% 209.25  195.05    
O081207 Steve  Cd  26.56 6 6 5% 5% 10% 144.22  134.47    
        Subtotal 2157.18  1997.62    
O081109 Martin Cc  46.5 9 9 0% 10% 10% 380.84  351.10    
O081109 Martin Cd  26.56 4 4 0% 5% 10% 96.68  89.65    
O081109 Martin Ra 85.02 6 6 5% 25% 35% 346.88  314.04    
        Subtotal 824.40  754.78    
O081211 John Cb  65.17 5 5 0% 5% 5% 311.19  288.56    
O081211 John Ra 85.02 8 8 10% 25% 35% 459.11  418.72    
        Subtotal 770.29  707.27    
        Total 3751.87  3459.68    
Another check list (Table 5.40) will be used by market-broker Tim when he takes the 
money from the customers, pays for the items, receives the coupons and sends them out 
via e-mail. The only thing the market-brokers need to do is fill in the customers’ names 
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on the coupons. The customers will be able to claim the products and services from the 
providers, on presentation the coupons. 
This completes the review of a session of group-trading. The benefits for all the 
participants are now clear to examine. Table 5.41 shows the discounts for the customers 
the commission for the core and market-brokers, and the profits of the providers. 


































Cb  0.00 22.81 0.00 0.00 4.84 17.34 0.00 12.62 117.74 75.64 70.42 
Cc 0.00 144.15 0.00 0.00 0.53 51.89 0.00 37.79 277.55 265.02 260.82 
Cd 42.50 63.74 42.50 15.30 24.88 22.95 15.30 48.28 0.00 423.78 393.28 
Ra 0.00 744.28 1071.76 0.00 28.95 55.29 79.62 148.63 614.51 627.83 533.56 
Total 42.50 974.98 1114.25 15.30 59.20 147.47 94.91 247.32 1009.80 1392.26 1258.07 
Some of the expenses incurred by the brokers in using the CBS site are 
not considered in the examples, such as a £30 session fee for Ben to list the 
session of the group-trading project on the site. But every participant seems to get a 
reasonable benefit out of the group-trading session in the project. The customers get more 
discounts when they team up together. The providers earn more money because they have 
attracted more customers. They achieve this by creating new products and using this new 
way of trading, involving brokers, who play an important role and gain commission for it. 
Ben gains £247.32 commission. Market-broker Tim’s commission is 
£59.20+£147.47=£206.67. Tim’s handling fee can be shown here, but in the real-
world, would only be disclosed to anybody except the market-brokers and their clients. 
Ben has no way to know the handling fee of the market-brokers. Although the core-
brokers seem to have more information than the other participants, the customers’ orders 
and personal information will always remain hidden from them. 
The rates of commission for the brokers are fixed throughout the illustrations in this 
chapter. In practice, they are fixed for the duration of the session, but the handling fee 
from customers and the final value fee from the providers are definitely negotiable 
between sessions. The session fee and the online store fee are fixed but they are also 
subject to negotiation in real-world websites. There may be several sessions of trading in 
a group-trading project. When a session of trading ends, the flow returns to stage 1. The 
process is repeated until the core-broker decides to terminate the project. A project 
terminates only when the broker decides to drop the list from the CBS website. 




This chapter provides a deeper insight into the functioning of the CBM and to 
demonstrate the applicability of the CBM to real-world markets. This has been 
demonstrated through the case study in the group-trading project using the scenario of a 
travel agent. Core-broker Ben created group-trading project by integrating the products 
from the three providers offering inexpensive hotel rooms and low car rentals for 
economical travel in the Midlands. 
The CBS website is for core-brokers to advertise their project and find market-brokers 
to sell the products. Ben registered himself and project S1 on the CBS site and uploaded 
three documents: project specs, product descriptions and price lists to the site. He then 
listed S1 and began a session of group-trading. The case study illustrates the processes of 
the four stages in the CBM, namely commencing, gathering, combining and closing. 
Brokers can use the CBS to help them with the tasks during the trading. 
In the commencing stage, core-broker Ben recruited three market-brokers. He started a 
session of the group-trading project. The market-brokers promoted the project on their 
websites. In the gathering stage, the market-brokers attracted customers. Market-broker 
Tim received orders from three customers and combined the orders. After he has 
negotiated with his customers and reduces their expected discounts, he submitted a 
market order to Ben. Market-broker Phil was the earliest one and Paul was the last one 
who submitted the order. 
In the combining stage, Ben combined all the orders from the market-brokers into one 
final order and calculated the actual discount and quantity of each product. The order 
lines were dropped from the trading, when their actual discounts are less than the 
expected discounts. Because the principle that the CBM uses in dealing with the market-
brokers’ orders is FCFS, some of the market-brokers may not get what they ordered. 
After the final order has been passed the stability check, Ben delivered the notices to the 
market-brokers and awaited payment from them. 
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In the closing stage, Ben calculated the number of items taken from each provider by 
using the Shapley value and ordered the coupons for the market-brokers. The market-
brokers prepare invoices for their clients and sent the invoices out. When the money from 
the customers had come through, the market-brokers proceeded to pay for the coupons by 
transferring the money into the Ben’s account. The market-brokers closed the 
transactions with the buyers by sending the coupons to them. Finally, Ben closed the 
transactions with the providers and ended the current session of group trading. He has to 
decide whether to start a new session of trading or to terminate this group-trading project. 
It would appear, the CBM created a win-win situation for all participants in a group-
trading session. In the next chapter, some data, generated in the two scenarios, will be 
used as input in both a traditional market and also in a group-trading e-market in the 
CBM. The results of these two markets will be compared and discussed. 





As mentioned in the previous chapters, the e-market is an arena in which distributed 
computing, incentive compatibility, and less computational complexity are all highly 
relevant. These three factors have been considered as evaluation criteria for the CBM. On 
the other hand, in the words of Reeve and Peerbhoy (2007) evaluation is an assessment 
about “the degree to which something is successful in producing a desired result”. Two 
factors, namely effectiveness and efficiency, need to consider as additional evaluation 
criteria for the CBM. The effectiveness of the new model requires an assessment having 
the right support to broader marketing objectives. Within e-commerce context, common 
efficiency measures across marketing activities to ensure minimising resources or time 
needed to complete a business process. And so, this chapter is about the evaluation of the 
CBM with five criteria, namely distributed computing, computational complexity, 
incentive compatibility, effectiveness and efficiency. 
One possible way to test the CBM is to use it in a real-world site and collect data from 
it. A CBS site has been developed, but the crux of this research is to demonstrate the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the CBM versus the Core as the mechanism drives it. At 
this stage, a real-world test would be inappropriate; further it would be unlikely to 
produce the data set necessary for rigorous testing. Simulation, “the imitation of the 
operation of a real-world process or system over time” (Banks et al. 2001) provides an 
approach. In this research, a simulation system was implemented to aid the evaluation of 
the model, and is introduced in section 6.1. The system consists of a Test Case Generator 
(TCG), a Core Simulator (CS) and a CBM Simulator (CBMS). 
This simulation system was used to perform the evaluation of the CBM. Firstly, its 
TCG generated the test data for the evaluation in two scenarios: normal and demanding 
customers. The data is based on group-trading project S1, which was created by Ben and 
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discussed in the previous chapter. In this project, the data produced by the TCG from 
these two scenarios was put into the CS and the CBMS. Secondly, from the outputs of the 
simulators, a comparison for the between the core and the CBM was made and is 
discussed in section 6.2. The simulation system was also used to test the performance of 
the CBM, when there are a large number of customers in an e-market. These results from 
the CBMS are discussed in section 6.3. A final evaluation of the techniques used in the 
new model is made at the end of this chapter. 
6.1 A Simulation System 
This simulation system was developed to produce results which would usually come 
out of a shopping site. A database to store the data output from the simulators consisted 
of the following eight tables: customer table, supplier table, product table, providing table, 
project price list table, broker table, order table and order detail table. The specification of 
the above tables can be found in Appendix 4. 
The simulation system was written in C# using the Visual Studio 2008 development 
environment. The system runs on a Windows operating system. All the results in this 
chapter were produced on a Windows Vista platform with a 1.86 GHz CPU with 2GB 
RAM and a 1280x800 display. The minimal hardware requirement for the system is a 1.6 
GHz CPU with 384 MB RAM and a 1024x768 display. 
The TCG is described in subsection 6.2.1. It was built to create data for the tables 
needed for the simulators. The CS was based on the concept of the core and is described 
in subsection 6.2.2. The CBMS in subsection 6.2.3 was constructed according to the 
pattern of the CBM. 
6.1.1 A Test Case Generator 
The TCG creates input data for the CS and the CBMS. In Fig. 6.1, this test data 
generator contains seven functions: customer creator, supplier creator, product creator, 
price list manager, providing allocator, market-broker creator and order creator. 




Figure 6.1 Test Case Generator 
1. Customer creator − creates new customers’ records into the customer table. 
2. Supplier creator − generates the records of new providers and adds them into the 
supplier table. 
3. Product creator − creates data about new products and adds it into the product table. 
4. Price list manager − sets up a price list for a product including what volume 
discount customers may get, when they order a certain number of items. This data is 
stored in the project price list table. 
5. Market-broker creator − allows users to assign an existing broker to be a market-
broker. The users can also add a new broker’s record into the broker table and assign 
him/her as a market-broker. 
6. Providing random allocator − allows users to input the number of providers and 
creates the information about the products which the providers offer. The data is 
created by using a random number generator and is stored in the providing table. 
7. Order random generator − creates the data for each customer’s purchases 
randomly. It generates a certain number of records for the order table and for the 
order detail table, according to the number of customers the user inputs. 
These seven functions work independently, and most of them are accompanied by a ‘list’ 
button that allows users to produce a report about the current contents in the tables related 
to that respective function. However, they have to be completed before users run the 
functions with higher level numbers. The interface of the TCG is shown in Appendix 7. 
The users may run the TCG repeatedly until they are satisfied with the data in the tables. 
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6.1.2 A Core Simulator 
The Core Simulator (CS) is based on the core concept. Its aim is to find a core in a 
coalition. In Fig. 6.2, there are three functions: core combination generator, core discount 
calculator and core locator. The interface of the CS is given in Appendix 8. 
 
Figure 6.2 Core Simulator 
1. Core combination generator − creates all the possible combinations of providers 
and customers. In order to reduce the complexity in the core, one customer can only 
purchase items from one provider. For instance, three providers: A, B and C, and two 
customers: a and b, have nine possible combinations, as shown in Table 6.1. This 
function can store these nine combinations in the order table and order detail table. 
Table 6.1 Core Combinations 
Combination Provider A Provider B Provider C 
1 Customer a Customer b  
2 Customer a  Customer b 
3 Customer b Customer a  
4 Customer b  Customer a 
5  Customer a Customer b 
6  Customer b Customer a 
7 Customer a and b   
8  Customer a and b  
9   Customer a and b 
2. Core discount calculator − calculates the discount for the customers, which they 
may get in all the combinations. 
3. Core locater − finds the core, which is the one which has the largest total benefit. It 
calculates the total benefit, which is the sum of providers’ profits and customers’ 
discounts in each combination. This function also works out the benefit for each 
individual in the core. 
This simulator will determine the number of providers and customers in a database 
automatically, when users assign the database to this simulator and run it. When this 
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simulator is used, in order to locate a core, the above three functions need to be executed 
in the above sequence. 
6.1.3 A CBM Simulator 
The CBMS is built to the pattern of the CBM. Its aim is to find a bigger core in a 
coalition effectively. In Fig. 6.3, there are four functions: core-broker creator, CBM 
combination generator, CBM discount calculator and stability checker. The interface of 
the CS is given in Appendix 9. 
 
Figure 6.3 CBM Simulator 
1. Core-broker combiner − this function allows a user to add together what all the 
providers have provided and to store it in the providing table as if it were what the 
core-broker has provided. 
2. CBM combination generator − works out all possible combinations of providers’ 
coalition and customers’ coalitions. For example, one providers’ coalition from core-
broker CB and three customers’ coalitions 1, 2 and 3 from market-brokers: 1, 2 and 3 
respectively could be joined together. There are seven possible combinations for 
them in Table 6.2. This function can store these combinations in the order table and 
order detail table. 
Table 6.2 CBM Combinations 
Combination The Core 
1 Buyers’ Coalition 1 
2 Buyers’ Coalition 2 
3 Buyers’ Coalition 3 
4 Buyers’ Coalition 1 and 2 
5 Buyers’ Coalition 1 and 3 
6 Buyers’ Coalition 2 and 3 
7 Buyers’ Coalition 1, 2 and 3 
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3. CBM discount calculator − calculates the discounts of customers’ coalitions and 
the profit of the providers’ coalition in each combination. 
4. Stability checker − calculates the total benefit of each combination. This checker 
will make sure that the coalition which has the biggest number of people is also the 
one which has the largest total benefit. 
Just like the previous simulator, the functions in this simulator need to be executed in 
the right order to produce the correct results. Users can input the number of providers, 
customers and market-brokers, generate some test cases, and use the simulators to 
produce results in a traditional market as well as in multi e-markets with the CBM. 
Two sets of test data for the evaluations were produced by the TCG. Each set of data 
contained orders from 99 different buyers and the items offered by the three providers are 
given in Table 6.3. One set of orders given in Appendix 5 has been generated from a 
scenario where buyers do not expect such a high discount. The other set of orders given 
in Appendix 6 is based on a scenario where buyers are more demanding. 
There may be thousands and thousands of traders on the Internet, therefore it would 
not be considered as a large coalition, when there are only 198 buyers and 3 providers in 
an e-market. However, the number of these test data is large enough to fulfil the main 
purpose of this chapter – comparing the new model with the core. In the next section, the 
above test cases were put into the CS and the CBMS at the same time. By comparing the 
outputs of these two simulators, it can be determined whether the CBM is more beneficial 
to the traders than the core. Using the outputs of the simulators, a comparison is made 
between the core and the CBM and the results are given. 
6.2 Comparison between the CBM and the Core 
In this section, the main focus is the comparison between the core and the CBM. Five 
criteria, namely the use of distributed computing, the degree of computational complexity 
incentive compatibility, efficiency and effectiveness are used to judge between them. 
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In distributed computing, a problem is divided into many tasks, each of which is 
solved by one or more computers. In subsection 6.2.1, the core and CBM are examined to 
establish whether they can solve problems better by using multi computers or more than 
one market. Their abilities to deal with the Internet environment are also assessed. A 
problem with large coalition can cause high computational complexity in solving it. In 
subsection 6.2.2, the complexity of both the core and CBM are evaluated when there are 
large numbers of participants in coalitions. In subsection 6.2.3, in order to compare the 
incentive compatibilities in the CBM and in the core, the assumption has been made that 
providers are willing to offer more volume discount to customers. The judgements of 
efficiency in the CBM and in the core are given in subsection 6.2.4. Their effectiveness is 
discussed in subsection 6.2.5. 
One of the aims of the CBM is to create a win-win situation for both customers and 
providers. So the discounts of buyers and the profits of suppliers are calculated and 
compared to see whether the CBM is superior to the core in subsection 6.2.4. 
6.2.1 Distributed Computing 
To fit in a distributed computing environment, by nature, a distributed model requires 
involving multiple computers to be effective. Another two distributed contexts, namely 
Internet and multi-markets, are used here to assess the models too. 
 
Figure 6.4 Multi E-Markets in the CBM 
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The core concept is used to find a stable set for a coalition in a traditional market. This 
is normally done on one computer. It might cause extra complexity if this problem were 
to be solved by using multi computers. The core might be used in an e-market, but it is 
difficult to apply it to multiple e-markets in the Internet environment. Fig. 6.4 shows how 
Ben involves three e-markets and the CBS website in the group-trading project. This 
indicates that the CBM enables a core-broker to use more than one e-market on the 
Internet and so bring more benefits to the participants. The core is normally used in a 
traditional marketplace, but it might be possible to put it into an e-market where it would 
allow customers to place orders via the Internet.  
Table 6.3 Distributed Computing 
Distributed Computing Environment The CBM The Core 
Multi Computers Yes No 
Internet Yes Maybe 
Multi e-Markets Yes No 
When the two systems are judged according to the criterion of distributed computing, 
Table 6.3 summarises the results which show that the core may be applied on the Internet 
but it fails when it is used with multi computers or e-markets. On the other hand, the 
CBM can use more than one computer being specially designed to make the best use of 
multi markets on the Internet. 
6.2.2 Computational Complexity 
The computational complexity can be expressed as big O notation, which is also a 
useful tool to analyse the efficiency of algorithms regarding the time it takes for them to 
complete their jobs. Assume there are p providers, b orders and g products in the market. 
There are at most 10 order lines in an order. The number of sub-coalitions is (p+1)b. The 
pseudocode in Table 4.2 takes (p+1)b×b×10×p×g steps to find a core in a coalition. If p, b 
and g are large, the big O notation of finding the core is O(nn), which can be classified 
into extremely high computational complexity. This is a fatal weakness of the core if 
applied in the real world markets.  
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Now suppose there are m e-markets in a group-trading project. In the CBM, the time 
for the result is the total time of the tasks shown in section 4.2: 
1. jointProviders: It takes p×g2 steps to merge the b providers for using the pseudocode 
in Table 4.5, so its big O notation is O(n3). 
2. combineOrders: Suppose there are b1, b2, …, bm in each e-market respectively. It 
takes g×(b1+b2+…+bm)×10+g×10=g×b×10+g×10  steps to combine the orders into a 
big combined order and decide the discounts for every product in it for using the 
pseudocodes in Table 4.5 and 3.14 when combining the orders in the m e-markets. Its 
big O notation should be O(n2). It takes g×m×10+ g×10 steps when combine m 
market orders from the e-markets. Because the number of e-markets is a constant, so 
the big O notation is O(n). 
3. checkStability: The pseudocode in Table 4.6 takes 100×m×g+100×g+100×m steps. 
The big O notation is O(n). 
4. rankOrders: The big O notation of a quicksort algorithm is O(n log n) (Hoare 1962). 
The number of orders is equal to the number of e-markets, i.e. m. Since a group-trading 
project commonly involves not more than 10 e-markets, so that m is a constant. 
Therefore, the big O notation of the sorting here is O(1). 
5. decideQuantities: According to the stock of each product, the pseudocode in Table 
4.7 may be used to decide the actual quantity for every market’s order and it takes 
g×m×10 steps. Since m is a constant, the big O notation of the pseudocode is O(n). 
6. decideSoldItems: pseudocode 4.9 takes 3×p×g×(g+2p) steps to decide the number of 
items for each provider and its big O notation is O(n2×2n). 
7. calculateCoalitionBenefit: The pseudocode in Table 4.10 takes 10×g steps to find the 
benefit of a coalition. Since there are m coalitions in the e-markets and a big 
coalition which is combined from them, so it takes 10×g×(m+1) to calculate the 
benefit of a coalition. The big O notation is O(n). 
8. calculateCommissions: Calculate the commissions for the market-brokers and core-
broker using the pseudocodes in Table 4.11. The steps are p×g×10×(2×m+b) and 
p×g×10×(m+1) and their big O notation are O(n3). 
9. calculateProfits: Calculate the profits of the providers. Table 4.12 can be referred to 
see the pseudocode of calculating the profit of each provider and it takes p×g2×10 
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steps. So, the big O notation is O(n3). 
The steps for the pseudocode in Table 4.4 for the CBM is 
40×g+100×m+10×g×b+30×g×m+10×p×g×(3×m+b+1)+3×p×g×2p and for the core is 
(p+1)b×b×10×p×g. Consider 3 providers, 100 customers, 10 products and 3 e-
markets. In Table 6.4, the steps of the core and CBM are 9600 and 10320 
respectively, when there are two customers. 
Table 6.4 Steps Needed in the Core and CBM 
Buyer 
No Core CBM 
Buyer 
No Core CBM 
Buyer 
No Core CBM 
Buyer 
No Core CBM 
1 1200 9920 26 3.51281E+19 19920 51 7.75802E+34 29920 76 1.30165E+50 39920 
2 9600 10320 27 1.45917E+20 20320 52 3.16406E+35 30320 77 5.27511E+50 40320 
3 57600 10720 28 6.05284E+20 20720 53 1.28996E+36 30720 78 2.13745E+51 40720 
4 307200 11120 29 2.50760E+21 21120 54 5.25720E+36 31120 79 8.65940E+51 41120 
5 1536000 11520 30 1.03763E+22 21520 55 2.14182E+37 31520 80 3.50760E+52 41520 
6 7372800 11920 31 4.28887E+22 21920 56 8.72306E+37 31920 81 1.42058E+53 41920 
7 34406400 12320 32 1.77089E+23 22320 57 3.55153E+38 32320 82 5.75247E+53 42320 
8 157286400 12720 33 7.30491E+23 22720 58 1.44554E+39 32720 83 2.32905E+54 42720 
9 707788800 13120 34 3.01051E+24 23120 59 5.88183E+39 33120 84 9.42844E+54 43120 
10 3145728000 13520 35 1.23962E+25 23520 60 2.39261E+40 33520 85 3.81627E+55 43520 
11 13841203200 13920 36 5.10016E+25 23920 61 9.72995E+40 33920 86 1.54447E+56 43920 
12 60397977600 14320 77 2.09673E+26 24320 62 3.95578E+41 34320 87 6.24971E+56 44320 
13 2.61725E+11 14720 38 8.61360E+26 24720 63 1.60783E+42 34720 88 2.52862E+57 44720 
14 1.12743E+12 15120 39 3.53611E+27 25120 64 6.53342E+42 35120 89 1.02294E+58 45120 
15 4.83184E+12 15520 40 1.45071E+28 25520 65 2.65420E+43 35520 90 4.13774E+58 45520 
16 2.06158E+13 15920 41 5.94792E+28 25920 66 1.07801E+44 35920 91 1.67349E+59 45920 
17 8.76173E+13 16320 42 2.43719E+29 26320 67 4.37739E+44 36320 92 6.76750E+59 46320 
18 3.71085E+14 16720 43 9.98089E+29 26720 68 1.77709E+45 36720 93 2.73642E+60 46720 
19 1.56680E+15 17120 44 4.08520E+30 27120 69 7.21290E+45 37120 94 1.10634E+61 47120 
20 6.59707E+15 17520 45 1.67122E+31 27520 70 2.92697E+46 37520 95 4.47243E+61 47520 
21 2.77077E+16 17920 46 6.83343E+31 27920 71 1.18751E+47 37920 96 1.80781E+62 47920 
22 1.16108E+17 18320 47 2.79279E+32 28320 72 4.81696E+47 38320 97 7.30655E+62 48320 
23 4.85544E+17 18720 48 1.14089E+33 28720 73 1.95355E+48 38720 98 2.95275E+63 48720 
24 2.02662E+18 19120 49 4.65862E+33 29120 74 7.92122E+48 39120 99 1.19315E+64 49120 
25 8.44425E+18 19520 50 1.90148E+34 29520 75 3.21131E+49 39520 100 4.82081E+64 49520 
When the number of customer increases, the number of steps taken in the core is 
getting much larger than that in the CBM. The number of steps in the core is enormous, 
i.e. 4.82081E+64, while the CBM only takes 49520 steps when there are 100 orders. The 
small number of steps needed in the CBM demonstrates that it has less complexity when 
it tackles problems in a large coalition. The fact that CBM has less computational 
complexity than the core can also easily tell by examining their big O notations. The core 
and CBM are O(nn) and O(n2×2n) respectively. 
Among the tasks of the CBM, task 5, which decides the number of items for each 
provider, seems to be a time-consuming job. In Table 6.5, the difference between the 
processes of the CBM with and without task 5 is 0, when the numbers of providers and 
customers are more than 58. This means that the time, which is taken in task 5, makes the 
other tasks in the CBM trivial. Therefore, task 5 is proven to be a critical task in the CBM. 
Chapter 6 Empirical Evaluation 
136 
 
The steps taken in pseudocode 4.9 are 3×p×g×(g+2p). They have nothing to do with the 
number of buyers, but mainly come from the number of providers, i.e. p. Assume p is 
limited within 20, the total steps taken in the process of the CBM becomes 
30×g+10×g×b+20×g×m+300×g×(3×m+b+1)+60×g×220. Its big O becomes O(n2) and 
can be classified as an algorithm with low computational complexity. The computational 
complexity can be dramatically lessened in the CBM by limiting the number of providers.  














1 1 4260 360 3900 31 31 1.99716E+12 1.99716E+12 165900 
2 2 7240 840 6400 32 32 4.12317E+12 4.12317E+12 174400 
3 3 10720 1620 9100 33 33 8.50404E+12 8.50404E+12 183100 
4 4 15120 3120 12000 34 34 1.75235E+13 1.75235E+13 192000 
5 5 21400 6300 15100 35 35 3.60777E+13 3.60777E+13 201100 
6 6 31720 13320 18400 36 36 7.42170E+13 7.42170E+13 210400 
7 7 50880 28980 21900 37 37 1.52557E+14 1.52557E+14 219900 
8 8 89440 63840 25600 38 38 3.13361E+14 3.13361E+14 229600 
9 9 170440 140940 29500 39 39 6.43214E+14 6.43214E+14 239500 
10 10 343800 310200 33600 40 40 1.31941E+15 1.31941E+15 249600 
11 11 717040 679140 37900 41 41 2.70480E+15 2.70480E+15 259900 
12 12 1520560 1478160 42400 42 42 5.54154E+15 5.54154E+15 270400 
13 13 3245880 3198780 47100 43 43 1.13470E+16 1.13470E+16 281100 
14 14 6937480 6885480 52000 44 44 2.32217E+16 2.32217E+16 292000 
15 15 14807200 14750100 57100 45 45 4.74989E+16 4.74989E+16 303096 
16 16 31524480 31462080 62400 46 46 9.71089E+16 9.71089E+16 314400 
17 17 66919720 66851820 67900 47 47 1.98440E+17 1.98440E+17 325888 
18 18 141636760 141563160 73600 48 48 4.05324E+17 4.05324E+17 337600 
19 19 298929360 298849860 79500 49 49 8.27536E+17 8.27536E+17 349440 
20 20 629237200 629151600 85600 50 50 1.68885E+18 1.68885E+18 361472 
21 21 1321303960 1321212060 91900 51 51 3.44525E+18 3.44525E+18 373760 
22 22 2768345640 2768247240 98400 52 52 7.02562E+18 7.02562E+18 387072 
23 23 5788251520 5788146420 105100 53 53 1.43214E+19 1.43214E+19 399360 
24 24 12079714720 12079602720 112000 54 54 2.91833E+19 2.91833E+19 417792 
25 25 25165950600 25165831500 119100 55 55 5.94475E+19 5.94475E+19 425984 
26 26 52345048120 52344921720 126400 56 56 1.21057E+20 1.21057E+20 425984 
27 27 1.08717E+11 1.08716E+11 133900 57 57 2.46437E+20 2.46437E+20 458752 
28 28 2.25486E+11 2.25486E+11 141600 58 58 5.01521E+20 5.01521E+20 0 
29 29 4.67078E+11 4.67078E+11 149500 59 59 1.02034E+21 1.02034E+21 0 
30 30 9.66368E+11 9.66368E+11 157600 60 60 2.07526E+21 2.07526E+21 0 
One interesting finding in this research is that CBM’s computational complexity will 
not become higher, when there are more orders in the e-markets, so market-brokers are 
free to take as many clients as they could in their e-markets. However, it may take time 
for them to negotiate with buyers if the size of a coalition becomes too big or the 
communications get too busy. In order to make sure brokers to collect the orders in time, 
one important principle is to limit the size of coalitions in e-markets within one group-
trading session, and this needs to be applied in the model. It is usually the brokers who 
monitor the size of coalitions in their e-markets. All of the brokers have to follow this 
principle in order to prevent situations where a coalition becomes too large to handle. 
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The aim is to produce outcomes for a group-trading project on an average computer 
within a reasonable time. To achieve this, a core-broker should limit the number of 
suppliers to form a group-trading project. The suggested number of providers is 15. What 
would happen to the core, if the number of providers was increased to 20? It takes 
2b×b×200×g steps to find the core in a coalition in Table 4.2. The big O, i.e. O(n2×2n), 
has high computational complexity and greatly depends on the number of orders. So even 
with only a few providers in a market, it is still a time-consuming job to find the core 
with many customers in a large coalition. 
In summary, the complexity in the core can be incredibly high and this means it will 
not reach the required speed and will not be able to support a large coalition in a 
marketplace. On the contrary, the CBM proposed here can effectively and efficiently 
reduce the computational complexity in online trading even when multiple providers and 
many customers are involved. 
6.2.3 Incentive Compatibility 
It is crucial to give people incentives to participate in online trading. The effectiveness 
of both models is assessed by comparing the benefits for participants. The core cannot 
deal with wholesale transactions in a buyers’ group, therefore individuals cannot obtain 
very good discounts within it when they purchase items from providers. In order to 
compare the incentive compatibilities, the assumption has been made that providers are 
willing to offer more volume discount to customers if a group of them purchases the same 
item from the same provider in the core, although it is rather unusual for them to give 
customers such discounts in a traditional market. If this is not done, there will be no 
means of comparing the two systems. 
There are three incentives for traders, namely volume discounts, an equilibrium price 
and a fair distribution. The providers offer volume discounts to customers in the CBM. 
As mentioned in chapter 3, if the core may be empty and unstable, an equilibrium price 
will not be reached in a coalition. The CBM performs a stability check to make sure that 
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there is a best price for traders. An evaluation was made to determine how fairly the 
profits that providers get were distributed, in both the core and the CBM, and the results 
are given here. 
 
Figure 6.5 Uneven Providers’ Profits in the Core 
Fig. 6.5 shows that in a traditional market place the profits are not distributed to all the 
providers evenly. This is a contrast to the fair distribution of profit in the CBM in Fig. 6.6, 
in which the percentage of the profit that each provider attains stays quite close to its 
average amount. The amount the provider gets is more or less constant. By using the 
Shapley value, the CBM can make a fair decision as to which items are allocated to 
which provider, even when customers’ requirements are less. The CBM provides fair 
shares to customers and providers, but the core does not. Fair distribution is crucial in 
teamwork. The providers might leave the team if the profits have been distributed 
unfairly, even though the profit they can get out of it is good. In the CBM, suppliers have 
a great chance to sell out their products. Even if the customers do not purchase all that is 
on offer, the suppliers still get their fair share. This will also give them satisfaction. 
 
Figure 6.6 Distribution of Providers’ Profits in the CBM 
Table 6.6 Incentive Compatibility 
Incentive Compatibility The CBM The Core 
Volume Discount Yes Yes 
Equilibrium Price Yes Not Sure 
Fair Share Yes No 
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Table 6.6 summarises incentive compatibility in the CBM and the core. The CBM has 
higher incentive compatibility than the core. The CBM created a win-win situation for all 
participants in a group-trading session. 
6.2.4 Efficiency 
Efficiency generally describes the intent to which some valuable resources are well 
used for an intended outcome. In this thesis, the efficiency of the CBM and the core are 
judged by the time and cost which they use to complete tasks. 
The CBM is more efficient than the core in collecting the necessary information to 
locate a stable set. It is a time-consuming job for the core to collect the information of 
marginal utility functions shown in Table 3.1, which describe the values that customers 
are willing to pay for the goods and the price the providers want to sell them for. Just as 
mentioned in subsection 3.1.3, collecting such information can be a big problem in the 
real marketplace. On the other hand, the inputs needed for the CBM, which are price lists 
and orders, are market information and can easily be collected by a core broker. For 
example, the expected discounts of the orders in Table 5.13 show the max values that 
customers are willing to pay and the volume discounts of the price lists in Table 5.7 
indicate the prices the providers want to sell the customers for. 














Information Collecting √ - - - 
A Stable Set Finding √  - √ 
Table 6.7 shows that the CBM has better efficiency than the core. By jointing 
providers together and combining orders from multiple e-markets, the CBM becomes 
more efficient than the core in locating a stable set in a large coalition. Firstly, it hides the 
information of providers and customers to ensure that there are less information and 
quicker data transfer between e-markets. Secondly, as mentioned in subsection 6.2.2, the 
big O notations of the CBM and core are O(n2×2n) and O(nn) respectively. It successfully 
reduces the computational complexity and executing time in group-trading, but there are 
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extra costs in doing so, including some expenses involving multiple e-markets and the 
commissions for the brokers. 
In the next subsection, the effectiveness including the discounts to customers, the 
profits for the providers and the total benefits in the CBM and the core are discussed. The 
net total benefits excluding the extra expenses to the brokers need to be checked to 
certain that it is worthy to spend the costs to perform group-trading in the CBM. 
6.2.5 Effectiveness 
There are effectiveness of data protection and fairness in the CBM. Market brokers 
can hide their customers’ personal information before they submit orders to the core 
brokers. An example is in Tables 3.18 and 3.19. The profits are shared by the providers. 
The Shapley value is used in the CBM to distribute the profit to each provider in a 
coalition fairly (reference Fig. 6.6). 
In a market, it is usual that if the customers get better discounts, then the providers 
receive less profit. To ensure the CBM has taken into account the interests of both 
customers and providers, the average discount that buyers can obtain and the average 
profit of suppliers are examined here. In this way, the CBM can be evaluated to see 
whether it gives more benefits than the core to both customers and providers.  
 
Figure 6.7 Customers’ Discounts 
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In Fig. 6.7 and 6.8, the discounts of the customers and profits of the providers in the 
CBM are all higher than the ones in the core. The discounts of the customers in the CBM 
are net discounts, which have had the brokers’ commission deducted from them. The 
same traders can gain more benefit in the multi e-markets of the CBM than they can in 
the core of a traditional market. 
 
Figure 6.8 Providers’ Profits 
 
Figure 6.9 Providers’ Net Profits 
In Fig. 6.9, for the providers in the CBM, the net profits are not always greater than 
the profits they can get in the core. It may be argued that the brokers deserve to be paid, if 
they do not bring more profits to the providers. In the CBM, the brokers earn commission 
because they provide a new channel of selling for suppliers and attract all kinds of 
customers including those who desire to get high discounts. 
It is quite common in an e-market nowadays to have many demanding customers. It is 
also very difficult to attract such customers to a traditional market. It is important to show 
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that CBM can effectively allure such buyers to e-markets and bring more profit to 
providers. It is also crucial that the simulation system provides evidence to show that 
there are far more discounts in the CBM for customers than in the core. For this purpose, 
the TCG created test data for a scenario of demanding buyers, who only buy items at an 
extremely low price. This data, which given in Appendix 6, was used in the CBMS and 
the CS. 
Fig. 6.10 shows that the providers are significantly better off by using the CBM, 
especially when this is compared with Fig. 6.9, and even after they have paid commission 
to the brokers. 
 
Figure 6.10 Providers’ Profits with Demanding Customers 
 
 
Figure 6.11 Demanding Customers’ Discounts 
In Fig. 6.11, with the demanding customers, the discount stays low in the core, but the 
net discount in the CBM keeps increasing when the number of the customers increases. 
This implies demanding customers can get the higher discounts they want in the CBM. 
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Table 6.8 Effectiveness in the CBM and in the Core 
Effectiveness
 
Normal Buyers Demanding Buyers 
The CBM The Core The CBM The Core 
More Net Discount √ - √ - 
More Profit √ - √ - 
More Net Profit √ √ √ - 
More Total Benefit √ - √ - 
Table 6.8 shows that the customers gain higher discounts in the CBM in both 
scenarios: the one with normal buyers, and the one with demanding buyers. Because the 
CBM can really attract customers and encourage them go through with their purchases, 
the providers can earn more profits in it, even after part of the profits goes to the brokers 
as commission. A wise provider will definitely choose to join the group-trading in the 
CBM rather than stay in the core of a traditional market. 
Table 6.9 Effectiveness 




More Total Benefit Commission 
The CBM
 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
The Core
 - - - - - - 
Table 6.9 summarises the effectiveness in the CBM and the core. In the above 
comparisons, only eight orders are used. This is because of the high complexity in the 
core. But in the next section, because the CBM is capable of handling a large coalition, 
all 198 orders generated by the TCG in the two scenarios are used and the results 
obtained in the CBM are discussed. 
6.3 Effectiveness of the CBM in large Coalitions 
As mentioned in chapter 5, there are three providers and three market-brokers in group-
trading project S1, which is created by core-broker Ben. The CBM is built to deal with large 
coalitions. Without testing the CBM with a large amount of data, the evaluation would be 
incomplete and the effectiveness of the new model in a large coalition could be unconvincing. 
In subsection 6.3.1, the CBM is tested with 99 orders using the scenario of normal buyers. 
Within the order detail table in which every order is stored, there is a special field called 
‘expected discount’. This field allows customers to place the orders without committing 
to buy the items. The CBM will wait for the final discount to be settled and decide 
whether the purchase should go ahead or be dropped, by comparing the final and 
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expected discount. When the market-broker makes the orders that come from his buyers’ 
coalition into one market order, the highest of the expected discounts attached to each 
product, will be put on the market order, when the CBM performs the information-hiding 
process. In Table 6.10, order O25 is an example from a typical normal customer, who 
does not ask for high discount, just like the other orders in Appendix 5. 
Table 6.10 A Normal Buyer 
Order ID Customer ID Product ID Quantity Expected Discount 
O25 C35 Ca 12 0.03 
  Cb 14 0.19 
  Cc 24 0.00 
  Ra 22 0.15 
  Rb 32 0.07 
Table 6.11 A Demanding Buyer 
Order ID Customer ID Product ID Quantity Expected Discount 
H72 C182 Ca 6 0.37 
  Cb 8 0.18 
  Cc 15 0.17 
  Ra 31 0.31 
  Rb 8 0.17 
  Rc 9 0.09 
In subsection 6.3.2, the CBMS uses the 99 orders which come from the scenario of 
demanding buyers. A typical one would be Order H72 in Table 6.11, in which buyer 
C182 asks for an extremely high expected discount for every item. The order for each 
item will not be put forward unless the actual discount of the item has reached or gone 
beyond the level of the expected discount. With the results in these two scenarios it is 
possible to discover what the overall performance of the CBM will be. 
6.3.1 Scenario 1: Normal Buyers 
Fig. 6.12 shows the total benefits of the providers and buyers. At the point of 13 
customers, the graphs reach their peaks. This means that the items are fully sold out at 
this point. It also implies that all the customers commit their purchases because they can 
get the expected discounts they want. 




Figure 6.12 Total Benefits with Normal Customers 
 
Figure 6.13 Normal Customers’ Net Discounts 
The system divides the total number of customers into 3 equal portions and assigns a 
portion to each market-broker. For instance, every market-broker has 23 clients when 
there are 69 customers in the system. Fig. 6.13 shows that the discounts for MB1’s clients 
keep increasing and reaches its peak at the point of 40 customers. MB3 is the last one to 
submit his order and the graph shows that the sum of all the discounts of his clients is at 
its highest at the point of 13 customers, but the total discount becomes zero when there 
are more than 20 customers in the system. MB2’s graph shows that the sum of all the 
discounts of his clients is greatest at the point of 17 customers, but none of his clients gets 
any product at all at the point of 40 customers, which means MB1 has 40÷3+1=14 
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customers. This shows that MB1 gets all the items at this point, if he has more than 14 
clients, because he was the first to submit his order. 
It is MB1’s decision which of MB1’s clients can have the items, if MB1 has more than 
13 clients, but the principle should be FCFS. Those clients, who sent their orders to MB1 
the earliest, should receive the offers from the providers. The CBM processes orders by 
means of FCFS. It is a quick way to manage the orders, but the consequence is that only 
the customers, whose market-broker submitted the market orders early, have a good 
chance of getting the products. So FCFS is good for the clients if they have an efficient 
market-broker. On the other hand, it is a disadvantage to buyers who order early, if their 
broker submits late. Because market-brokers hide the customers’ information before they 
submit the orders, Ben does not know which customers ordered early. He has no way to 
secure a product for them. So market-brokers who delay the submission of their orders 
will receive plenty of complaints from their clients. 
 
Figure 6.14 Provider’s Net Profit with Normal Customers 
Fig. 6.14 shows that the CBM is good for providers because their profits can increase 
rapidly when they use it. The results of the CBMS for the customers and providers in the 
other scenario are given in the next subsection. 
6.3.2 Scenario 2: Demanding Buyers 
Fig. 6.15 shows that the graphs reach their peaks at the point of 15 customers. This is 2 
buyers more than in Fig. 6.12. This implies that the CBM can successfully convince the 
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demanding customers to buy, but it takes a little more time than the normal buyers need. 
The larger the coalition is, the bigger the total benefit should be to traders. But the total 
benefits drop, when the number of customers is more than 22. The unusual results in this 
scenario are reflected in the strange appearances of the graphs. 
 
Figure 6.15 Total Benefits with Demanding Customers 
Table 6.12 A Dead Product 








21 Rc 41 10% 8% 16% 15% 
22 Rc 41 0% 11% 16% 15% 
A term ‘dead product’ is used in this thesis, which is a phenomenon when a product is 
available, but no buyers can have it. This is because every order has an over-high 
expected discount on it. Table 6.12 reveals the reason why this causes a dead product. 
Product Rc’s stock is 41 and its volume discount is 10%. At the point of 21 customers, 
MB1 expects to have an 8% discount from Rc and he gets it, while at the point of 22 
customers, the expected discounts of all the market-brokers are greater than 10%. So Rc 
becomes a dead product. Most of the buyers in the second scenario demand for extremely 
high discounts. As the buyers’ coalition becomes larger, the chance for the coalition to 
have higher expected discounts in the market order will increase. It is easy for a core-
broker to deal with the dead product problem. Ben may inform the market-brokers and 
ask them to alter the expected discounts. He may also ask the supplier to adjust the 
volume discount for that particular item. 
Fig. 6.16 shows the graphs of MB2 and MB3 reach the peak at the point of 20 and 13 
customers respectively. The discounts for MB1’s clients keep increasing until at the point 
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of 43 customers. MB1 gets all the items when he has 43÷3+1=15 customers. This result is 
not significantly different from the last scenario, i.e. 14 customers. It is a good sign for 
the participants, as it shows that demanding buyers continue to make deals just like 
normal customers do. 
 
Figure 6.16 Demanding Customers’ Net Discounts 
 
Figure 6.17 Provider’s Net Profit with Demanding Customers 
In Fig. 6.17, provider 3 has an unusual graph. It reaches its peak at the point of 15 
customers, but it drops when the number of customers is more than 22 because of the 
dead product Rc. Provider 3 is the only supplier who provides product Rc, so the dead 
product reflects on his graph. The discounts for MB3’s clients are zeroes in the beginning, 
which is shown on his graph in Fig. 6.17. It is normal that demanding customers do not 
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buy if the price is too high for them. They begin to commit their purchases when the 
buyers’ coalition is big enough to have certain bargain power and get higher discount. 
The results in the two scenarios show that the CBM is capable of dealing with a large 
coalition. The CBM also shows its potential in attracting customers including demanding 
buyers, who want high discounts. Demanding buyers are quite common on the Internet 
and do not commit to their purchases easily. The CBM creates a win-win-win situation 
for customers, providers and brokers in the CBM. 
6.4 Effectiveness and Efficiency of the CBM’s Techniques 
The CBM adopts ten techniques, namely price lists and orders with expected discount, 
brokers, Internet computing, information-hiding, distributed computing, collaboration, 
FCFS, volume discount, stability check and the Shapley value. In order to determine the 
above ten techniques are useful in the new model, they are examined independently in 
this section to see their impact to the process time, cost, buyers’ discount, providers’ 
profit, fairness and data protection in group-trading: 
1. Price lists & orders with expected discount  − in economics, marginal utility 
functions are commonly used to express how traders quantify relative prices of goods 
and services. Because its difficulty in collecting from traders makes it inapplicable in 
real world e-commerce, price lists and orders with expected discount are used in the 
CBM. Price lists, which contain retail prices and discounts for each product, can 
express the prices which the providers are willing to offer. Adding expected 
discounts in orders can allow customers to place orders without being committed to 
buy the items. This is a good way to collect the data about the price buyers are 
willing to pay. It saves time and cost in information collection for market-brokers. 
Disadvantage − in order to increase the chance for market orders to get the items, 
market-brokers’ have to beware that there are over-high expected discounts on the 
customers orders. 
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2. Brokers  − the CBM creates a different channel of trading for both customers and 
providers and brokers play important roles in the trading. They are introduced into 
the CBM to smooth the trading process and maintain a healthy level of competition 
in e-markets. They may effectively increase the benefits of the traders in group-
trading. The personal information of customers can also be protected by them. 
Disadvantage − the commission for brokers is an extra expense for traders, but the 
results of the simulation system show that the brokers are worthy of such payments. 
3. Internet computing − Internet technologies and programming enable the CBM to 
involve e-markets. Internet has been able to penetrate all parts of the globe 24 hours 
a day and can easily bring great number of potential buyers into markets. It is 
beneficial for buyers and providers to participate in group-trading on the Internet. 
The distributed nature of the Internet can also efficiently reduce the process time of 
trading. 
Disadvantage  − involving multiple e-markets may be more costly than simply 
using one e-market. 
4. Information-hiding  − the personal information of market-brokers’ clients can be 
protected from others by using this technique. Hiding customers’ information and 
making orders of a coalition into a market order reduces the complexity dramatically. 
Disadvantage − the original times of customer orders are lost after the orders are 
combining. It is not fair to those customers who order early but their market-brokers 
submit market orders late. 
5. Distributed computing  − it can reduce the complexity in the core by using multi 
computers and e-markets and provide good results. 
Disadvantage − involving multiple computers may be more costly than simply 
using one machine. 
6. Collaboration  − without collaboration between the participants in group-trading, 
the CBM cannot function well and bring more benefits to buyers and providers. 
7. FCFS − this is a straight forward way of managing orders and is a quick way to 
process orders. 
Disadvantage − in order to ensure their clients obtain the items, the market-brokers 
have to be efficient and submit their market orders as quickly as possible. The CBM 
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may need to consider some solutions for being fair to the customers who order early, 
but whose broker submits late. 
8. Volume discount − high discounts attract both normal and demanding buyers. The 
results of the simulation also indicate that this brings more profit to providers. 
9. Stability check − it is an efficient way to ensure that a coalition is stable and not 
falling apart. A coalition, that passes this check, will have a best price for providers 
and buyers.  
Disadvantage  − it takes little extra time to calculate the stability of coalitions, but 
the time is worthy. 
10. Shapley value  − the CBM distributes profits among providers by using this. The 
results suggest it is a fair distribution. 
Disadvantage  – this increases computational complexity. 
Table 6.13 CBM’s Evaluations 
Technique Result Effectiveness Efficiency 
More Discount More Profit Fairness Data Protection Less Time Less Cost 
1. Price Lists & Orders 
with Expected Discount 
Information 
Collecting − − ㄨ − √ - 
2. Brokers Smooth Transaction √ √ − √ − ㄨ 








4. Information Hiding Less Information − − ㄨ √ √ − 
5. Distributed Computing Multi Computers − − − − √ ㄨ 
6. Collaboration Large Coalition √ √ − − − − 
7. FCFS Less Complexity − − ㄨ − √ − 
8. Volume Discount More Customers √ √ − − − − 
9. Stability Check Stable Set √ √ − − ㄨ − 
10. Shapley Value Fair Distribution − − √ − ㄨ − 
Table 6.13 summarises the results of these techniques in relation to effectiveness and 
efficiency. In this Table, √ is an yes and ㄨ is a no. It shows these techniques have all 
successfully produced the desired result in the new model. The CBM therefore creates a 
win-win-win situation for customers, providers and brokers in e-markets. 
6.5 Summary 
A simulation system was developed to evaluate the new model. The system contained 
a test case generator (TCG), a core simulator (CS) and a CBM simulator (CBMS) and 
was written in C# in the Visual Studio 2008 development environment. The TCG was 
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built to create data needed for the simulators. The CS was based on the concept of the 
core. The CBMS was constructed according to the pattern of the CBM. All the results in 
this chapter were produced in this system on a common personal computer with Windows 
Vista. Two sets of test data for the evaluations were produced by the TCG. The first set of 
99 orders comes from a scenario of normal customers where buyers do not expect a high 
discount. The second set of 99 orders is based on a scenario of demanding customers 
where buyers demand a high discount. 
Five criteria are used to judge between the core and CBM, namely distributed 
computing, computational complexity, incentive compatibility, efficiency and 
effectiveness. In distributed computing, the core might be used in an e-market, but it is 
difficult to apply it to multiple e-markets. The CBM enables a core-broker to make the 
best use more than one e-market. The computational complexity of both systems is 
evaluated. The big O notation of the CBM demonstrates that it is capable of reducing the 
computational complexity in a large coalition and dealing with a vast number of 
customers effectively and efficiently. 
Three incentives: an equilibrium price, volume discounts and a fair distribution are to 
be judged for both the systems. An equilibrium price may not be reached in the core, but 
there is an equilibrium price for traders in the CBM. Although both systems can offer 
volume discounts to customers, the fair distribution of profit in the CBM does not happen 
in the core. The efficiency of the CBM and the core are judged by the time and cost 
which they use to complete tasks. The CBM is more efficient than the core in collecting 
the necessary information to locate a stable set. It successfully reduces the computational 
complexity and executing time in group-trading, but there are extra costs in doing so, 
including some expenses involving multiple e-markets and the commissions for the 
brokers. 
There are effectiveness of data protection and fairness in the CBM. Because customers 
can get more discounts from group-buying and providers gain higher profits from more 
customers, the traders may get more benefits in the CBM than in the core especially in a 
large coalition. The results of the simulation system also show that the CBM can more 
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effectively allure demanding buyers when comparing the results in the core. The 
outcomes show both the providers and customers are significantly better off by using the 
CBM. 
The CBM is capable of handling a large coalition in the scenarios of normal customers 
and demanding customers are used. In the normal customers’ scenario, the results of the 
system show that all the customers can get the expected discounts they want. The CBM is 
good for providers, because their profits can increase rapidly when they use it. In the 
demanding customers’ scenario, the CBM can successfully convince the customers to buy, 
although it may take a little more time. The results support demanding buyers keep 
making deals in the CBM just like normal customers do. A problem referred to here as a 
‘dead product’ happening in orders with over-high expected discounts can be resolved 
easily by core-brokers. The results in the two scenarios show that the CBM is capable of 
dealing with a large coalition. The CBM also shows its potential in attracting customers 
including demanding buyers, who can be common customers on the Internet and are not 
easy to commit to their purchases. 
The CBM adopts ten techniques. An evaluation of these techniques was made based 
on the results of the CBM in relation to effectiveness and efficiency. They have all 
successfully produced the desired result in the CBM. In the next chapter, discussions 
about the CBM and the contributions of this dissertation are presented. The conclusion 
and suggested future works are also dealt with in the final chapter. 
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Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Future Works 
This research has created a new group-trading model. This aims not only to bring 
lower prices for buyers but to create higher profits for providers. While the survey of 
current e-markets in chapter 2 shows no sign of an online group-trading model, but there 
are plenty of joint-selling activities and many online group-buying sites. The former 
increases competitive advantages and benefits providers, and also provides ways for 
cartels to control price and thus is disadvantageous for customers. The latter have become 
very popular recently. A major problem of these models is that they lack ability to deal 
with the stability issue in coalitions, which therefore fall apart easily. The core, 
introduced in chapter 3, provides solutions to ensure a stable coalition, but certain 
problems of the core have hindered researchers from applying it to a real-world market. 
Building an online group-buying model can be a real challenge. The new model 
presented here is based on the core and adopts the additional solution concepts shown in 
chapter 3. In the case study of chapter 5, the CBM successfully creates a win-win-win 
situation for customers, providers and brokers in e-markets. In previous chapter, the 
comparison between the results of the two systems shows the CBM is superior to the core 
in terms of distributed computing, computational complexity, and incentive compatibility. 
The results of the simulation system demonstrate that the CBM can attract customers and 
deal with online group-trading problems in a large coalition. An evaluation of the 
techniques in the CBM was made showing that all of them have produced the desired 
results in the CBM effectively and efficiently. 
The new model has overcome a number of group-trading problems on the Internet. 
The six significant contributions of this research are listed in section 7.1. In order to make 
the model function properly, some conditions need to be met. Section 7.2 provides details 
of several assumptions used in the CBM. In the final section of this chapter, suggestions 
are made for the additional research needed in this field in the future. 
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7.1 Contributions of the Research 
The main contribution of this research is the CBM, but during the process of creating 
this new model for group-trading in e-markets, six additional issues have emerged which 
also make a contribution to knowledge in this field: 
1. The advantages and problems of group-buying models − there are four problems 
in group-buying models. The first problem is that they fail to overcome stability 
problems, so coalitions can fall apart easily. The second problem is that their markets 
are monopolies and they may fall foul of competition laws. The third problem is 
these models need to deal with high computational complexity when there are many 
customers perform group-buying in e-markets. Finally, providers on group-buying 
sites are liable to be overcharged. This research avoids the aforementioned problems 
and uses the following three methods which are expected to be effective in bringing a 
large number of customers onto group-buying websites: 
(a) Offering low price deals to customers. 
(b) Gaining benefits from using broking systems with fair and professional 
coordinators acting on behalf of both sellers and buyers. 
(c) Using the force of peer pressure to increase the size of buyers’ coalitions. 
Another contribution of this research is uncovering some of the advantages and 
problems of group-buying models. 
2. The advantages and problems of joint-selling − in this research, three reasons are 
advanced for using joint-selling, 
(a) It gives incentives to sellers: joint-selling increases the competitive advantage; 
achieves economies of scale and scope; reduces costs of transactions; contributes 
forming and maintaining a brand, for instance, and conducting advertising and 
initiating research together. 
(b) It gives incentives to buyers, new products, low prices due to low cost and better 
services through business partnering. 
(c) It reduces computational complexity: this greatly reduces the time taken to 
process trading transactions. 
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Joint-selling as developed in this research ensures that every seller has a fair share of 
the profits by using the Shapley value. Another contribution of this research is that it 
provides ways of taking part in joint-selling without violating competition laws 
thereby protecting the interests of consumers. A joint-selling agreement which 
restricts competition will not necessarily turn out to be a cartel. Agreements between 
companies leading to the development and improvement of products or services are 
encouraged and they are also good for consumers and markets. However, agreements 
to fix prices, limit production or sharing markets or customers, are considered out of 
bounds for the purposes of this research. 
3. The advantages and problems of the core concept − The core has three problems: 
(a) it can be effective only when the coalition is small, (b) its input is not easy to 
collect and additionally (c) its output is not always stable. Consequently, it does not 
seem practical for use in e-markets. The CBM inherits two important advantages of 
the core. Firstly, it provides a way to find a stable set, which is also a Pareto 
efficiency allocation. Secondly it gives that set incentive compatibility. 
One important discovery of this research has been that the core is not applicable in 
the real-world e-markets especially for a large coalition because its problems. 
4. A stability check for a coalition − in a stable coalition, there will be an equilibrium 
price, which is an important incentive for the participants. This best price is achieved 
when the quantity of goods that providers wish to supply matches the quantity that 
customers want to purchase. Detecting the stability of a coalition is crucial in this 
research. Without an equilibrium price, the members may lose interest in remaining 
in the coalition. However, determining the stability of the core is a NP-complete 
problem. A way to check the stability of a coalition has been given and any coalition 
that fails this check would be rejected by the CBM. Thus an important contribution 
of this research has been to use the stability check to ensure a coalition is stable and 
then to calculate an equilibrium price for its members. 
5. The use of brokers in group-trading − in order to avoid unequal member 
allocations, which are a common problem on group-buying sites, the person 
organising the group-trading session should not be a member of a coalition. In 
addition, unprofessional leadership of a coalition leads to a lack of commitment 
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among its members, and so it is concluded that group leaders must be specialists. 
This makes a broker a perfect candidate to manage a group. Brokers are brought in to 
manage transactions and to keep the competition in e-markets healthy. If each broker 
finds customers locally, some handling expenses like shipping or tax can be saved. 
The model will work better with a large number of participants. If several brokers 
work together, they may be able to find more buyers. When brokers collaborate 
together, it would be possible to form a large coalition on a global level and thus to 
attract a large number of buyers.  
One of the important contributions of this research is to involve brokers in the 
process of group-trading. 
6. The fees system of the CBM − the main revenue of broking systems and brokers 
comes from fees for the transactions. In order to be able to set up the fees for the 
CBS and the commission for the brokers, the fees for 15 popular marketplaces were 
investigated. Generally speaking, there are three types of fee which sellers are 
charged. These are: final value fees, online store fees and insertion fees. In the CBM, 
there are only two fees, a session fee and an online store fee for the CBS site. The 
commission for the brokers consists of a handling fee and a final value fee.  
A contribution of this research is a fees system for the CBM based on the fees 
systems of some real-world online marketplaces. 
Even though the model has overcome a number of problems and has made seven 
significant contributions to the area, some conditions need to be met in order for the 
model to function properly. The next section gives details of several assumptions used in 
the CBM. 
7.2 Limitations of the CBM 
It is accepted that several assumptions are made in the e-markets of the CBM. There 
are three different types of assumptions: negligibility, heuristic, and domain (Musgrave 
1981). Negligibility and heuristic assumptions describe “simplifications and idealised 
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cases of the real world respectively” (Lam 2010). The assumptions of the simple games 
in the beginning of chapter 2 relate to negligibility, while the presumptions of perfect 
competition in subsection 2.1.2 are heuristic. These two kinds of assumptions are too 
unrealistic to be used in a model such as the CBM, which is built to deal with real-world 
group-trading problems. 
A domain assumption is “a hypothesis concerned with the domain of applicability of a 
theory; it is the statement that theory T applies only if factor F is absent” (Maki 2000). It 
specifies the conditions under which a particular theory will apply. It also plays an 
important role in model development because it appropriately sets out the boundary 
conditions which must be present if the model is to function properly. Eight domain 
assumptions in the model are described next. 
The first assumption is about the information used in the CBM. There are four 
different levels of information: public-level, member-level, project-level and private-
level. The public-level information contains three documents: the project specifications, 
the product descriptions, and the price lists. They are displayed on the CBS website by 
the core-brokers and can be viewed by anyone. 
Member-level information can only be accessed by the members of the CBS site. 
Registering as a member on the site is free. Five tables, namely the project table, the 
project session table, the project providing table, the product table and the project price 
list table, are available for free download from the site by the members when they need 
them. Project-level information is the working data of a project and can only be shared 
between the brokers who work on the project. Private-level information is protected from 
people who do not own it. Providing information contains the stock and the unit price of 
a product from the suppliers. It is considered to be private and belongs to the core-brokers 
the suppliers work with, while the purchase details of the customers can only be accessed 
by their market-brokers. All the above information is stored in the CBM database and is 
provided in Appendix 4. 
The second assumption is that the stock of the items may be limited. In the CBM, 
quantity of sales depends on the amount of stock held by a provider. 
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The third assumption relates to the way that the orders are organised. The CBM 
manages the orders on a First Come, First Served (FCFS) basis. An order that arrives first 
will be handled first. If an order is submitted late, the required items may no longer be 
available, especially when the supply of products falls short of demand; the market-
brokers need to submit their order as quickly as they can. 
The fourth assumption is that the project does not offer multi-product volume discount 
to customers. For example, a customer has 10% and 12% discounts for buying products 
A and B respectively. In the CBM, discounting for the customer is based on the 
popularity of a product rather than size of order. If the customer purchases product A and 
B together, the discounts for each individual product stay unchanged. They are dealt with 
on their own and no extra discount will be offered, even though they have been bought 
together. 
The fifth assumption regards the products and services that customers receive. In the 
CBM, when customers pay for the orders, they receive electronic coupons from brokers. 
They can claim the real products and services from the providers printed on the coupons. 
Each coupon has a unique ID to ensure that one coupon may be redeemed only once. 
The sixth assumption is that no extra fee for shipping will be charged during the 
processing of transactions. In the CBM, all customers must leave email to brokers. They 
receive electronic coupons via e-mail from the market-brokers, which they can print out 
and exchange for products and services, when it is convenient for them to do so. Some of 
Amazon and eBay sellers offer apparently cheap goods but then charge very large 
‘postage fees’, which actually cover part of the cost of the item. Because the market-
brokers are not allowed to make a shipping charge in the CBM, any shipping costs must 
be borne out of profits, if the goods must be sent by post. This may be necessary if the 
product is too large or heavy for customers to pick up. 
The seventh assumption is about the commissions for brokers. The fees system of the 
CBM given in section 4.4 consists of four kinds of fees: a session fee, an online store fee, 
a handling fee and a final value fee. A session fee of £30 is paid by core-brokers every 
time they enter a listing for a session on a project on the site. An online store fee of the 
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CBS at £24.50 is a suggested monthly fee for market-brokers, who wish to open an 
online store on the site. The commission comes from two sources: a final value fee and a 
handling fee. The final value fee is paid by the providers to reward the brokers and is 7% 
of the final selling value. The handling fee is 10% of the extra discount, which the 
customer gains, after each of the brokers has processed the orders. 
The eighth assumption relates to the method of payment. The CBM offers alternative 
payment methods including bank transfers, PayPal and utility & debit cards. Bank 
transfers are regarded as secure and are a common and efficient way of making payments 
today. PayPal is an alternative safe way but it involves additional cost. In the case study 
of chapters 5 and 6, the providers and the core-brokers receive money by bank transfer, 
while customers pay for their items via PayPal. 
All systems are capable of improvement and some issues with the CBM can be 
identified. These issues are described in the next section as recommended improvements 
to the model and represent interesting avenues of future work. 
7.3 Future Works 
The ultimate goal of this research is to apply the CBM to perform group-buying tasks. 
This section outlines the main research recommendations to improve the CBM for the 
near future. They are: 
• Multi-product volume discount − It may be advantageous to abandon the fourth 
assumption of this research. Offering multi-product a volume discount to customers 
is actually a common method in the real-world market for attracting more purchases. 
Most customers do not stand a great chance of obtaining much benefit from 
discounts like this when they shop individually. When market-brokers bundle orders 
together, they may succeed in receiving extra discount through multi-product 
purchases. There is no doubt that they will be able to attract more customers to join 
the buyers’ coalitions if they can do this. 
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• Fair distribution − the CBM manages the orders by means of FCFS. The results of 
the simulation show that a late submitted order may get nothing, especially when the 
stock of a product is limited and its supply falls short of demand. If the policy is that 
people who order more are likely to get their orders fulfilled, it may encourage 
individual customers to make larger purchases. The Shapley value can be used here 
to decide how many items each customer may get, using the order amount as an 
initial estimate. 
• Real cases/situations − one future work of this research is to fitting the CBM on an 
enterprise. The results of the simulation based on sample values/situations may not 
represent all cases. More comparisons between the core and the CBM based on real 
data from the practical scenarios need to be done. There should be more details to be 
considered, for instance, the differences between manufacturers, distributors and 
resellers have to be taken on board, in order to map these different types of provider 
onto the CBM.  
• Cooperation with e-trailers − it is essential that a popular online shopping site is 
included in this model. It is the job of the market-brokers to find a suitable e-market. 
They must research current online sites and discover which rules, fees and related 
information apply to each e-market. The choice of e-markets for the project will have 
a dramatic effect on the outcome for the market-brokers. A list of e-markets and 
advice on how these online sites can be fitted into a group-trading project should be 
offered to the market-brokers on the CBS site. EBay is one of the popular online 
shopping sites in the world. It would be particularly interesting to include eBay in the 
CBM in the course of future research. The information about eBay in appendixes 1 – 
3 would be a good basis for the future works.  
• Services − it may be advantageous to consider selling composite services using the 
model. A service can be data, a database, a program or a system. New composite 
services can be produced easily by sharing and reusing existing services. It is 
beneficial for service providers to work together in coalitions, because if they do, 
they may use them to compose new composite services to attract potential buyers. 
Composite services can usually attract more buyers, because new promising services 
are always needed. Services may not appear in the same form for a very long time 
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and are usually supplied in a short-term context (Matear et al. 2000). It is crucial that 
service consumers should be able to have the services they want as soon as possible, 
because services are soon out of date (Matear et al. 2000). The CBM is efficient 
enough to deal with a large group of service consumers within a short time, and so 
can keep up with the changes. It has also shown its potential in handling online 
group-trading for composite services. 
From the list above, it becomes clear that there will be two main targets for future 
research. One main target will be to create more incentives for participants. Another 
target will be to expand the CBM by including particular e-markets and selling a great 
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Appendix 1 – EBay: an Online Broking System 
EBay provides online marketplaces for the sale of goods and services, online payment 
services, and online communication offerings to a diverse community of individuals and 
businesses internationally. Because it is one of the most successful stories in e-commerce, 
eBay provides an excellent basis from which to develop ideas about building a good 
online model for group-trading. One of eBay’ big successes arises from “being nothing 
more than an intermediary” (Burns 2011). The eBay website is a genuine online broking 
system. Only by viewing eBay from this standpoint, can its true nature be seen. Its online 
broking system is discussed here. 
The complexion of the online trading industry is changing almost daily. Even though 
it is not easy to overcome the competitive and market challenges, eBay's management 
team has managed to run eBay successfully. It increased its size from approximately two 
million registered users at the end of 1998 to 2.2 million as of December 31, 2006 (SEC 
2007). It has at the present time attracted more than 94.5 million active registered users, 
which are spread widely over more than 22 countries (EBay n . d . h). In 2010, its annual 
net revenues were US $9,156 million (EBay Inc. 2011). EBay is an excellent basis from 
which to develop ideas about building a good online shopping model. In this section, 
eBay is fully examined in order to harness some of its lessons in the new group-trading 
model for e-markets presented in this work. 
Being the most popular online marketplace in the world, eBay provides online 
marketplaces for the sale of goods and services, online payment services, and online 
communication offerings to a diverse community of individuals and businesses 
internationally. An introduction to eBay helps to gain a brief idea of what it is. EBay, an 
American Internet company founded in 1995, pioneered online trading and has become 
one of the fastest growing shopping websites. EBay’s site was launched on 4 September, 
1995, as ‘Auction Web’ and was later renamed ‘eBay’. EBay went public on 21 
September, 1998. In that year, it had revenues of US $4.7 million and 2.2 million active 
registered users (Bradley and Kelley 1999). In this subsection, the shopping process on 
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eBay is introduced. EBay provides the following eight topics to understand the eBay 
marketplace in more detail (EBay n . d . b): 
1. Membership and account − every user must register to be a member first. Users 
pick a username for their accounts and provide basic information including name, 
address, phone number and email address. 
2. Categories and searching − customers can search an item via categories, key words, 
popular products, themes or stores. The advanced search options can be used to 
further narrow their searches. 
3. Bidding and buying − buyers can place a bid for the maximum amount that they are 
prepared to pay and then the eBay system will bid on their behalf. A notification will 
be sent via email when someone has been outbid. Some items can be bought with 
‘buy it now’ prices, if their sellers allow this. 
4. Payment and postage − the money can be transferred using traditional methods like 
cheque or money order. Or buyers may pay for items through their PayPal accounts 
without giving personal information to sellers directly. 
5. Feedback − buyers and sellers leave feedback for their transactions. Other people 
will be able to refer to users’ feedback history to obtain a picture of their overall 
performance. Feedback is made up of comments, overall ratings and detailed seller 
ratings. Unlike the overall ratings, the detailed seller ratings are anonymous. 
6. Selling − sellers choose a title, pictures and a category for selling an item. And then 
they input descriptions, shipping information, length of the auction, a starting price 
and payment options. A ‘reserve price’ is an optional acceptable selling price. 
7. Communication − communication in the eBay market is via e-mail, but ‘eBay 
customer support’ can communicate with users using voice over Skype, and through 
traditional landlines and mobile phones. The ‘eBay resolution centre’ provides a 
communication channel for buyers and sellers to resolve transaction problems. 
8. Safety and security − the ‘eBay safety centre’ is created to keep eBay safe and to 
build trust between buyers and sellers. If buyers pay for their items through PayPal, 
they are under the ‘eBay buyer protection’ scheme, which protects buyers from online 
fraud and helps them get their money back if transactions go wrong. 
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Everyone can visit the eBay website, but only members are allowed to shop on it. To 
register an account on eBay is free. Members can shop for almost anything on eBay using 
the following five steps: (a) find an item from a seller; (b) learn about the item; (c) review 
the seller's feedback; (d) bid for the item and (e) pay for the item (EBay n . d . a). 
EBay allows everyday people who have a seller’s account, to sell practically anything 
by performing the following three steps: (a) create a listing; (b) manage the listing and 
(c) carry out the transactions with the buyer (EBay n . d . g). Members may also sell their 
items to make some extra cash, but they must upgrade their accounts to seller’s accounts 
first. This is free, but they must confirm their identity first. They then need to provide 
information to eBay about how they will pay their seller’s fees. The sellers need to pay a 
monthly fee to own an eBay Store. This can help sellers setup their own brands and so 
encourage buyers to buy more. 
A successful firm always has sound strategic management to keep the enterprise going 
and eBay is no exception in this respect. Only suitable strategies which come from good 
strategic management can give a company the ability to cope with changed circumstances 
arising from new technologies, new competitors, or a new environment. Good strategic 
management is so crucial because it provides a correct direction for an enterprise and 
keeps the enterprise going. No wonder eBay founder, Pierre Omidyar, has focused on 
designing a business model and overseeing eBay's strategic direction and growth. EBay’s 
market dominance is sustained by its sound strategies (Burns 2011), made by the 
powerful executives of eBay. 
Meg Whitman was one of the most successful executives of eBay. She served as 
President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of eBay from 1998 to 2008. On her first 
day in 1998, the eBay site crashed for eight hours (Champy and Nohria 2000). After a lot 
of painful changes, Whitman has successfully transformed eBay into a superb company. 
During her ten years with the company, she managed expansion from 30 employees and 
US $4 million in annual revenue to more than 15,000 employees and US $8 billion in 
annual revenue. No wonder that Whitman has received numerous awards and accolades 
for her work at eBay. The Harvard Business Review has named her the eighth-best-
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performing CEO of the past decade and she is the only woman of the top 100 performing 
CEOs (Hansen et al. 2010). 
As a result of the relentless implementation of its strategic objectives, eBay had met 
with significant success. Not only was the company financially profitable from the first 
day, but it has won many prestigious honours and awards. Among the most significant 
was the US national medal of technology and innovation for advancing global 
entrepreneurship in 2008. EBay was the first Internet firm to receive this national 
technology award, from President Bush at the White House (Bucki 2008). EBay’s sound 
strategic management sustains its position and has put it amongst world leaders in online 
broking for some time. 
Unlike other e-commerce stores, eBay does not deliver goods - it operates purely as an 
intermediary between providers and consumers (Cabral and Hortaçsu 2005). The 
mediating website of eBay is actually an online broking system. An online broking 
system is an online system acting as a broker. How eBay has achieved success when 
attempting to handle the problems were raised when designing a broking system is the 
main focus here. 
One of the biggest successes of eBay has been the development of a ‘virtuous circle’ 
to attract more buyers and sellers (Burns 2011). EBay is simply the trading platform. 
Buyers use eBay’s online broking system to find the items they want, and to place their 
bids. A virtuous circle starts from a situation where ‘more buyers attracted more sellers’. 
Sellers pay to setup their own auction. The circle then comes around to a position where 
‘more sellers cause higher level of competition’. It then reaches the point where a ‘higher 
level of competition lowers the price of auctions’. The circle finally comes to ‘low prices 
of items attract more customers’. Then it will iterate again and so the circle continues. 
EBay is a virtual business, a “network of independent companies, suppliers, customers 
- even rivals, linked by information technology to share costs, skills and access one 
another’s markets” (Byrne 1993). Virtual companies use networks as intermediaries to 
ally with other companies and create and distribute products beyond the limitation of 
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their organisational boundaries or physical locations. Additionally, eBay has other 
successful strategies that ordinary virtual companies do not have. 
One of the important strategies of eBay has been to make its site fully automatic, 
relying on software rather than people. Firstly, eBay tries to let its customers do all the 
manual operations. It sells advertising space to sellers. Sellers setup their stores and lists 
manually. Buyers operate their bids manually. Communications, shipping, payment and 
feedbacks are arranged between traders manually. EBay holds no stock and its 
involvement in the trade is minimal. In the trading process, users interact with the system 
only. The manual tasks for eBay take place mostly in Customer Services and 
Communications, which is its weak area, because eBay does not focus on that part at all. 
Secondly, eBay tries to make the kernel of its business as ‘virtual’ as possible. It has 
bought software companies, such as iBazar, PayPal, Skype and StubHub, to gain 
exclusive use of their technologies and make the auction process more efficient. 
Strengthening its relationship with PayPal is part of this strategy. EBay basically 
generates revenues from sellers. Encouraging traders to use PayPal means that eBay also 
turn buyers into clients. EBay also earns off-site revenues when the PayPal account is 
used in non-eBay transactions. In addition, the competition within the eBay e-market is 
very stimulating for traders who enter it. With so many members, no other shopping site 
could have created such a healthy trading environment in its own right as the eBay site 
has. 
Undoubtedly, the eBay market is one of the best trading places for traders. Individuals 
can find almost any goods they want. They can buy and sell products or services on the 
site with safety. The eBay site is an online broking system and it plays its broker role 
well. Its sound strategic management sustains its position and has put it amongst world 
leaders in online broking for some time. Fig. A1.1 shows that its annual revenues 
increase every year, but it also reveals the fact that its power to earn revenue has been 
weaker in the last three years. Poor Customer Services and Communications has been one 
of the biggest causes of the weakness. EBay has many competitors now 
(VentureBeatProfiles n . d . ) and some of them have been getting stronger recently, such 
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as Bonanzle (Crum 2009). It may be time for the directors of eBay to consider new 
strategies to sustain eBay’s market dominance. 
 
Figure A1.1 History of eBay’s Revenue (Nasdaq n . d . b ) 
The research topic in this thesis is group-trading, but eBay does not provide group-
trading for traders. Sellers can list as many identical items as they wish in one fixed price 
listing on eBay (EBay n . d .  g), but this is not group-trading at all. People can connect 
with others who share similar interests through communities in eBay (EBay n . d . f). For 
instance, the members of ‘simply stamp’, a community for stamp-collectors, can chat and 
exchange stamps with each other, but they cannot perform any group-trading activity in 
these communities on the site. In other words, the answer to the initial question is a ‘No’, 
because the communities in eBay are not really designed for group-trading. EBay should 
definitely consider adopting group-buying for its business model, especially after it 
pulled out of Taiwan (EBay financial 2006). Things have not been going smoothly in 
China either (Wang 2010). ); it should take note that online group buying is extremely 
popular there. 
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Appendix 2 – Fees System of eBay 
EBay is a broking system and its main revenues come from the commissions on 
transactions. The revenue of the brokers comes from commission paid by the customers. 
Of course, higher commission usually brings better services from brokers, but if there are 
fewer customers they may object to paying such a high price for commission. Deciding a 
reasonable fee which will please both brokers and customers is a problem. Different 
companies have various different ways of charging. EBay’s main revenues come from 
the commissions on transactions. EBay’s fees and the details of eBay’s commissions are 
discussed here. Some principles for setting up commissions in the model have benefited 
from eBay’s practice here. When selling items on eBay, sellers pay certain fees to eBay. 
Although the fees are quite complex and based on various factors and scales, primarily 
they include ‘insertion fees’ and ‘final value fees’. 
Table A2.1 ‘Buy It Now’ Insertion Fees 
Category  Normal sellers  Basic shop  Other shop  
All categories, except those listed below £0.40 £0.20 £0.10 
Media-related £0.20 £0.10 £0.10 
Property £35 £35 £35 
Mobile phones with contract £7.95 £7.95 £7.95 
Table A2.2 Auction-Style Insertion Fees 
Category  Starting price  Insertion fee  
All categories, except those listed below £0.01 - £0.99 No fee  
 £1.00 - £4.99 £0.15 
 £5.00 - £14.99 £0.25 
 £15.00 - £29.99 £0.50 
 £30 - £99.99 £1 
 £100 or more £1.30 
Media-related £0.01 - £0.99 No fee  
 £1.00 or more £0.10 
Property Any price (single or multiple items) £35 x number of items 
Mobile phones with contract Any price (single item) £7.95 
 Any price (multiple items) £19.95 
Insertion fees need to be paid whenever a seller lists an item on eBay, even if the item 
is not sold (EBay n . d . e). Before sellers list their items, they have to decide whether each 
item will be listed as an item with a fixed selling price or with final selling price decided 
by buyers in an auction, which begins at a low starting price. The seller will pay a ‘Buy it 
now’ insertion fee when the item has a fixed selling price. The eBay fees for sellers are 
varied in different countries. All the tables in this subsection are based on the eBay fees 
system in the UK. In Table A2.1, the various insertion fees for a fixed-price item are 
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given. Sellers will pay auction style insertion fees, when they auction their items. In 
Table A2.2, the various insertion fees for auctions depend on the starting price. 
As shown in Tables A2.1 and A2.2, items listed in the various categories have 
different insertion fees. EBay charges different insertion fees if items are categorised as 
media-related, technology-related, mobile phones with contracts or property. Media-
related refers to items listed within the following categories: books, DVDs and games, 
with a sub-category of video games, and music. Technology-related refers to items listed 
within the following categories: mobile and home phones, computing, consumer 
electronics and photography. The range of eBay’s insertion fees is large, ranging from 
£0.0 to £35 per item. The fees vary depending on the format under which the item is 
listed. So, eBay takes from £0.15 to a maximum rate of 3% for an ordinary listing. 
EBay provides optional features for sellers to help increase the number of bids and to 
give them a better chance of selling their items successfully. The insertion fees for items 
can be higher, if the sellers choose to use these optional features to help their selling. 
EBay encourages sellers to list an item at a low starting price. The insertion fee is zero 
when the starting price of an item is between £0.00 and £0.99. EBay also encourages 
sellers who have an eBay store, to list their items at a fixed selling price. In Table A2.2, 
the low insertion fees for eBay shops are given. There are certain requirements for sellers 
who wish to open a shop on eBay. There are three types of shop: ‘basic’, ‘featured’ and 
‘anchor’. The requirements for a ‘basic shop’ on eBay are less stringent than for the other 
the kinds of shop. Thus it is easier for sellers to apply for a ‘basic shop’ rather than 
another type of shop but a ‘basic shop’ has higher insertion fees than the other shops. 
A low starting price encourages people to bid, but a reserve price can protect sellers 
from selling an item for too little. When a seller sets the insertion fee for an auction-style 
listing it is dependent on the reserve price and not the starting price. The item will not be 
sold until the bidding meets the reserve price. Until the bidding reaches the reserve price, 
the listing will display ‘reserve not met’ under the current bid. There is no obligation to sell 
to the highest bidder until the reserve is met. Reserve prices must be set at £50 or more. 
Table A2.3 shows that the insertion fee is 3% of the reserve price. 
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Table A2.3 Auction-Style Insertion Fees (with Reserve Price) 
Category  Reserve price  Insertion fee  
All categories, except those listed below £50 - £99.99 £1 + 3%  
 £100 or more £1.30 + 3%  
Media £50 or more £0.10 + 3%  
Mobile phone with contracts £50 or more (single item) £7.95 + 3%  
 £50 or more (multiple item) £19.95 + 3%  
Property £50 or more (single item) £35 + £2  
Table A2.4 ‘Buy It Now’ Final Value Fees 
Category  Final selling price  Final value fee  
All categories, except those listed below £0.99 - £49.99 9.9% of the final selling price up to £49.99 
 £50 - £599.99 £4.95 + 5.9% of the final selling price of £50 or more 
 £600 or more £37.40 + 1.9% of the final selling price of £600 or more 
Media-related £0.99 or more 9% of the final selling price 
Technology-related £0.99 - £29.99 5.25% of the final selling price up to £29 
 £30 - £99.99 £1.57 + 3% of the final selling price of £30 or more 
 £100 - £199.99 £3.67 + 2.5% of the final selling price of £100 or more 
 £200 - £299.99 £6.17 + 2% of the final selling price of £200 or more 
 £300 - £599.99 £8.17 + 1.5% of the final selling price of £300 or more 
 £600 or more £12.67 + 1% of the final selling price of £600 or more 
Mobile phones with contracts £0.99 or more No fee 
Property £0.99 or more No fee 
When an item sells, the seller will be charged a final value fee based on a percentage 
of the item's final selling price (EBay n . d . e), which does not include shipping and 
handling costs. The final selling price for a fixed-price item is known as the ‘buy it now’ 
price. In Table A2.4, the different final value fees for fixed-price items in the various 
categories are given. In Table A2.5, the various different final value fees for items sold in 
auction style are given, according to the different categories. So, the final value fee is 
from 0.75% to 10% of the final price. 
Table A2.5 Auction-Style Final Value Fees 
Category  Final selling price  Final value fee  
All categories, except those listed below £0.01 or more 10% of the final selling price (up to a maximum of £40) 
Mobile phones with contract £0.01 or more No fee 
Property £0.01 or more No fee 
The final selling price of an item decides the actual final value fees that the seller has 
to pay to eBay. In a ‘Buy it now’ list, the final selling price is setup at the beginning of 
the transaction. On the other hand, in an auction style list, the final selling price of the 
item is not revealed until the end of the auction. The buyer who has the highest maximum 
bid will be the winner of an auction style item. Because the eBay system places bids on 
behalf of buyers, the final selling price is usually less than the highest price that the 
bidder is willing to pay. If sellers are selling their items at a fixed price, as part of the 
listing process they can choose Best Offer. With Best Offer, sellers give buyers a chance 
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to negotiate the price. Just like an auction style item, the final selling price of the item is 
not decided until the end of the transaction. 
Table A2.6 PayPal Fees 
Purchase payments received (monthly)  Fee per transaction  
£0.00 - £1,500.00  3.4% + £0.20  
£1,500.01 - £6,000.00  2.9% + £0.20  
£6,000.01 - £15,000.00  2.4% + £0.20  
£15,000.01 - £55,000.00  1.9% + £0.20  
above £55,000.00 1.4% + £0.20  
When sellers receive a payment in their PayPal account, they are charged an additional 
fee by PayPal. Sending a payment via PayPal to another trader on the eBay market is free, 
but the one who receives the payment needs to pay ‘PayPal fees’ to eBay. Table A2.6 
shows that the standard rate for receiving payments for goods and services is 3.4%, but if 
a person receives more than £1,500.00 per month, the fees can be as low as 1.4%, based 
on the volume of sales in the previous month (PayPal n . d . ). 
The most widespread way to pay or to receive payment for a transaction on eBay is 
via PayPal. It is the easiest and fastest way to pay when compared to other online 
payment methods. Most people choose PayPal, because it is safer. It provides protection 
for its users as they make their purchases. If there is a problem, they can get their money 
back. In addition to eBay fees, sellers must pay an extra 1.4~3.4%, if buyers pay via 
PayPal. Table A2.7 is an example about an auction-style item with a reserve price £99.99. 
The item has a starting price £14 and a final selling price £150. 
Table A2.7 An Example 
Format  Category  Starting Price  Reserve Price  Final Selling Price  Shipping & Handling  
Auction style Basic fees  £14  £99.99  £150  £30  
Table A2.8 Result of the Example 
Insertion Fee  Final Value Fee  PayPal Fees  Total  
£4  £15  £6.32  £21.32  
Table A2.8 shows the results of the example. The insertion fee is £1+£99.99×3%=£4. 
The final value fee is £150×10%=£15. The PayPal fee is £0.2+£180×3.4%=£6.32. So the 
total fee for the seller is £21.32. The ecal website offers a free online tool to calculate and 
compare a seller’s eBay and PayPal fees (Ecal 2011). This site may save some money for 
the sellers if they try it before they list an item on the eBay site. 
EBay fees for a transaction include insertion fees and final value fees. The insertion 
fee is up to 3% of the starting price. Sellers who have eBay shops get reduced rates on 
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insertion fees. The final value fee is from 0.75% to 10% of the final selling price in the 
UK. EBay’s final value fees will begin depending on Total Value (TV) (Steiner 2011). 
TV is the total price of an item including shipping fees and handling costs. In Table A2.9, 
the final value fee is (£150+£30)×10%=£18. So the fees for sellers will be higher than 
before. 
Table A2.9 Result of the Example (TV) 
Insertion Fee  Final Value Fee  PayPal Fees  Total  
£4  £18  £6.32  £24.32  
Amongst the fifteen shopping sites analysed in chapter 3 and also referred to below, 
eBay charges a higher than average final value fee. It charges users the highest online 
store fee, £349 as well. In most of the shopping venues, listing an item is free. EBay 
seems to be the only site which charges different insertion fees for different listing 
formats. It does not seem fair to ask the seller to pay for insertion fees and final value 
fees at the same time. About PayPal fees, critics also say that this is a way for eBay to 
"double dip" on its fees (Kidman 2008). 
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Appendix 3 – Performance of the eBay Website 
The overall performance of an e-commerce website, and how well it meets people’s 
expectations, may have a dramatic effect on whether customers want to come to the 
website to shopp. EBay today owns the largest marketplace in the world and is possibly 
the most successful web-based enterprise in existence. No other online company has ever 
attracted so many buyers and sellers to an e-marketplace. As it is the most popular e-
market in the world, its website is a useful model to study when building an e-market. 
The performance of the eBay website is brought to the fore and examined by some of the 
criteria suggested by researchers of e-commerce websites. The results of an open 
Auctionbytes.com survey are discussed here. This will give a clearer idea of how good 
the performance of the eBay website is. 
Developing websites that meet users’ requirements is critical for all managers and 
designers. Website design can benefit from the application of usability principles 
(Nielsen 2000). It is necessary to have a closer look at the website to decide whether its 
Web design add utility to the success of eBay. 
Usability is the measurement of how easy it is for users to use a website. It can also 
measure the time users take to accomplish a particular task. Or it may be the degree of 
satisfaction users experience after executing an operation as well. These principles 
suggest the need for easy-to-use navigation, frequent updating, minimal download times, 
relevance to users and high-quality content that takes advantage of the capabilities of the 
online medium (Nielsen 1993). The criteria of usability for the eBay website, therefore, 
include ease of reading, of searching and of getting a user’s tasks done, clarity of 
interaction, arrangement of information, consistency, layout and speed. 
The usability of the eBay site seems to be all right for most of users. The speed of 
downloading photos on the site can sometimes be quite slow. Perhaps, this is due to too 
much traffic on the site. An open survey gives an even clearer idea of how good the 
performance of the eBay website is. 
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On 24th of January in 2010, an open survey of online marketing companies was made 
by Auctionbytes.com. Over 1,400 sellers were asked to rank 15 marketplaces on a scale 
of 1-10 based on five criteria: Profitability, Customer Service, Communication, Ease of 
Use and Recommendation (Steiner 2010 a). Over 98% completed the survey. The results 
contain much useful information and reveal the general view of sellers about the different 
e-marketplaces and the eBay website in particular. The results show that online sellers are 
a tough crowd, sixes and sevens were generally the highest grades received on a scale of 
1 to 10. The average scores of each criterion in the survey are shown in Table A3.1. 
Table A3.1 Auctionbytes.com Survey in 2010 
The result implies that the eBay website is not high in usability as a selling venue 
either. EBay was ranked on Ease of Use poorly, only twelfth out of fifteen as a 
recommended selling site. One respondent said “this is absolutely the best site for the 
small to medium sized seller to start and operate a business”, while another said it is “a 
little harder to figure out for beginners as far as trying to list an item” is concerned 
(Steiner 2010 b). Sellers complained that the site was slow-to-load. EBay got a rating 
5.27 (Steiner 2010 b). This indicates that the site has all the necessary functions for users. 
However, as the largest marketplace, eBay clearly needs to address a number of problems 
in usability. 
EBay gets the most sales and had the highest number of respondents who had 
experienced selling there. The number of eBay sellers is twice more than the second 
highest number on Craigslist. The result reflects the fact that selling goods on eBay is 
popular. However, in the survey, eBay was one of the lowest ranked marketplaces, and 
was the weakest in terms of Customer Service and Communication (see Table A3.1). The 
This item has been removed due to third party copyright. The unabridged version of the thesis can 
be viewed at the Lanchester Library, Coventry University.
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great volume of customers is putting a terrific strain on eBay’s customer service. Some 
sellers commented that fees were eating into their margins. From the 800 comments of 
respondents, “it was difficult to find any that didn't include some anger or angst” about 
eBay (Steiner 2010 b). 
In 2010, the goods sold on eBay totalled US $62 billion - more than US $2,000 every 
second (EBay n . d . d). The respondents ranked eBay ten out of fifteen (see Table A3.1) 
and rated its Profitability as 4.83 out of 10 (Steiner 2010 b). It is definitely not the profit 
that makes sellers want to sell on the site. Sellers on the eBay site earn little profit, so that 
more and more consumers come to the site and hunt for bargains. It is probably the 
gigantic base of buyers that motivates sellers to list their products for auction on the site. 
Of course, with a huge customer base, eBay has encountered many different problems. 
In order to overcome the problems of usability on the eBay website, eBay has been 
making a series of upgrades, intended to make the site more friendly to buyers, especially 
after the company expanded beyond its auctions business into an Internet telephone 
service with its acquisition of Skype, event ticketing with StubHub and comparison 
shopping with Shopping.com. Whitman said “We have to make sure our old users stay 
with us, but we’re going to be more bold around product changes than we’ve been in the 
past” (Tedeschi 2007). 
According to the survey, eBay's recent changes do not meet customers’ needs. Sellers 
complained that the site has had too many changes. A number of respondents even said 
they would have given eBay a rating of ten on Ease of Use 3 to 5 years ago. Of course, 
1134 respondents could not speak for millions of sellers on the eBay site, but eBay 
should regard it as a warning. However many big sellers such as Sheng have benefited 
from the changes (Swartz 2010). "I have seen more dramatic changes in the last three 
years at eBay than in the previous 10 years" said Sheng (Swartz 2010), who was the first 
eBay seller to hit 2 million in his user feedback comments.  
In spite of many complaints from sellers, eBay has made some good changes from 
which it has derived considerable benefit in an era of social media and real-time customer 
service. EBay has done a "remarkable job" focusing on innovation and opening the 
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PayPal platform, says former eBay executive Maynard Webb (Swartz 2010). "As a 
company, we needed to be more customer-driven and technology-driven" John Donahoe 
said (Swartz 2010). Since Donahoe took over as CEO in early 2008, eBay had made its 
name in innovation with new technology including (a) improving the site's e-commerce 
technology; (b) expanding eBay's mobile capability; (c) Orchestrating a series of 
acquisitions that reinvigorated the hardy online auction pioneer; and (d) Opening up 
PayPal (Swartz 2010). 
PayPal is an e-commerce business allowing money transfers to be made through the 
Internet. On October 3, 2002, PayPal became a wholly owned subsidiary of eBay 
(Wolverton 2002). Encouraging customers to use the PayPal service is one of eBay’s 
policies. EBay will only accept PayPal in payment for some particular categories. In July 
2010, BBC News announced that “auction site operator eBay has reported a 26% rise in 
profits for the last three months thanks largely to increased use of its PayPal service” 
(BBC News 2010). PayPal - the easy way for buyers to pay online - seems to be well 
accepted by users and brings more benefits to eBay 
The results of the survey show that the superiority that the eBay website has over other 
websites may not be a consequence of its website design. It also suggests eBay needs to 
improve its poor customer service and communication. 
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Appendix 4 – CBM’s Database 
The database in the CBM is designed so that the core-brokers and market-brokers can 
manage and store all the data they will need to fulfil their tasks in the group-trading. Fig. 
A6.1 is an Entity - Relationship diagram of the CBM. 
 
Figure A4.1 Entity-Relationship Diagram 
It is comprised of the 13 entities. Except the relationship between entities ‘order’ and 
‘invoice’, which is one on one, the other relationships are all one to many. For example, 
one project can have many project sessions. The physical tables are described as follows: 
• Project table − the project information containing a project ID, a project 
specification, a project initiation date, a project closing date and the ID of the core-
broker initiating the project. Users may find the details of the broker in the broker 
table by using the core-broker’s ID. 
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• Providing table − this table holds the information about the products from the 
suppliers. These may be products not included in a particular bundle selling project. 
The composite key of this table consists of a supplier ID and a product ID. The other 
fields are the stock, the retail price and the cost of a product, which is the minimum 
amount that the supplier will charge. Clearly the actual selling price of a product 
cannot be less than the cost of a product, if brokers and providers are to make a profit. 
• Project providing table − this table holds the information about products in a 
bundle selling project whereas the previous table listed all the available products. So 
the data in this table can be finalised only after the core-broker has made an 
agreement with each of the suppliers of the project. A bundle selling project can have 
multiple products and therefore this table has a composite key, which consists of a 
project ID and a product ID. The remaining fields in this table are the stock, the retail 
price and the cost of a product. 
• Project session table − there may be many selling sessions in one project. Its 
composite key consists of a project ID and a session ID. It also has fields for the 
starting date and the end date of a session. 
• Supplier table − this table can only be accessed by the core-broker of a project. All 
core-brokers have one supplier table of their own to store the information of the 
possible supplier they may be considering for a project. The key of this table is the 
ID of a supplier. This table should contain fields for the name, the email, the phone 
number, the address and the postcode of a supplier. 
• Product table − the key of this table is the ID of a product. This table contains fields 
for the product description. 
• Project price list table − there are different discounts that depend on the quantity of 
items purchased. As an example, Table A5.1 shows that if between five and ten 
items are purchased, there will be a 5% discount for product Cup in project PA, but if 
it is between eleven and twenty, 12% discount will apply. The larger the quantity of 
a product on an order, the higher the discount the buyers may get. The composite key 
of this table is the project ID and the product ID for each discount range. There are 
three additional fields in this table: the range number, the minimum quantity and the 
discount for the range. 
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Table A4.1 Volume Discount for a Product 
Project ID Product ID Range Number Minimum Amount Discount 
PA Cup 1 5 5% 
PA Cup 2 11 12% 
• Broker table − this table stores the basic information about the brokers. Its key is the 
ID of a broker. It contains fields for the name, the email, the phone number, the 
address, the postcode, the bank account, the PayPal account, the password and the 
URL of a broker. Brokers can log into the CBS by using their broker ID and 
password. In the CBM, brokers receive money via bank accounts, and market-
brokers receive customer’s payment via PayPal accounts, so these account fields 
cannot be empty. 
• Project session broker table − in a project session, the core-broker can have several 
market-brokers. Therefore, it has a composite key, which consists of a project ID, a 
session ID and a broker ID. It also has fields for order ID, order time, notice date, 
total and received payment from each market-broker. 
• Supplier offer detail table − a product in an order may be offered by more than one 
supplier. The primary key of this table consists of three fields: supplier ID, order ID 
and product ID. It has another field for the quantity of the product offered by the 
supplier. 
• Order table − the information that is stored under an order, contains an order ID, a 
description about the order, the date/time ordered, the shipping address of the order, 
and the ID of the market-broker to whom the order belongs. The date/time ordered is 
the actual date/time when the market-brokers submit their orders to the core-broker. 
In the CBM, when the customers have paid, they will receive coupons from the 
market-brokers at the shipping address. If the shipping address of the order is empty, 
it will be filled with the address of the customer in the customer table automatically. 
• Order detail table − an order may contain multiple products and therefore this table 
has a composite key, consisting of an order ID and a product ID. The remaining 
fields in this table are the quantity ordered, the expected discount, the actual quantity 
and the actual discount of a product. The actual quantity and discount are blank at the 
beginning. 
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• Invoice table − the information stored under an invoice contains an invoice ID. The 
invoice consists of a description, a date/time, a total payment, a shipping address, a 
shipping date, an order ID and the market-broker ID to whom the invoice is sent. 
Every market-broker needs to store the information about customers and the order from 
the customers in the local database, which is accessed by this market-broker only and has 
the following four tables: 
• Customer table − this table stores the basic information about customers and can 
only be accessed by the market-broker who created it. The market-broker will wish 
to keep the information in this table from others. Its key is the ID of a customer. It 
contains fields for the name, email, PayPal account, phone number, address and 
postcode. In the CBM, customers send money via PayPal accounts, so the PayPal 
account field cannot be empty. 
• Customer Order table − the information that is stored under an order, contains an 
order ID, a description about the order, the date/time ordered, the shipping address of 
the order, and the ID of the market-broker to whom the order belongs. The date/time 
ordered is the actual date/time when the market-brokers submit their orders to the 
core-broker. In the CBM, when the customers have paid, they will receive coupons 
from the customers at the shipping address. If the shipping address of the order is 
empty, it will be filled with the address of the customer in the customer table 
automatically. 
• Customer Order detail table − an order may contain multiple products and 
therefore this table has a composite key, consisting of an order ID and a product ID. 
The remaining fields in this table are the quantity ordered, the expected discount, the 
actual quantity and the actual discount of a product. The actual quantity and discount 
are blank at the beginning. 
• Customer Invoice table − the information stored under an invoice contains an 
invoice ID. The invoice consists of a description, a date/time, a total payment, a 
shipping address, a shipping date, an order ID and the customer ID to whom the 
invoice is sent. 
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Appendix 7 – Interfaces of the TCG 
 
Figure A7.1 Main Menu of the TCG 
When users choose to input customers’ personal details manually by pushing button 
‘Append Customers Manually’, they can enter the data in the two following screens: 
 
Figure A7.2 1st Page of Customer Personal Details Maintenance 
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Figure A7.3 2nd Page of Customer Personal Details Maintenance 
Table A7.1 Code for Using SQL in a C# Program 
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The data can be generated automatically by pushing button ‘Append Customers 
Automatically’ and this can be done by executing a C# program. The sample codes in 
Table A7.1, are a typical example of a program which will perform this kind of task.  
When button ‘Append Provider’s Offers Randomly’ is pressed, this generator will 
create a random amount which will be what the providers offer for each product. The 
program to generate this is shown in Table A7.2. 
Table A7.2 Codes for Generating Provider’s Offers Randomly 
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Figure A7.4 Offers from Two Providers 
Assume the number of market-broker, provider and order are 3, 2 and 6 respectively. 
When ‘List Provider’s Offers’ is executed, the offers from the two providers is shown in 
Fig. A7.4. The details of the six orders are displayed in Fig. A7.5 after the ‘List Orders’ 
button is pushed. 
 
Figure A7.5 Six Orders 
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Appendix 8 – Interfaces of the CS 
 
Figure A8.1 Main Menu of the CS 
The first step to find the results of the core in the CS is to push button ‘Combinations 
Append’ and to store all the possible combinations of providers and customers in tables. 
If the number of the combination is large, in this stage, it can take long time to complete. 
 
Figure A8.2 ‘Combination Append’ Button 
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Fig. A8.3 shows all the possible combination by pushing ‘Combination List’ button. 
 
Figure A8.3 Possible Combinations in the Core 
 
Figure A8.4 ‘Discount Calculate’ Button 
The next step is to push ‘Discounts Calculate’ and calculates all the discounts for all 
the combinations. 
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Figure A8.5 The Core 
A core can be found by pressing ‘Find Core’. In Fig. A8.5, the results reveal that 
combination 36 is the core. Its profit for the providers is £3026.23 and its discount for the 
customers is £1826.71. The profits for P1 and P2 are £1899.04 and £1127.20 respectively. 
The discounts for O01, O02, O03, O04, O05 and O06 are £532.87, £923.62, £79.52, 
£251.94, £241.58 and 0 respectively. 
The number of items sold is shown opposite where the pair ‘P1 and P2’ is listed for 
the second time in Fig A8.5. When the group ‘O01, O02, O03, O04, O05 and O06’ is 
mentioned for the second time in same figure, the number of product purchased by every 
order is shown opposite. 
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Appendix 9 – Interfaces of the CBMS 
 
Figure A9.1 Main Menu of the CBMS 
 
Figure A9.2 ‘Broker Providing Append’ Button 
In order to perform joint-selling in this case, the products for sale have to be 
channelled through core-broker Pen and let him be the only provider to customers in the 
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first stage of the CBMS. In Fig. A9.2, button ‘Append Broker Offers’ can accomplish this 
task for users. In Fig. A9.3, Pen has put all the providers’ offers together. The retail price 
for each product is the average of the providers’ retail prices and the cost is derived in the 
same way. 
 
Figure A9.3 Core-broker Pen 
 
 
Figure A9.4 ‘Core Combinations Append’ Button 
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The second step is to push the ‘Append Broker Combinations’ Button in Fig. A9.4 and 
the resulting combinations are shown in Fig. A9.5. Because customers are performing 
group-buying here, many orders are combined so that the items can be purchased on a 
wholesale basis. 
 
Figure A9.5 Possible Combinations in the CBM 
 
Figure A9.6 Calculate Discounts for the Possible Combinations 
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The third step is to push the ‘Calculate Discounts’ button and this will calculate the 
discounts for all the orders including the original and the combined ones. 
 
Figure A9.7 The Stable Set and Profit for Providers 
The stable set can be found by executing ‘Core Stability Check’. The CS and the 
CBMS are using the same data – the same providers’ offers and the same customers’ 
orders. The results of both simulations can therefore be compared. In Fig. A9.7, 
combined order ‘B0’ is the new stable set. Its profit for the providers is £8274.76 and its 
discount for the customers is £6766.87, which are much better than those that the core 
produces. 
The total discounts for each market-broker’s group depend on the products they 
purchase. In Fig. A9.7, opposite where the group ‘B1, B2 and B3’ is first mentioned, the 
discount for each product can be found, and when ‘B1, B2 and B3’ is repeated below that, 
the figure shows the number of items that the group gets. 
 There are only two providers. The number of items sold is shown opposite where the 
pair ‘P1 and P2’ is listed for the second time in Fig. A9.7. Opposite the first mention of 
the pair ‘P1 and P2’ in the same figure, the total benefits and the individual profits and 
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discounts for each product are shown, after they have been fairly distributed by using 
Shapley value. Table A9.1 shows the codes used to calculate Shapley value. 




Appendix 10 Published Papers Relating to the CBM 
 
This section has been removed due to third party copyright. It consists of copies of the 
following papers. The unabridged version of the thesis can be viewed at the 
Lanchester Library, Coventry University. 
 
 
Sun, P., et al. (2006) ‘Core-based Agent for Service-Oriented Market.’ In Lee, T. and Zhou, 
M. (ed.) Proceedings of 2006 IEEE International Conference on Systems, Man, and 
Cybernetics (SMC’06). Held 8-11 October at The Grand Hotel, Taipei, Taiwan. Piscataway, 
New Jersey: the IEEE Inc.: 2970-2975 
Sun, P.,  et al. (2009) ‘Extended Core for E-Markets.’ In Isaias, P., White, B. and Nunes, M. 
B. (ed.) Proceedings of IADIS International Conference WWW/Internet 2009 Held 19-22 
November at Rome, Italy : IADIS Press: 437-444  
Sun, P.,  et al. (2012 a) ‘A Core Broking Model for E-Markets.’ In Proceedings of The 9th 
IEEE International Conference on e-Business Engineering (ICEBE 2012) Held 9-11 
September at Zhejiang University, Hangzhou, China: IEEE Press: 78-85 (19.7% acceptance 
rate) 
Sun, P., Odetayo, M., Iqbal, R., & James A. (2012 b) ‘Evaluations of A Core Broking 
Model from the Viewpoint of Online Group Trading.’ In Proceedings of The IEEE 
International Conference on Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management (IEEM 
2012) Held 10-13 December at Hong Kong Convention and Exhibition Centre, Hong Kong, 
IEEE Press: 1964-1968 
 
 
 
